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ABSTRACT
Jing Teresa Zhou: Analyses of Physician Labor Supply Dynamics and its Effect on Patient Welfare
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
My dissertation focuses on the supply side of health and labor economics in order to inform policymakers
who seek to address physician shortages and thus improve patient welfare in the United States.
The first chapter evaluates the determinants of physician geographic and professional movement within
North Carolina (NC) using a dynamic discrete choice model designed to analyze labor supply behaviors of indi-
viduals over time. I jointly model the initial specialty, activity, location, facility, and hours of direct patient care
of all physicians in NC from 2003 to 2012 using a full information maximum likelihood estimation approach
that allows for correlation of unobserved determinants. Using the parameter estimates from the dynamic model,
I simulate several policy interventions aimed to attract and retain physicians in rural and underserved areas. I
find that loan forgiveness policies are less effective at decreasing the probability of movement and increasing
retention in the same rural county than an increase in the reimbursement rate. An increase in midlevel practi-
tioners decreases retention in rural areas and increases the likelihood of a physician becoming inactive, while an
increase in registered nurses in rural areas significantly increases physician retention.
The second chapter evaluates the relationship between physician supply and patient welfare. Ambulatory
care sensitive conditions (ACSC) are preventable or manageable with access to a primary care physician (PCP)
and medication, but progression of ACSC tends to lead to costly hospitalizations. Results from existing litera-
ture on the causal effect of PCP supply on ACSC admissions are mixed. These mixed results can be explained
by the endogeneity issue (i.e., the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term) that arise from simul-
taneous causality and omitted variables bias. This chapter addresses the endogeneity problem in the literature
and correctly identify the true effect of PCP supply on patient welfare by using exogenous policies related to
Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) designation at the county level. Using data from NC and Regression
Discontinuity (RD) design, I find that a decrease in PCP supply leads to a significant increase in the number of
the ACSC admissions, and vice versa.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States in 2014 was around 17.4 trillion dollars, almost
7 trillion dollars more than the second largest economy. Perhaps even more mind-boggling is the fact that one
out of every six dollars spent in the US that year is spent on health care (i.e., 17 percent of GDP went toward
national health expenditures, NHE, compared to the 10 percent world average), in the form of physician office
visits, surgeries, medicines, and new investments in medical research.1 In the US, twenty percent of total NHE
constitutes physician and clinical services, which is the second largest category after hospital care (32%).2 In
addition to its substantial monetary cost, adequate physician presence is essential to patient welfare. However,
undersupply of physicians is a pressing health issue in the US and around the world. Concern exists among
the public that a continuing physician shortage will drive up medical care costs, increase waiting times, shorten
office visits and, generally, decrease overall patient welfare.3 A significant amount of research has shown that,
instead of an aggregate shortage, there is a maldistribution of physicians both geographically and by specialty
in the US. Existing physician supply models challenge our ability to understand incentives, with the objective
of promoting equity of access, since they do not consider in detail the physician and location characteristics
that affect physician location decisions. Multiple programs (federal and state) have been created to increase
physician supply to meet physician shortages. However, these programs have had limited success at maintaining
physician presence in underserved areas.
My dissertation addresses the supply side of the health care market using both economic theory and empirical
strategies in the form of two stand-alone papers in the following chapters. My first paper (Chapter 2) focuses on
building a holistic physician supply model captures the employment behavior of physicians in the US. Existing
physician supply models challenge our ability to understand incentives, with the objective of promoting equity
of access, since they do not consider in detail the physician and location characteristics that affect physician
1Health expenditure, total (% of GDP): World Health Organization Global Health Expenditure database, The World Bank.
2National Health Expenditure Data, 2014: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics
Group.
3Smith, Yolanda. Physician Shortage. News-Medical.net, 30 June 2016, www.news-medical.net/health/Physician-Shortage.aspx.
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location decisions. My paper evaluates the determinants of physician geographic and professional movement
within North Carolina (NC) using dynamic empirical models designed to analyze the behavior of individuals
over time. I jointly model specialty, practice location, facility type, and hours worked of all physicians in
NC from 2003-2012. I also study the determinants of physician movement within NC by race and ethnicity,
which has not been studied in detail. In order to address these questions, I collected physician data from the
NC medical board, which tracks all physician movement across NC. I obtained the physician licensures of
all board-certified physicians in NC from 2003-2012 and used the information to construct a database that
includes physician demographics, specialty, location of practice, facility type, and hours worked for each year
an individual physician practices in NC over this period. I have also merged the physician-level information with
county-level information from Log into NC (LINC), and with constructed salary variables from the Hospital and
Healthcare Compensation Service (HHCS) and NC Occupational Employment Statistics (OES).
Using the model I built, my research informs policies aimed to attract more physicians to underserved
communities and to maintain their presence in order to achieve equity of health care access in the US. However,
in reality, there has not been an amelioration of this problem due to the low retention of physicians in underserved
areas. In this paper, I find programs that forgive medical school debt if a physician serves in a rural area is less
effective at retaining physicians in rural areas than an increase in reimbursement rates, which increases the
physicians salary. In another words, loan forgiveness programs are a short-term solution to a long-term problem.
I also find a change in other medical care providers or support staff also affects physician behavior, where
mid-level practitioners (i.e., physician assistants, advance nurse practitioners) decrease retention and increase
physician transition to inactivity-and are thus a substitute for physicians- while an increase in Registered Nurses
(or RNs), a complement to physicians, significantly increases retention in rural areas.
In my second paper (Chapter 3), I shift my attention to evaluate the effect of physician presence on patient
welfare. The question remains that whether an increase of physician supply from federal and state policies
improves health of the population in the long run. I use the same dataset of physicians and county characteristics
I built from the aforementioned chapter and combined it with all hospital discharges in NC to evaluate the effect
of the number of primary care physicians on preventable hospital admissions, or Ambulatory Care Sensitive
Conditions (ACSC), in NC. Because existing studies provide mixed results on the subject, I use the Regression
Discontinuity (RD) design, to correct the statistical deficiencies in the literature. I find that an increase in the
supply of primary care physicians (PCP) significantly decreases hospital admissions for preventable ailments.
From a cost-benefit analysis, a increase in the number of PCP in underserved areas is more beneficial to patient
welfare, because it is less expansive to treat preventable ailments with regular visits to primary care physicians
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than waiting for acute manifestations of these ailments that results in hospital admissions.
The combined analyses and results from the two chapters address the mechanisms that impact the physician
labor force and the effect of physicians on patient welfare through rigorous econometric methods. My disser-
tation improves upon existing models in both health economics and health policy by evaluating a wide range
of factors that influence physician geographic and professional movement as well as uncovering the beneficial
effect of access to physicians on patient health.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DOCTOR IS IN/OUT: DETERMINANTS OF PHYSICIAN LABOR SUPPLY DYNAMICS
2.1 Introduction
Two concerns about physician labor supply dominate the academic literature and the popular press: short-
age and maldistribution. The American Medical Association (AMA) contends that their data, used by the US
Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) to calibrate physician workforce models, uncover sig-
nificant current and anticipated shortages.1 Other researchers (Zurn, 2004; Dussualt, 2006; and Dorsey, 2011)
argue that there exists a maldistribution of physicians both geographically and by specialty, which leads to a
shortage of certain types of doctors in some areas and a surplus in other areas. Indeed, a frequent observation
about physicians is the clustering of specialists in metropolitan areas and a shortage of physicians in rural areas.
Some argue that an important contributor to this uneven distribution is financial barriers that prevent individuals
who would be the most likely to serve in primary care and in underserved areas from entering the profession
(Vaughn, et al., 2010; Dorsey et al., 2011). Others emphasize that physicians tend to be attracted to areas with
complementary staff in order to practice effectively (Stange, 2003; Roblin et al., 2004; MGMA, 2016). Others
argue that current health care system regulations that require a substantial amount of documentation by physi-
cians have reduced the time available for direct patient care and could potentially increase burn out (Christino, et
al., 2017). Efforts to mitigate these concerns require an understanding of determinants of physician labor supply
decisions regarding specialty, geographic location, facility type, hours worked and continued practice over one’s
career.
Current leading models of physician supply, developed by the AMA, USDHHS and American Association of
Medical Colleges (AAMC), aggregate physician behavior to the national or state level, while ignoring individual
preferences shaped by gender, race, and experience as well as within-state variations in physician demand,
supply conditions, and location amenities. A recently-developed interactive tool, the FutureDoc Forecast Tool,
1Shortage, in this context, does not embody the full characterization used by economists, which suggests that demand exceeds supply
due to pricing irregularities in the labor market (i.e., in a competitive market, wages should adjust to equate supply and demand). The
AMA, USDHHS and other medical organizations use the term physician shortage to describe a situation in which there are not enough
physicians to treat all patients in need of medical care. Thus, policy recommendations are targeted toward training and retention of
physicians.
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improves upon the three models by allowing some physician mobility and disaggregation to the county level.2
The forecasting model, which uses inventory projections from historical data on separation and arrival rates,
does not attempt to explain what drives observed physician employment behaviors.
I formulate and estimate a dynamic model of physician behaviors that includes initial specialty, activity
(whether or not to remain active), location, facility, and hours of direct patient care. I use the population of
licensed physicians in North Carolina (NC) over 10 years (2003-2012) to explore the underlying factors that ex-
plain the professional behaviors of physicians. An economic model of mobility decision-making motivates a set
of estimable, correlated, and dynamic labor supply equations whose probabilities or densities form the likelihood
of observed physician employment outcomes in the research sample. In addition to individual-level explanatory
variables such as gender, race, and age, time-varying county-level characteristics that capture location-specific
quality of life, number of physician substitutes or complements (i.e., advanced nurse practitioners, physician as-
sistants and registered nurses) and potential demand shifters help identify endogenous individual behaviors over
time. The endogenous histories of behaviors (i.e., work experience, lagged hours worked, facility choices, etc.)
also explain current behaviors. I use the estimated data-generating process to simulate the effects of potential
policies likely to affect physician migration patterns such as loan forgiveness, increases in service reimbursement
rates, midlevel practitioner or registered nurse growth, and changes in Medicare/Medicaid coverage.
To simulate the existing loan forgiveness programs that aim to attract and retain physicians in rural areas, I
allow for a lump sum wage increase of $200,000 for all rural physicians in one year. Although the simulated
policy is the most generous version of the loan forgiveness program, I find that it does not significantly decrease
the average likelihood of movement nor does it decrease the probability of moving one or two years of service in
a rural area (i.e., retention). However, an increase in the reimbursement rate in rural counties via a proportional
increase in average salary has the potential to increase physician retention in rural areas. A 5-percent increase
in rural county salaries decreases the probability of moving after one year by 11.7 percent and moving after
two years by 6.7 percent. Male physicians are more responsive to the policy change than female physicians
and, for both groups, there is a decreasing marginal return to a larger increase (10 or 20 percent) in salary.
Other policies that impact physician movement and retention involve changing the composition of other medical
care professionals. A 5-percent increase in midlevel practitioners in rural counties increases the probability
of moving after one or two years by 15.7 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. The policy also significantly
increases the likelihood of a physician exiting the labor force by becoming inactive. A 5-percent increase in
2This statistical model and forecasting tool was developed by researchers at the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Servcies Research at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and funded by The Physicians Foundation. https://www2.shepscenter.unc.edu/workforce/
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RNs in rural counties significantly decrease the probability of leaving after one year and two years of service
by 13.8 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively. These findings offer a new understanding of the effectiveness of
policies that attempt to change physician behavior and increase retention in rural and underserved areas.
In the next section, I review the relevant literature regarding physician labor supply. Section 3 describes data
from the North Carolina Board of Medicine, Log into NC and the Physician Compensation Survey and details
construction of the research sample. Section 4 presents a theoretical discrete choice framework that motivates
the empirical model detailed in Section 5. Results are presented and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
and provides a discussion of future research.
2.2 Literature Review
Leading physician supply models in the policy research literature simplify physician employment behavior
by ignoring many physician characteristics such as race and experience as well as detailed location charac-
teristics. Most of the existing models also aggregate physician labor supply to the national or state level by
estimating the historical probability of physician inflow and outflow, while disregarding physician preferences
and within-state variations. For example, the most commonly used Physician Supply Model (PSM) developed
by the AMA and USDHHS is an inventory model that tracks the supply of physicians by age, gender, country of
medical education, type of degree and medical specialty. The model uses historical data to determine the prob-
ability that physicians will remain active from year to year and the annual number of hours worked in patient
care at the national level. The model takes the number of physicians at time t (starting with the base year 2000),
adds in new additions to the physician labor force (i.e., new US medical graduates and international medical
graduates) and subtracts attrition each year (due to retirement, death, and disability), arriving at the physician
supply for year t + 1. The extrapolation of the supply of physicians and hours worked is assumed to be linear
in the probability of retirement or death, the probability of being accepted into medical school, graduation from
medical school, and other probabilities based on age, gender and specialty. The PSM does not address the heavy
presence of physicians in metropolitan areas and severe shortages in rural or poor areas, does not consider move-
ment at the state or county levels, and does not include other individual characteristics such as race or exogenous
location-specific amenities or medical market characteristics.
Moving beyond the projections of the PSM models, the health economics literature also compares and
contrasts employment behavior by physician characteristics. Panel data analysis of Canadian generalists finds
that there is little impact of age on hours worked (Crossley, Hurley, and Jeon, 2009). It also verifies that female
physicians work significantly fewer hours on average than male physicians but the aggregate decline in hours of
direct patient care from the 1980s through the mid-1990s is not differentially explained by decreases in hours
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worked over all age or gender groups. Similar results are found for US physician supply (Weisman et al.,1980;
Fossett, et al., 1990). Female physicians tend to have higher retirement rates and to work fewer hours in direct
patient care, and female physicians are concentrated in pediatrics and psychiatry and are underrepresented in
general surgery and other medical subspecialties (Kletke et al., 1990). Although there is a growing representation
of female physicians in the labor force, the supply of physicians continues to reflect differential selection of
specialty by gender.
The economics literature on labor mobility highlights the role of individual preferences for location char-
acteristics. Although higher (lower) wages and better (worse) economic opportunities are often credited as the
major factors that induce general migration into (out of) an area (Muth, 1971; Olvey, 1972; Greenwood, 1985;
Partridge and Rickman, 2006), studies have shown the importance of location-specific amenities and positive
quality of life measures as drivers of general migration (Cushing, 1987; McGranahan, 1999; Green, 2001; Deller
et al., 2001; Cebula and Payne, 2005; Gunderson and Ng, 2006). In seminal work by Roback (1982), the author
claims that better amenities would drive down wages and drive up rents, but individuals would rather trade off
higher wages and pay higher rents to live in those communities. Building on the same principle, Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994, 1995) incorporate Smith’s (1985) compensating differential and extend the Roback model in
the presence of unemployment. These papers assume free mobility of labor because when migration is costly,
workers are more likely to view the decision to migrate as an investment. However, Clark et al. (2003) find
that when there are both pecuniary and psychic costs associated with moving, households are generally more
responsive to undercompensation between income and location characteristics than overcompensation (i.e., the
household perceives a higher opportunity cost of not moving than moving, conditional on the compensation
level at the destination and at the origin being the same). These theories tell us that, for an agent with a high
wage, there exists a high marginal cost of living in a location with relatively low amenities because, for that
person, the marginal benefit of having better amenities is high. Therefore, the agent is more likely to move to an
area with relatively higher amenities and lower wages.
In addition to the amenity and wage trade-off literature, a number of studies find that high-income individuals
have small or negligible labor supply elasticity with regard to earnings (Pencavel, 1986; Roed and Strom, 2002).
Showalter and Thurston (1997) extend their research on white-collar professional labor market decisions to US
physicians and focus on tax effects. They find that self-employed physicians are sensitive to marginal tax rate
changes, but the effect is small and insignificant for employed physicians. Since physicians are some of the most
highly paid professionals in the US,3 the literature hypothesizes that they are more likely to accept a decrease in
3According to the US Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the annual real median personal income is $31,099 in 2016 and the
7
income for better amenities and the earnings elasticity of labor supply is small.
Recent empirical economic studies use dynamic panel data models and structural discrete choice models to
study labor supply (Rizzo and Blumental, 1994; Scott, 2000; Saether, 2005; Baltagi et al., 2005; Cheng et al.,
2013; Wang and Sweetman, 2013; Kalb et al., 2015; Andreassen et al., 2013; Broadway et al., 2017). Rizzo and
Blumental (1994) evaluate the effects of both income and non-labor income on US physician labor supply among
self-employed physicians. They find that the income effect of an earnings change for male physicians is negative.
Controlling for the income effect, a one percent increase in wages leads to a 0.49 increase in labor supply. Using
Norwegian hospital data between 1993-1997, Baltigi et al. (2005) find labor supply elasticities are around 0.3,
but they do not control for physicians heterogeneity across specialties. Saether (2005) uses a static random
utility labor supply model and finds that a wage increase causes a small response in total hours and reallocation
of hours within the sectors with increased wages. Broadway et al. (2017) estimate a structural, discrete choice
model of labor supply and after-hour care (AHC) in a sample of Australian general practitioners. They find that
physicians are more likely to increase after-hour care if their daytime-weekday hourly earnings increases, but the
effect is very small. Yet, in another setting, hourly wage increases actually reduce the probability of providing
AHC, especially among male physicians. The results lead them to conclude that wage increases appear to be, at
best, relatively ineffective in incentivizing increased provision of AHC and may even prove harmful if incentives
are not well targeted. None of these studies explicitly consider each of the relevant professional decisions of
physicians over time nor do they differentiate behavior by race, gender, facility type, or specialty. In addition,
they are unable to measure the short- and long-run effects of potential policies that may dynamically impact
behaviors through location and facility changes.
My work contributes to the physician labor supply literature by estimating a dynamic model of physician
employment behavior (i.e., initial specialty, annual location, facility type, and hours of direct patient care) that
accounts for physician preference shifters (i.e., gender, race, age, experience), location-specific amenities, and
medical care market characteristics. The ability to separately identify the importance of these factors and to
quantify the heterogeneous impact of these factors on physician employment decisions allows us to evaluate
the impact of financial incentives that may vary by individual characteristics. Using the estimated parameters
of the dynamic data generating process, I simulate the behavior of physicians over time under different policy
scenarios.
annual real mean personal income is $50,756. For US physicians, BLS reports a median annual income of $206,920 and mean annual
income of $205,560.
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2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Before presenting an economic model of location decisions and professional behavior of physicians, I begin
by describing the data that are available. The specific structures of these data inform and dictate the empirical
modeling in important ways. The first section details three sources of data, describes variable construction, and
summarizes the variables used in analyses. The second section describes the constructed annual income data
and the last section describes the county-level medical care market and local amenity characteristics.
2.3.1 Physician Level Panel Data
The North Carolina Physician Licensure Database from the North Carolina Medical Board provides annual
physician-level data from 2003 to 2012. The data are collected and released by the North Carolina Health
Professions Data System (HPDS). The database tracks the universe of physician applications for NC medical
licenses, which must be renewed annually. It provides a comprehensive view of the physician labor force in the
state and allows a researcher to track the movement of all physicians within the state across time.
Prior to May 2009, the state allowed two methods for annual license renewal: paper and electronic. Com-
plicated to process and prone to mistakes, paper applications have been phased out in favor of an electronic
renewal process on the NC Medical Board website. Because medical licenses are time delimited, the Board
sends a renewal notice two months before each physician’s deadline (dated as his/her birthday). On average,
the electronic renewal process takes about 15 minutes because the information regarding education history, de-
mographics, and work history often remains unchanged. If a physician changed location of practice, facility
type, or specialty, they must update this information. Many physicians also provide updates when they decide to
become inactive, by indicating retirement or other reasons. Inactive physicians that annually update their status
can avoid a time-consuming reinstatement process should they decide to return to practice.4
If a physician fails to renew the license on time, a grace period of 30 days is provided and the physician
is charged an additional late fee. If renewal is not completed during the grace period, the license is placed on
inactive status and it is illegal to practice medicine or surgery, write prescriptions or administer prescription
drugs in NC under any circumstances. If the inactivity period is less than one year, it is necessary to pay an
additional fee and undergo a background check to reactivate the license.
However, if there has been an interruption in the continuous, clinical practice of medicine greater than two
years, the applicant may have to reestablish his or her competence to practice medicine safely to the Board’s
4Among physicians who become inactive by notifying the board, rather than failure to renew, the four most common reasons are:
primarily engaged in medical research and/or teaching, employment in a non-medical field/industry, temporarily out of the labor force,
and retirement.
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satisfaction, in accord with GS 90-14 (11a). The reinstatement procedure might entail, and is not limited to, full-
scale assessments, engagement in formal training programs, supervised practice arrangements, formal testing
(Board Examination), or other proofs of competence. The Board is much more likely to require a physician who
has not maintained annual notification of reason for inactivity to undergo these competency procedures.5 Such
decisions are made on a case by case basis.
After a physician submits his/her application, the information is processed and updated in HPDS. Basic
information in the database includes an ID number to identify the physician through time (not the board license
number), gender, race, age, medical school, internship, residency, location of practice, facility type, and practice
specialty.
The data obtained from the Medical Board include 43,765 uniquely-identified physicians or a total of
293,835 person years over the period 2003-2012. These person-year observations include all instances where
physicians maintained either active or inactive status in NC; 5,427 physicians are never active in NC and 5,339
physicians appear only once in the sample. I restrict the research sample to the longest spell of continued com-
munication with the Board for each physician. I do not include multiple spells within the observation period of
the data because I do not observe a physician’s activities between spells and therefore cannot construct relevant
variables that explain re-entry into the NC physician labor force. Prior to selection based on the longest spells,
person-year observations for which location, facility type or hours worked is missing and cannot be intelligently
imputed are considered a break in a spell; 2,518 physicians are missing employment location that cannot be
filled in and 573 are missing facility or specialty. The research sample also includes physicians with at least two
years of observation in order to model location transitions. With these necessary removals, my research sample
contains 29,908 uniquely-identified physicians who contribute two to 10 years of observed practice behaviors,
for a total of 187,402 person-year observations. Conditional on being active in NC and having renewed their
license by the next period, there are 165,668 person-year observations in the sample.
This rich dataset allows me to explore the professional behavior of physicians practicing in NC. Among
those in my research sample, duration of practice in NC is unknown because I do not observe how long a
physician has been in the state when first observed in 2003. However, years of experience as a Board-certified
physician are available. In the research sample, 19.94 percent of physicians ever report zero years of experience;
these are new entrants to the profession who initially locate in NC. Despite the large entry rate, I only observe
physicians in NC and cannot explain a physician’s decision to locate in NC. Because the attrition rate is small
5Updated requirements for medical license renewal process comes from the North Carolina Board of Medicine:
http://www.ncmedboard.org/renewals/renewal type/category/physicians.
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(i.e., 2.5 percent move out of NC and 1.7 percent become inactive), I have chosen to focus on the determinants
of movement within the state.
Activity and Location
Using the zipcode and its respective FIPS code provided in the data, I define the primary county of practice
for each active physician. Location variables (zipcode and county) define physician movement from one year
to the next as well as whether the location is rural or urban. Because physicians are not required to provide a
residential address, my research cannot differentiate residential location from employment location.
The partial equilibrium model that motivates my empirical analysis considers annual employment location
decisions of physicians. An empirical analysis of physician location decisions might consider all zipcodes or
metropolitan areas as the relevant set of location alternatives. It is computationally infeasible, however, to allow
location alternatives to include each of the 850 zipcodes across the 100 counties in NC. Additionally, consistent
time-series data on location amenities are not available over time at the zipcode level. Finally, data on medical
care market characteristics are likely to vary at the county level and, generally, may not change at the zipcode
level. Hence, efforts are made to reduce the set of location alternatives.
Aggregation from zipcode to county results in 102 location alternatives (i.e., move to any of the 100 coun-
ties, move out of NC, or become inactive), which presents too many alternatives for a multinomial logit estima-
tion that also includes unconditional explanatory variables.6 I examined county-to-county moves to determine
whether consideration of adjacent counties only might be a reasonable way to narrow the choice set. To demon-
strate the complexity of county-to-county movement, Figure 2.1 shows the origination and destination counties
for physicians who moved from 2003 to 2004, with the end destination for each move indicated by a black arrow
and the blue dot is the centroid of the county.
To make clear the variety of destinations, Figure 2.2 focuses on movement of physicians from one county
(Orange County) in one year (2003-2004). Orange County is one of the most populated counties in NC and
contains a large, public research and teaching hospital. In one year, there were 27 physicians who moved from
Orange County (denoted by blue lines) and 13 physicians who moved to Orange County from other counties
(denoted by red lines). Although physicians may move to neighboring counties, the majority of moves were
across the state to non-neighboring counties. Physician movement out of urban Orange County also included
both rural and urban destinations (where urban counties are denoted in green and rural counties are denoted in
6In the Appendix, I show results from a 102-alternative conditional multinomial logit model with county-level characteristics from all
100 counties and a mixed multinomial logit model with both county-level factors and a few individual-level characteristics. Here, I
can allow specifically for both push and pull county level factors to explain location transitions. However, I prefer the model presented
in this chapter because it allows me to include more physician characteristics in order to explore heterogeneous effects of location
characteristics on movement.
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Figure 2.1: Physician Movement within NC, 2003-2004
blue). Table 2.1 shows the average distance (in miles) of moves within NC using centroid to centroid calculation
at the county level, where the average distance for all physicians who moved is around 61 miles.
Figure 2.2: Physician Movement to and from Orange County, 2003-2004
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Average Distance of Moves in Miles
Year Mean Std Min Max Median Freq
2004 87.48 63.33 13.72 433.36 74.97 367
2005 63.09 59.35 8.93 378.74 38.09 1241
2006 62.86 60.50 8.93 434.60 37.03 1117
2007 60.84 53.50 12.17 407.36 38.68 729
2008 61.59 57.15 12.17 413.89 38.38 818
2009 59.68 54.77 11.26 373.75 37.31 1062
2010 53.57 50.03 11.26 341.64 33.50 863
2011 61.34 56.58 11.26 384.85 38.68 916
2012 52.56 50.06 8.93 376.61 32.22 1076
Total 60.78 56.38 8.93 434.60 38.09 8189
Note: Statistics are based on 8,189 physicians who moved to a different county
within NC in any given year.
To further explore movement, I summarize physician location within NC by urbanicity/rurality of the county
and of the zipcode within the county in Table 2.2.7 Around 73.3 percent of physicians employed in an urban
county are in an urban zipcode, while around 14.2 percent of physicians in a rural county are in a rural zipcode.
Table 2.2: Location by Urbanicity/Rurality of County and Zipcode
Urban Zipcode (%) Rural Zipcode (%) Marginals (%)
Urban County (%) 73.26 6.43 79.69
Rural County (%) 6.14 14.17 20.31
Marginals 79.40 20.60 100.00
Note: Statistics are based on 165,668 person-year observations among active physicians including
their first year in the sample.
Conditional on being active in NC in a given year, a physician may remain in the same location of employ-
ment in NC, move within NC, move out of NC or become inactive in the next year. Table 2.3 shows the activity
and location outcomes by year. Over 83 percent of year-to-year observations involve no change in activity or
location, 12 percent involve a move within NC and 2.5 percent involve a move out of state, while less than two
percent of transitions are to inactivity. A majority of the physicians who changed zipcode of employment moved
7I follow the county urbanicity/rurality definition used by the Sheps Center. I construct the zipcode urbanicity/rurality distinction based
on population density (described in detail in the Appendix).
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within the county instead of out of the county. Among active physicians in NC, 12 percent change zipcode of
employment. Of physicians who moved, 60 percent moved within their counties, while 26 percent moved out
of the county to an urban zipcode and 14 percent moved out of the county to a rural zipcode. In light of the
computational and data constraints discussed above and in an effort to preserve the urban/rural distinction that
characterizes zipcodes and counties, I differentiate location alternatives in the empirical model by moves within
and across counties and by urbanicity/rurality of the destination zipcode as summarized in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Activity and Movement by Year
Activity and Movement
Year
Remain in the
Same Location
in NC
Move within
NC
Move out of NC
Become
Inactive
2003 91.75 3.98 1.84 2.43
2004 76.41 17.96 4.26 1.37
2005 80.37 14.12 3.15 2.36
2006 86.92 9.17 2.22 1.7
2007 86.41 9.46 2.31 1.82
2008 83.14 12.07 2.76 2.02
2009 82.05 15.25 1.44 1.26
2010 82.92 13.44 2.4 1.24
2011 81.45 14.72 2.23 1.6
Total 83.42 12.36 2.48 1.73
Movement and Rurality Conditional on a Move within NC
Year
Move within
the County to
an Urban
Zipcode
Move within
the County to a
Rural Zipcode
Move out of the
County to an
Urban Zipcode
Move out of the
County to a
Rural Zipcode
2003 34.49 7.72 38.74 19.06
2004 49.32 8.38 27.03 15.27
2005 45.75 8.2 29.93 16.12
2006 47.62 7.88 27.66 16.85
2007 45.59 7.56 30.13 16.72
2008 47.33 6.17 29.6 16.9
2009 65.33 5.87 18.45 10.34
2010 61.15 5.59 23.82 9.44
2011 58.97 5.88 24.6 10.55
Total 53.14 6.87 26.29 13.71
Note: Statistics based on 165,668 person-year observations including a physician’s first year in the survey.
Facility
The physician licensure database also provides current type of facility in the primary, secondary, and ter-
tiary locations of employment. The twelve facility types are: locum tenes,8 solo practitioner’s office, free-
standing clinic, group office, staff or group model HMO, hospital-outpatient department, hospital-emergency
room, hospital-other, medical school or parent university, nursing home/extended care facility, telemedicine,
and others. Missing values in facility type are replaced using a similar procedure as with primary location of
8The locum tenes facility type describes an employment situation similar to substitute teaching in the education profession. Locum tenes
physicians generally work a lower number of hours than physician who are permanently placed.
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practice. The previous or future facility type serves as the facility type in a year when it is not reported if zip-
codes match across years of primary, secondary, or tertiary location of employment. To simplify the number of
categories of facilities, I group the facilities into six categories: group practices, solo practices, hospital-ER re-
lated, hospital-Not ER related, Medical School/Parent University, and others. Table 2.4 displays the distribution
of facility type among physicians in NC by year.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Primary Facility Type
Year Group Solo
Hospital:
ER
Hospital:
Non ER
Medical
School
Other
2004 51.45 14.53 5.74 17.62 8.69 1.98
2005 50.40 15.23 5.58 16.99 9.32 2.47
2006 49.13 14.63 5.49 16.99 10.51 3.25
2007 48.58 14.14 5.63 17.65 10.67 3.33
2008 47.67 13.58 5.76 18.56 10.93 3.50
2009 47.93 13.02 5.68 19.30 10.85 3.21
2010 47.25 12.38 5.74 20.11 11.31 3.21
2011 46.17 11.91 5.77 21.34 11.59 3.23
2012 45.49 11.58 5.89 22.13 11.67 3.25
Total 48.06 13.33 5.71 19.13 10.70 3.08
Note: Statistics based on 155,767 person-year observations among active physicians excluding their first year in the sample.
Table 2.5 depicts year-to-year probabilities of changing facility and changing county conditional on staying
active in NC. A relatively larger proportion of physicians (20.38 percent) change facility when they change
locations than physicians who change facility but not location (7.07 percent).
Table 2.5: Location and Facility Change Summary
Do Not Change
Facility
Change Facility Total
Remain in the Same Location in NC 92.93 7.07 100
Move within the County to an Urban Zipcode 84.03 15.97 100
Move within the County to a Rural Zipcode 83.36 16.64 100
Move out of the County to an Urban Zipcode 73.13 26.87 100
Move out of the County to a Rural Zipcode 73.07 26.93 100
Total 79.62 20.38 100
Note: Statistics based on 158,682 represents the person-year observations among active physicians excluding their first year in
the sample.
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Hours of Direct Patient Care
Each active physician provides average hours worked per week in the locations of practice. In estimation, I
focus on the number of self-reported direct patient care hours (i.e., I do not model non-patient-related activities).
I cap the number of patient care hours at 100 hours per week, which is over two standard deviations above
the mean. In the research sample, there are only 914 person-year outliers who reported greater than 100 hours
per week and 8,106 (5.2 percent) report zero hours of direct patient care. African Americans report a greater
average number of hours of direct care than any other group while Caucasians report the lowest average number
of hours. Female physicians report fewer patient care hours on average than their male counterparts across all
races. Figure 2.3 depicts a histogram of hours of direct patient care using all person-year observations of active
physicians (with specific percentiles in red).
Figure 2.3: Histogram of Hours of Direct Patient Care
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2.3.2 Specialty, Experience, and Demographics
As described in Section 3.1, I observe the activity, location, facility, and hours of direct patient care behaviors
of physicians annually. Important determinants of these annual behaviors are specialty and years of accumulated
work experience, which are determined prior to entry into the dataset. In this section, I describe the available
data on physician’s specialty and discuss construction of experience when first observed since I do not observe
all physicians upon graduation from medical school or after completion of residency or fellowship. I also detail
the demographic characteristics available in the dataset.
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Specialty
Although physicians are allowed to update their primary/secondary areas of practice specialty each year,
less than 1 percent of physicians in the research sample change their primary area of practice. There are 166
specialties recorded in 2003 and 55 additional specialties appear in the ten subsequent years of observable data.
In total, there are 221 different types of medical specialties listed in the database.
Rather than model selection among 221 alternatives, I collapse the large number of physician specialties
into five categories that conform to the guidelines set forth by the AMA: (1) primary care physicians/generalists,
(2) medical specialists, (3) surgical specialists, (4) hospital-based specialists, and (5) other specialists. Primary
care physicians, or generalists, act as the first contact and principal care provider for patients. They also coordi-
nate between patient and specialist if additional care is needed. Unlike specialists, generalists require minimal
diagnostic and therapeutic technology. Unlike generalists, specialists are trained to handle illnesses that may
not occur frequently and that are more serious in nature. They are also more dependent on capital, such as
equipment, laboratories, and advanced diagnostic technologies. Therefore, specialists are more likely to be con-
strained by their surrounding resources than generalists and are more likely to be attracted to environments with
higher concentrations of technological capital. Also, specialists are differentiated by the degree of interaction
with patients.
Areas of expertise that fall under generalist include family medicine, general internal medicine, general
pediatrics and general OB/GYN. Medical specialists include those in allergy and immunology, cardiovascular
disease, dermatology, gastroenterology, internal medicine sub-specialties (such as diabetes, endocrinology, geri-
atrics, hematology, infectious disease, nephrology, nutrition, and medical oncology rheumatology), pediatric
subspecialties, pediatric cardiology, and pulmonary disease. Surgical specialists are those in general surgery,
colon/rectal surgery, neurological surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, plas-
tic surgery, thoracic surgery, and urology. Hospital-based specialists in are anesthesiology, anatomic/clinical
pathology, and radiology. Other specialists have expertise in occupational or preventative medicine, or in mental
health fields, such as rehabilitation and psychiatry.
The distribution of physician specialty differs across gender and race (Table 2.6). A larger percentage of
minorities are generalists, especially among African Americans; only 35 percent of Caucasian physicians are
generalists. With the exception of Asian physicians, who have the highest percentage of medical specialist
(16.73 percent), Caucasian physicians are more likely to specialize than other races. The same pattern is found
among female physicians, where more than half of female physicians are generalists.
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics: Distribution of Specialty by Race and Gender
Primary-Care
/Generalist
Medical
Specialist
Surgical
Specialist
Hospital
Specialist
Other Specialist
Race
Caucasian 35.03 16.28 21.32 20.69 6.69
African American 51.48 10.54 17.83 13.79 6.37
Asian 45.22 16.73 13.58 17.06 7.41
Hispanic 44.43 10.73 17.12 19.02 8.70
Other 44.02 16.13 15.32 18.08 6.44
Total 38.13 15.72 19.79 19.58 6.77
Gender
Male 32.78 17.15 22.58 21.00 6.20
Female 50.75 12.36 13.24 15.54 8.11
Total 38.13 15.72 19.79 19.58 6.77
Note: Statistics based on 29,908 uniquely-identified physicians in the research sample. The percentage reported is the row percentage by
race and gender.
Experience
Each respondent must provide the year she first received her medical license, regardless of the state in
which it was obtained. Thus, assuming continuous employment as a physician, the initial level of experience is
recorded as the difference between the year of first observation in the research sample and the year of licensure.
In the following years, if the respondent remains active, then an additional year of experience is gained. Table
2.7 reports the initial level of experience for physicians in the research sample by gender and race. Minority
and female physicians have less experience than their counterparts, which reflects their more recent entry into
the physician profession within NC due to policy changes that encouraged their entry in the late 1980s. On the
national level, there is a similar influx of new minority physicians in the last decade. Figure 2.4 shows the race
distribution of physicians by medical school graduation year between 1980 and 2012 and demonstrates a shift
in the demographic composition of new physicians in the US. As the share of minority physicians increases
overtime, a greater percentage of new physicians in NC (and, hence, in my research sample) are minorities.
Thus, the average experience level of minority physicians tends to be lower than their counterparts. Among all
physicians first observed in the research sample, 19.9 percent have zero years of experience (i.e., the year of
entry in the sample is their first year of licensed practice).
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics: Experience by Race and Gender
Median Mean
Race All Male Female All Male Female
Caucasian 7 9 3 10.73 12.38 6.18
African American 1 2 1 5.64 6.72 4.38
Asian 1 1 1 4.53 5.10 3.56
Hispanic 1 1 1 4.66 5.22 3.68
Other 1 1 1 4.19 4.78 3.02
Figure 2.4: Race Distribution of US Physicians by Graduation Year, 1980-2012
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Demographics
Race, gender, and age are reported for all 29,908 physicians in the research sample. A self-reported
race variable contains six mutually-exclusive options: Caucasian & Non-Hispanic, African American & Non-
Hispanic, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Other (in estimation, American
Indian/Alaskan Native are included in the group Other because it comprised less than 2 percent of the obser-
vations). Table 2.8 summarizes gender and race of physicians in the research sample. Overall, 70.2 percent of
the uniquely-identified physicians are male and 29.8 percent are female, while 73.5 percent are Caucasian and
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26.5 percent are minorities. Compared to the census data, there are larger proportions of Caucasian and Asian
physicians than the populations of both races in NC. There are fewer African American and Hispanic physicians
in NC relative to their population in NC. The gender and racial distributions of physicians change during the ten
years of data as more minority and female physicians enter the labor force. Table 2.9 summarizes age of the
research sample. On average, male Caucasian physicians in the sample are older with a median age around 50.
Female and minority physicians are generally younger.
Table 2.8: Summary Statistics: Physician Gender and Race
Race Male Female Total
Census
Percent
Caucasian/Not Hispanic 76.85 65.47 73.46 64.40
African American/Not Hispanic 6.09 12.27 7.93 22.00
Asian 8.96 12.36 9.97 2.60
Hispanic 2.23 3.00 2.46 8.90
Other Race 5.87 6.90 6.18 2.10
Note: Statistics based on uniquely identified 29,908 physicians in the research sample. The last column contains
the demographic information from the 2013 US Census 2013 in North Carolina.
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics: Physician Age By Race and Gender
Median Age Mean Age
Race All Male Female All Male Female
Caucasian/Not Hispanic 43 45 38 44.60 46.46 39.47
African American/Not Hispanic 38 42 35 40.18 42.53 37.43
Asian 37 38 35 39.61 40.97 37.28
Hispanic 38 40 35 40.48 42.17 37.50
Other 37 38 35 39.56 40.67 37.33
2.3.3 Salary Data
Hourly wages reflect the price of an hour of work in a particular labor market. In a high skilled labor market,
a worker’s market value is his/her annual salary. In the partial equilibrium analysis of physician labor supply
that I perform, I assume that market salary as well as the demand for labor are pre-determined and known to
physicians. Unfortunately, the Physician Licensure Database does not contain salary information and, to my
8North Carolina Census Quick Facts: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html
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knowledge, there is no publicly- or privately-available salary database for NC physicians at the individual level.
To capture variation in physician labor income, I use two datasets: the Physician Salary Survey Report from
the Hospital and Healthcare Compensation Service (HHCS) and the NC Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) of Healthcare Practitioners. Salary data from 2003 to 2012 are reported in real dollars with 2003 as the
base year.
The HHCS physician survey provides the average salary (Ssft) for physicians in 48 different specialties (s)
and 6 different facilities (f ) across 10 years (t). The survey also reports the 25 percentile (Q1), median, and
75 percentile (Q3) of salaries for each specialty/facility/year combination. The OES database records salaries
of health care practitioners in each of the 100 counties in NC for each year. The OES data reflect averages
over all health care practitioners, not exclusively physicians. I calculate for each county k a z-score, zkt, to
reflect the number of standard deviations from the average state salary. Using information from both datasets,
I am able to construct a physician salary in each of the 100 NC counties for 48 specialties, 6 facilities, and 10
years. Using the interquantile range formula, I solve IQR = Q3sft − Q1sft = 2Φ−1(0.75)σsft ≈ 2720σsft ≈
1.349σsft where σsft represents the standard deviation of salaries in each specialty, facility, and year. Using
the formula, average salary for a physician in county k with specialty s in facility f at time t is defined as
Sksft = Ssft + [σsft × zksft].9
When county salary data are missing from OES, I infer unknown values through extrapolation using data
from the previous years and/or future years and the average wage inflation data collected by the St. Louis Federal
Reserve. The wage inflator reflects seasonally-adjusted salaries of private employees, which includes physicians.
If multiple years of the data are not known, I extrapolate information from the American Community Survey
(ACS) which also reports full-time, year-round employment information for health care professionals in NC at
the county level.
In addition to using this constructed average salary variable (which varies by county, year, specialty, and
facility), I generate a salary rank variable by year. I arrange salaries of each county in ascending order such that
the highest ranking represents the highest salary level in all counties in a particular year. I assign an average
salary and the salary rank to each physician in each year based on her county, specialty and facility.
2.3.4 County-Level Data
I obtain county-level data from Log Into North Carolina (LINC), which combines census data from both
state and federal agencies. The 100 counties of NC differ greatly in wealth, size, and the demographics of its
9For example, if the average salary of Alamance County physicians is two standard deviations below the mean wage in NC, then all
physicians in Alamance county (regardless of facility and specialty) are assigned a salary two standard deviations below the mean
salary.
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residents. I link the county-level data with the location of the physician’s primary practice. The county-level
data include basic demographic variables that summarize the size, age, and race distributions of the population in
each of the 100 counties in NC. Other variables capture characteristics of the county that might describe the local
labor market and local amenities that influence movement into or out of a county. These variables include the
number of unemployed, income per capita, total retail sales, number of industry establishments, and education-
related variables (i.e., public school personnel, public school personnel with a masters level education, average
SAT verbal score, average SAT math score, total public school expenditures, and total public school expenditure
from the local government). Importantly, the county-level variables also include characteristics of the medical
care market in the county. The variables chosen reflect the potential demand for medical care as well as medical
care supply-related characteristics (i.e., total number of pregnancies, total number of births, number of hospital
beds, number of long-term care beds, and total number of Medicaid eligible and Medicare enrollees). Summary
statistics for available county-level data are provided in Table 2.10 and are averaged over the 100 counties
by year. The county-level characteristics capture local amenities, the employment market (potentially relevant
for both the physicians and spouse), local demand for medical care professionals, and medical care supply
characteristics (i.e., complements and substitutes).10
To capture physician supply characteristics more accurately, different types of physicians are aggregated to
the county level using the physician licensure database. Detailed physician supply in the county may capture
the degree of complementarity or substitutability of different types of physicians. It may also proxy for the local
physician network and reflect ease of referral or competition.
10All dollar-valued variables are adjusted to reflect real values in year 2003 dollars.
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics: County-Level Data of North Carolina
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Demographics
Population (10,000s) 9.06 13.15 0.41 96.26
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 11.11 12.10 0.64 86.11
Caucasian/Non-Hispanic (1000s) 60.82 79.51 2.26 586.20
African American/Non-Hispanic (1000s) 19.48 36.40 0.02 296.22
Asian (1000s) 1.06 4.97 0.01 51.10
Hispanic (1000s) 6.89 13.31 0.10 121.5
Other (1000s) 3.16 8.15 0.05 72.7
Medical Care Market
Births (1000s) 1.24 2.06 0.04 14.90
Pregnancies (100s) 15.11 26.37 0.41 192.33
Hospital Discharges (1000s) 9.83 12.26 0.34 87.82
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) 2.05 3.28 0.00 19.96
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) 4.42 4.99 0.00 31.00
Midlevel Practitioners 62.55 123.39 0.00 922.00
Registered Nurses (1000s) 0.83 1.57 0.01 10.69
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) 1.56 1.83 0.08 14.32
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 1.07 1.21 0.06 8.87
Primary Care Physicians 65.35 118.31 0.00 880
Medical Specialists 32.32 80.74 0.00 643
Surgical Specialists 36.35 75.96 0.00 538
Hospital Specialists 33.04 73.08 0.00 547
Other Specialists 12.64 30.94 0.00 228
Amenities
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) 0.98 2.05 0.01 18.88
Unemployed (100s) 33.45 51.83 1.12 515.15
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) 3.00 0.52 1.88 5.17
Industrial Establishments (100s) 21.81 39.25 0.66 285.18
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 2.60 4.67 0.07 33.80
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 10.91 15.78 0.72 114.99
Public School Personnel (100s) 10.10 14.46 0.00 102.40
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) 3.17 5.03 0.12 40.8
Average SAT Math (100s) 4.94 0.33 3.91 5.84
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 4.76 0.33 3.74 5.70
Note: Statistics based on 100 counties in NC averaged over all years (2003-2012).
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2.4 Theoretical Motivation
This section presents a theoretical model of the professional and geographical decisions of NC physicians.
The primary objective of the theory is to motivate the empirical specification in terms of the individual physician
and county-level characteristics that affect physician’s professional and geographical decisions. The community
characteristics are of particular interest, and I use the theoretical framework to explain how local characteristics
enter as both push factors (i.e., increase the probability of leaving an area) and pull factors (i.e., increase the
probability of locating in a particular area). The theory also allows me to discuss the assumptions that must
be made to reduce the set of location alternatives to a number feasible for estimation. Because the theoretical
model is not parameterized, solved, and estimated, I ignore some issues that would complicate full solution of
the physician’s optimization problem. I address these concerns after providing the theoretical motivation.
Physicians are forward-looking agents who make decisions based on current utility, budget and time con-
straints and discounted expected future utility. Since behavior today affects future utility, I use a dynamic
framework in modeling physician’s decisions. I assume that time is discrete with a period being a year. Figure
2.5 displays the timing of physician professional behaviors, where a period is defined as one year. At the be-
ginning of period t, an active physician practicing in NC county or zipcode kt and facility ft selects how many
hours (ht) of direct patient care to engage in during this period. At the end of the period, active physicians have
gained an additional year of experience and decide whether or not to renew their NC medical licenses for next
period (rt+1). If the physician decides not to renew her license, she attrits from the estimation sample. Con-
ditional on renewing the license, a physician decides on activity and location (jt+1) and facility (ft+1) for the
next period. Physicians who renew their licenses select whether or not to remain actively practicing medicine.
If active, they select the geographical region in which to practice. The alternatives, j, for the activity location
decision (jt+1 = j) are:
j =

0 inactive
k active in NC in zipcode or county k where k ∈ [1, . . . ,K]
K + 1 active in NC but not practicing in NC
Inactive physicians (jt+1 = 0) and physicians who choose to practice outside of NC (jt+1 = K + 1) are not
followed in my data. As explained below, they receive a terminal value function, W 0t+1 andW
K+1
t+1 , that depends
on their specialty and experience through period t. In the empirical work, I focus on the location decisions of
active physicians with NC licenses, and model attrition out of the active status among NC-practicing physicians.
The physician enters each period with an information set, or a vector of state variables Ωt, composed of
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individual-specific exogenous characteristics (Xt) at time t;11 a vector of location characteristics for all counties
in NC (Lt = [L1t , . . . , L
K
t ], where k ∈ [1, . . . ,K] and K = 850 zipcodes or and K = 100 counties); and the
history of her previous employment-related behaviors. The pre-determined state variables include specialty (S1)
upon completion of medial school and a residency program, current activity and location (jt), current facility
(ft), hours of direct patient care in the previous period, (ht−1), experience up to period t (Et), and annual salary
for the current period (Yt).12
Figure 2.5: Timing
A physician derives current period utility from both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of working in
county k at facility f at time t. Specifically, the physician receives utility from consumption (Ct), leisure (lt),
location characteristics in county k (Lkt ), the type of facility (ft = f ), and an unobserved (by the researcher)
component (εut ). At the beginning of each period, the physician selects hours of direct patient care, ht = h,
conditional on the activity, location, and facility selected at the end of the last period. The value of alternative
ht = h at the beginning of period t is:
Vh(Ωt, εt) = U(Ct, lt, ft = f, L
k
t ;Xt, Et, ht−1) + ε
u
ht
+β{max [W 0(Ωt+1),Wj′f ′(Ωt+1)j′={1,...K},f ′={1,...F},WK+1(Ωt+1)]} (2.1)
∀t,∀h = 0, . . . ,H
Total consumption is constrained by the annual salary (Yt1[ht > 0]) minus the cost of moving (Mt), where
11The vector Xt includes variables for age, gender, and birth country/state.
12In the theoretical model section, the subscript i on individually-varying variables is omitted for notational simplicity.
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Ct = Yt1[ht > 0] −Mt1[jt−1 6= jt]. Leisure (lt) in each period is constrained by total time (Υ) minus hours
worked (ht) and time required to move from one location to another (N ), where lt = Υ− ht −N1[jt−1 6= jt].
The salary received at time t depends on physician specialty (St), facility (ft = f ), and county (jt = k), where
Yt = Y (St, ft, jt). The terminal value of inactive status is denoted by W 0(Ωt+1) and the terminal value of
activity outside of NC is WK+1(Ωt+1). The value of selecting activity and location (j′) and facility (f ′) at the
end of the period is:
Wj′f ′(Ωt+1) = Et[φj′f ′(Lj
′
t , St, ft)×max
h′
V k
′f ′
h′ (Ωt+1, εt+1)] (2.2)
where φjf reflects the probability of receiving a job offer from facility f ′ in location j′ = k′ and depends on
physician specialty and the contemporaneous location characteristics for each county and facility type.13 The
utility a physician receives in the current period depends on the amenities and medical care market characteristics
in the previously determined location (jt = k) and facility (ft). To capture effects of habit or a change in routine,
I allow current utility to depend on previous hours of direct patient care (ht−1).
At the end of the period, the values of the location and facility for the next period alternatives depend on the
current location characteristics (or push factors) as well as the location characteristics of alternative locations (or
pull factors). The push factors may influence the location decision directly by lowering the value of staying in
the current location via expectation of future levels of those location characteristics. The push factors could also
influence the location decision indirectly through hours worked (e.g., high medical demand in a county that leads
to long hours in period t may raise the value of a new location with lower demand for medical services). The
location characteristics may serve as pull factors if they raise the utility of an alternative location. Additionally,
characteristics in other locations affect the probability of a job offer.14
2.5 Empirical Framework
Solution to the physician’s optimization problem would yield probabilities of the behaviors (activity, lo-
cation, facility, and hours worked) observed in the data. However, the large set of alternatives (among 100
counties or 850 zipcodes and 12 facilities) renders solution and estimation difficult. Although it is possible to
13The model defined in the theoretical section is a partial equilibrium model, where the market demand for physicians is exogenous to
the individual physician and is impacted by exogenous demand-side variables such as county-level demographic, insurance coverage,
and other medical care demand characteristics.
14If we wanted to solve the optimization problem, we must make an assumption regarding a physician’s beliefs about future location
characteristics. I could assume perfect foresight or assume that physicians use their current knowledge of all location characteristics
(Lt) to forecast the characteristics of each location next period (i.e., Markov beliefs, adaptive expectations). Alternatively, I could
assume a physician expects the characteristics to remain the same next year, and is surprised by new values of these characteristics. I
do not take a stance here because I do not solve this model explicitly due to computational demands. The empirical model, described
in Section 5, requires that I limit the choice set and, hence, the use of location characteristics.
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conceptualize the decision problem of physicians as one over all county and facility alternatives within NC,
estimation of the probability of moving from a specific county-facility combination to another county-facility is
computationally costly if one tries to include observed variables to explain that movement.
To simplify the problem while also retaining as much information about locations as possible, I first collapse
location alternatives of active physicians to three: remain in the same zipcode of employment in NC, move
to another zipcode of employment in NC, and move outside NC. Conditional on moving to another zipcode
of employment in NC, I then expand the location alternatives among those who moved within NC in order to
consider four additional categories: move within the county to an urban zipcode, move within the county to
a rural zipcode, move out of the county to an urban zipcode, and move out of the county to a rural zipcode.
For facility alternatives, I simplify the twelve alternatives to six alternatives. The facility categorization comes
from the HHCS physician survey, which was introduced in the data section and is used in my average salary
construction. Thus, conditional on remaining active, a physician chooses among six facility types and seven
location types. Because it is also important to examine physician labor supply in areas of need, I allow location
alternatives to reflect rural and metropolitan counties as defined by the Sheps Center and rurality of zipcode
using another method as described further in the Appendix for Chapter 2.
2.5.1 Per-Period Employment Behaviors
Conditional on being active in NC at time t, the redefined activity and location alternatives (jt+1 = j) in the
empirical model are:
j =

0 inactive in t+1
1 active in NC and do not change zipcode of employment in t+1
2 active in NC and change zipcode of employment in t+1
3 active and move out of NC in t+1
Conditional on changing zipcode of employment within NC in t+ 1, the movement alternatives mt+1 = m, are:
m =

1 move within the county to an urban zipcode in t+1
2 move within the county to a rural zipcode in t+1
3 move out of the county to an urban zipcode in t+1
4 move out of the county to a rural zipcode in t+1
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The reduced set of the facility alternatives, ft+1 = f , are:
f =

1 Group Practice
2 Solo Practice
3 Hospital: ER Related
4 Hospital: Non ER related
5 Medical School/Parent University
6 All other types
I use the theoretical framework to derive demand behaviors as functions of the physician’s information enter-
ing period t, Ωt, and the primitive parameters of the optimization problem (if the utility function parametrization
was specified). A first-order Taylor series expansion of the resulting demand functions yields reduced form equa-
tions that I specify below. While physicians choose some behaviors (location and facility) jointly, I specify the
demand for each behavior but allow for correlation across periods through observed determinants over time (i.e.,
physician characteristics such as work experience and lagged employment behaviors) and unobserved individual
characteristics (such as permanent preferences for living in large cities). The correlation structure also allows
for correlation across the many physician behaviors within a time period using observed characteristics as well
as time-varying unobserved physician characteristics (such as the birth of a child or an unobserved shock that
permeates all employment behaviors within the period). This joint correlation through unobservables is modeled
using random effects and requires that I integrate the (conditional) likelihood of the observed outcomes over the
distribution of these unobservables, which by definition is unknown. Rather than impose a distributional assump-
tion that might be incorrect, I approximate the distribution of these unobserved components by estimating the
support of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution (using discrete mass points) and their associated weights
jointly with the parameters capturing the effects of the observed characteristics (Mroz and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz
1999).15 This flexible method allows me to incorporate important omitted (in the literature) aspects of physician
employment behaviors such as dependence on past behaviors and simultaneity of many jointly-chosen behaviors.
To make explicit the correlation in the resulting probabilities or densities of observed behaviors that form
15Mroz (1999) found that when the unobserved heterogeneity is not (jointly) normally distributed, the discrete factor approximations
perform better than maximum likelihood estimation that assumes normality. The Monte-Carlo study also found that when the distribu-
tion of the unobserved component is normally distributed, there is little bias or efficiency loss using the discrete factor random effect
method.
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the estimated likelihood function, I decompose the unobserved heterogeneity in each equation into three com-
ponents, εet = µ
e + νet + 
e
t , where µ represents permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity, νt is serially-
uncorrelated time-varying individual unobserved heterogeneity, and εt is idiosyncratic unobserved heterogene-
ity.16
At beginning of each period, the continuously-valued hours of direct patient care in period t is a function of
the following determinants:17
ht = f
H(Xt, Et, Yt, L
k
t ,1[jt = 2],1[mt = 2, 4], ft, ht−1, Z
D
t ) + µ
H + νHt + 
H
t (2.3)
where Ht is the serially-uncorrelated error explaining variation in hours worked and follows a normal distri-
bution and ZD are exclusion restrictions that identify (beginning of period) outcomes.18 In addition to its de-
pendence on demographic variables, work experience, and salary, the hours outcome depends on current county
characteristics, indicators of a recent move and a move to a rural area, current facility type, and lagged hours
worked. Empirically, the hours outcome is observed only for those physicians who remain active in NC from the
period to the next. This selection is modeled by the following license renewal, activity and location, and facility
probabilities.
Conditional on working in county k and facility f in period t, I observe the activity, location, and facility
outcomes for the next period. However, these outcomes are observed only if a physician is licensed in NC.
The probability of not renewing a medical license or attriting from the estimation sample (rt+1 = 0) relative to
renewing (rt+1 = 1) in period t+ 1 is:
ln(
p(rt+1 = 0)
p(rt+1 = 1)
) = fR(Xt, Et+1, Yt, L
k
t , ft, ht) + µ
R + νRt (2.4)
Conditional on not attriting from the sample, the probabilities of being inactive (jt+1 = 0), being active
and changing zipcode of employment (jt+1 = 2), or being active and changing employment to outside NC
(jt+1 = 3) relative to being active and not changing county of employment (jt+1 = 1) in period t+1, are:
16The subscript e denotes the relevant behavior: hours (H), activity and location (J,M ), and facility (F ). Because the unobserved error
in each equation is individual specific, the error decomposition, with the individual subscripts i, is: εeit = µ
e
i +ν
e
it+ 
e
it. Theoretically,
the permanent component of this specification, µ, is individual specific. Empirically, I estimate this unobserved heterogeneity as a
random effect, not as a fixed effect as the notation may suggest. That is, an individuals contribution to the likelihood of her observed
behaviors is the product of the probabilities of each behavior, e, conditional on observed explanatory variables and the value of the
permanent unobserved heterogeneity, where I integrate the conditional likelihood contribution over the estimated distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity. Similarly, νit is individual specific, and I model it as a random effect. The likelihood function is provided
in section 2.5.3.
17The functions represented in the below section f(·) are linear functions with higher order and interaction terms.
18Discussion of these exclusion restrictions is provided in the Identification Section 5.4.
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ln(
p(jt+1 = j|rt+1 = 1)
p(jt+1 = 1|rt+1 = 1)) = f
J(Xt, Et+1, Yt, L
k
t ,1[jt = 2],1[mt = 2, 4], ft, ht) + µ
J + νJt
for j = 0, 2, 3, (2.5)
Conditional on being active and changing zipcode of employment (jt+1 = 2), the probabilities of moving
within the county to a rural zipcode (mt+1 = 2), or moving out of the county to an urban zipcode (mt+1 = 3),
or moving out of the county to a rural zipcode (mt+1 = 4) relative to moving within the county to an urban
zipcode (mt+1 = 1) in period t+1, are:
ln(
p(mt+1 = m|jt+1 = 2)
p(mt+1 = 1|jt+1 = 2) ) = f
M (Xt, Et+1, Yt, L
k
t ,1[jt = 2],1[mt = 2, 4], ft, ht) + µ
M + νMt
for m = 2, 3, 4 (2.6)
The probabilities of each facility type (ft ∈ [2, 6]), relative to group practice (ft+1 = 1) in period t+ 1, are:
ln(
p(ft+1 = f |rt+1 = 1)
p(ft+1 = 1|rt+1 = 1) ) = f
F (Xt, Et+1, Yt, L
k
t ,1[jt = 2],1[mt = 2, 4], ft, ht) + µ
F + νFt (2.7)
The empirical framework includes the characteristics of the county in which the physician is currently em-
ployed, Lkt , jt = k, instead of the characteristics of each county (Lt). As stated in the beginning of Section 5,
the set of activity and location outcomes are reduced from 852 or 102 alternatives (i.e., 850 zipcodes or 100 NC
counties, 1 option for outside of NC, and 1 option for inactivity) to a set of seven alternatives for simplicity.
This simplification restricts my ability to include county characteristics from other counties, L−kt , where −k
denotes counties that are not chosen. However, if does allow for movement to locations characterized as rural
or urban. Thus, the empirical model includes the relevant theoretical push factors on physician professional and
geographical outcomes and restricts the pull factors to rural and urban characterizations.
2.5.2 Initial Conditions
Because I first observe (in the data) physicians in the middle of their career, some endogenous state vari-
ables are non-zero and present an initial conditions problem in estimation. Rather than treating these variables
as exogenous, I model them using reduced form, static equations. All of the initial condition equations are
jointly-estimated with the employment behavior equations and are modeled as functions of exogenous individ-
ual characteristics Xt and appropriate exclusion restrictions, ZIt .
The endogenous, initially-observed variables include specialty, experience up to period t = 1, facility, hours
worked, and metropolitan or rural county location. Variables used to identify the initial conditions are based
on the self-reported birth country if the physician is foreign-born and birth state if the physician is born in the
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US. Additionally, corresponding market characteristics of these locations at year one affect the probability of (1)
specialty S, (2) experience E1, (3) facility f1, (4) rural or metropolitan location 1[j1 = 2, 3], and (5) hours of
direct patient care hI0, but should not affect the subsequent per-period physician behaviors conditional on these
observed initial conditions.
The probabilities of each specialty type (St ∈ [2, . . . , 5]), relative to primary-care/generalist in the first
period, are:
ln
(
p(St = s)
p(St = 1)
)
= fS(Xt, Z
I
t ) + µ
S + St for s = 2, 3, 4, 5; t = 1 (2.8)
The continuously-valued level of experience in the first observable period (Et) is specified as:
Et = f
E(Xt, St, Z
I
t ) + µ
E + Et for e = 0, . . . , 69; t = 1 (2.9)
The probabilities of initially-observed facility type relative to group practice (ft = 1) are:
ln
(
p(ft = f)
p(ft = 1)
)
= fF
I
(Xt, St, Et, Z
I
t ) + µ
F I + F
I
t for f = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; t = 1 (2.10)
The probability of working in a rural county (jt = 2) relative to working in a metro county in the first period
(jt = 1) is:
ln
(
p(jt = 2)
p(jt = 1)
)
= fJ
I
(Xt, St, Et, Z
I
t ) + µ
JI + J
I
t for t = 1 (2.11)
The hours of direct patient care in the first period is specified as:
ht = f
HI (X,St, Et, ft, Z
I
t ) + µ
HI + H
I
t for h = 0, . . . , 100; t = 1 (2.12)
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2.5.3 Likelihood Function
The unconditional likelihood function for N physicians observed for T periods is:
L(Θ) =
N∏
i=1
{
M∑
m=1
θm
5∏
s=1
P(S1 = s|µm)1[Si1=s] ·
6∏
f=1
P(f1 = f |µm)1[fi1=f ] ·
2∏
j=1
P(j1 = j|µm)1[ji1=j]
· ΦE(·|µm) · ΦHI (·|µm)
·
Ti∏
t=2
[ L∑
l=1
ψlΦ
H(·|µm, νlt) · Pr(rt+1 = 0|µm, νlt)1[rit+1=0]
·
[
Pr(rt+1 = 1|µm, νlt) ·
3∏
j=0
[
Pr(jt+1 = j|µm, νlt) ·
4∏
m=1
[
Pr(mt+1 = m|µm, νlt)
·
6∏
f=1
[Pr(ft+1 = f |µm, νlt)]1[fit+1=f ]·1[jit+1=2]
]
1[mit+1=m]·1[jit+1=2]]1[jit+1=j]]1[rit+1=1]]}
(2.13)
where Θ represents the vector of estimated parameters on implicitly-included regressors as well as the param-
eters of the correlated unobserved components. I estimate the permanent and time-varying distributions of
unobserved heterogeneity using a discrete approximation of their distributions, where θm is the probability of
observing the mth mass point of the permanent heterogeneity distribution and ψl is the probability of observ-
ing the lth mass point of the time-varying heterogeneity distribution. These weights and the associated vectors
of mass points (µ and νt) are jointly estimated via full information maximum likelihood along with the other
parameters of the model.
2.5.4 Identification
Time-varying exogenous individual and location-specific characteristics identify the dynamic, multiple-
equation system. For physicians who moved between adjacent periods, the difference in these county char-
acteristics, ZDt , affects hours of direct patient care conditional on hours of care in the previous location. These
aforementioned variables affect number of hours of patient care, but they do not affect end of period outcomes
conditional on hours worked. For example, the direction and size of the change in demand for physician services
may affect current patient care hours but the level of demand in the current location affects end of period move-
ment. Additionally, the lagged hours of direct patient care (ht−1) is included in the current hours equation to
capture habit or break in routine, but should not affect activity, location, and facility decisions at the end-of-the
period (for the current period) conditional on current hours. The dynamic equation system is also identified by
the histories of exogenous time-varying determinants across individuals over time. The non-linear functional
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forms of the likelihood contributions provide additional identification. Finally, a few covariance restrictions on
the unobserved heterogeneity is necessary for identification as well. Table 2.11 summarizes the jointly-estimated
set of equations and their determinants.
Table 2.11: Specification Summary for Jointly Estimated Behaviors and Outcomes via FIML
Explanatory Variables
Pre-Determined
Endogenous
Exogenous
Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Likelihood
Contribution
Behaviors
Hours of direct patient care (ht) jt, ft, ht−1, Et, Yt, St Xt, Lt, ZDt µH , νHt , Ht ΦH
Attrition/Renewal (rt+1) jt, ft, ht, Et+1, Yt, St Xt, Lt µR, νRt , 
R
t P (rt+1 = r), r = 0, 1
Active and Movement (jt+1) jt, ft, ht, Et+1, Yt, St Xt, Lt µJ , νJt , 
J
t P (jt+1 = j),
j = 0, 1, 2, 3
Movement and Rurality (mt+1) jt, ft, ht, Et+1, Yt, St Xt, Lt µM , νMt , 
M
t P (mt+1 = m),
j = 1, 2, 3, 4
Facility (ft+1) jt, ft, ht, Et+1, Yt, St Xt, Lt µF , νFt , 
F
t P (ft+1 = f),
f = 1, . . . , 6
Initial Conditions
Specialty (S1) Xt, ZIt µ
S , St P (S1 = s),
s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Experience (E1) St Xt, ZIt µ
E , Et Φ
E
Facility (f1) St, Et Xt, ZIt µ
F , F
I
t P (f1 = f),
f = 1, . . . , 6
Rural or Metro County (j1) St, Et Xt, ZIt µ
J , J
I
t P (j1 = r),
j = 2, 3
Hours of Direct Patient Care (h1) St, Et, ft Xt, ZIt µ
HI , H
I
t Φ
HI
2.6 Estimation Results
In this section, I begin by demonstrating how well the estimated model of physician professional behaviors
fits the observed data. Then, I present and discuss briefly the significant and marginal effects of variables of
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interest. Lastly, I use the estimated data-generating process to simulate the short- and long-term impacts of
alternative policy scenarios.
2.6.1 Model Fit
After estimating the coefficients from the dynamic multiple equation model using FIML and DFRE, it is
essential to check whether the model captures the patterns displayed in the observed data. I use the estimated
parameters to simulate physician professional and geographical behavior from the initial period forward, and
use the simulated values of the endogenous variables to update behavior and outcomes in the following periods.
The model that performed the best in terms of statistical fit has four mass points for the permanent unobserved
heterogeneity and two mass points for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. For each of the N replications
of the sample in simulation, I draw a permanent type once and draw a time-varying type each period using the
estimated distributions. A draw from the appropriate i.i.d. error distribution completes simulation of behaviors.
The comparison between simulated outcomes and the observed data is shown in Table 2.12 and suggests that the
estimated model fits the data well.19
Table 2.12: Per Period Summary Statistics for Model Fit
Outcome Observed Simulated
Activity and Movement Mean Mean
Do Not Move 83.42 84.29
Move within NC 12.36 12.21
Move out of NC 2.48 2.26
Inactive 1.73 1.23
Movement and Rurality (conditional on moving within NC)
Move within the County to Urban Zipcode 53.14 52.47
Move within the County to Rural Zipcode 6.87 8.96
Move out of the County to Urban Zipcode 26.29 25.57
Move out of the County to Rural Zipcode 13.71 13.99
Facility
Group Practice 47.82 47.10
Solo Practice 13.36 13.19
Hospital: ER Related 5.70 5.78
Hospital: Non ER related 19.19 19.42
Medical School/Parent University 10.79 11.02
Other 3.14 3.49
Hours worked 40.29 40.17
19Graphical comparisons by age or experience of the physician are available from the author.
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2.6.2 Results from the Dynamic Multiple-equation Model
The estimated coefficients and their standard errors of variables that affect physician movement and activity,
while allowing for correlation across equations and over time through modeling permanent and time-variant
unobserved heterogeneity, are displayed in Table 2.13. Additional results regarding rurality, facility and hours
worked are detailed in Appendix Tables A.8, A.9 and A.11. Here, I focus the discussion on the key variables
of interest in this chapter including average hours and salary, individual characteristics and county-level market
characteristics and amenities.20
An increase in current hours of direct patient care significantly decreases the likelihood of moving within
NC relative to not moving. Theory suggests that more hours of direct patient care may be habit forming and
induce the physician to stay in their current location rather than face uncertainty about future hours worked in
another location.21 I also find that an increase in the average salary reduces the likelihood of changing location
of employment in NC relative to not moving. Importantly, the interaction term of rurality and average salary is
negative and is greater in magnitude than the coefficient for average wage, which indicates that a higher average
salary in rural areas decreases the likelihood of moving within NC. Conditional on a current rural zipcode and
moving within NC, Table A.8 shows that physicians are 1.3 times more likely to move within county to another
rural zipcode, relative to moving to an urban zipcode within county. Conditional on moving out of a county
in NC with a current rural zipcode, physicians are 42 times more likely to move to a rural zipcode, relative
to moving within county to an urban zipcode. Conditional on a current rural zipcode and moving within NC,
physicians are 0.15 times as likely to move out of the county to an urban zipcode relative to moving within county
to an urban zipcode. This finding echoes the persistence mechanism in physician migration where selection into
rural or urban area reveals the type of location physician would most likely to move to conditional on moving.
Further, there are several findings regarding movement that are consistent with existing literature. An in-
creased level of experience is associated with a decreased likelihood of movement. However, as age increases,
the odds of moving increase. Controlling for age, more experience suggests a lower likelihood of being inactive,
or increase in experience increases the odds of changing location and facility early in one’s career, with evidence
that movement is less likely later in ones’s career. Although the coefficient for experience squared is positive
and significant, the magnitude is small. Consistent with the literature, I find that a female physician is more
20The UH coefficients, standard errors, and estimated probability weights are listed in Appendix Table A.12.
21 A physician with a greater number of hours of direct patient care in the current period is likely to work a larger number of hours in
the next period, which supports the habit story in the theoretical model. A physician in a rural zipcode is also more likely to work
more hours than their urban counterparts. African American and Hispanic physicians work 1.78 hours and 1.11 hours more than their
Caucasian counterparts in a workweek, respectively. This finding is true for foreign born doctors as well, who work 1.63 more hours
than native born physicians.
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likely to switch her location and facility than a male physician. Because the data do not contain information in
family structure, I cannot attribute this difference in behavior by gender to martial status or family size.
Several location characteristics significantly impact physician activity and movement. An increase in the
numbers of public school personnel and of more educated public school personnel (those with Master degrees
and above) deceases the likelihood of moving. On average, physicians in a county with a greater public school
staff presence are 0.9 times as likely to move than their counterparts.22 This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that physicians remain in locations with higher quality school systems.
Medical care market characteristics also impact movement. On the supply side, the number of mid-level
practitioners, including ANPs and PAs, appears positively correlated with retention of physicians relative to not
moving. Stange (2013) finds there is a complementary relationship between physicians and mid-level practi-
tioners, while the Sheps Center model treats mid-level practitioners as substitutes for generalists. Consistent
with Stange, I find that an increased number of mid-level practitioners decreases the likelihood of movement,
conditional on remaining active. That is, physicians and mid-level practitioners are complementary. Indeed,
mid-level practitioners must be overseen by a physician. Thus, an increased number of mid-level practition-
ers may require a greater number of physicians for supervision, explaining the reduced likelihood of physician
movement. Interestingly, I also find that an increased number of mid-level practitioners increases the likelihood
of becoming inactive. The larger number of midlevel practitioners may drive out physicians.
On the other hand, the number of RNs significantly increases physician movement. However, the effect of
nurses differs among rural and urban areas, where an increase in RNs in a rural (urban) area decreases (increases)
the likelihood of moving relative to not moving. In rural areas, the initial level of healthcare provision by all
types of healthcare professionals is low relative to demand. A greater numbers of RNs in rural areas may
decrease the likelihood of physician burnout through task allocation and thereby facilitate physician retention in
those areas. On the other hand, RNs may serve as substitutes for physicians since multiple RNs can be overseen
by a single physician, especially in areas where all types of healthcare professionals is high relative to demand.
Therefore, the substitutability of RNs dominates in urban areas, while their ability to relieve burnout helps to
retain physicians in rural areas.
22The county characteristics in the current model are in levels (and not normalized by population) while controlling for county-specific
population. I have estimated the model with per-capita county characteristics as well. The odds ratio associated with public school
staff per capita and educated public school staff per capita is 0.94 and 0.95, respectively.
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Table 2.13: Estimation Results: Activity and Location Outcome at End of the Period
Move within NC Move out of NC Inactive
Coeff Signif. SD Odds Coeff Signif. SD Odds Coeff Signif. SD Odds
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.002 * 0.000 0.998 -0.012 *** 0.003 0.988 -0.034 *** 0.004 0.966
Average Salary × Rural -0.011 *** 0.003 0.989 0.012 *** 0.004 1.012 0.009 0.006 1.009
Current Salary Rank -0.001 0.001 0.999 -0.001 0.001 0.999 0.004 ** 0.002 1.004
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care -0.002 *** 0.001 0.998 -0.001 0.001 0.999 -0.021 *** 0.002 0.979
Experience -0.043 *** 0.007 0.958 -0.115 *** 0.014 0.892 -0.147 *** 0.016 0.863
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.085 ** 0.036 1.089 0.054 0.091 1.055 0.513 *** 0.077 1.670
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.023 0.052 0.977 0.131 0.149 1.14 -0.574 *** 0.099 0.563
Current Rural Location -0.018 0.031 0.982 0.238 *** 0.061 1.269 -0.172 ** 0.080 0.842
Moved in Previous Period 0.758 *** 0.033 2.134 0.274 *** 0.075 1.315 0.079 0.112 1.082
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice -0.075 ** 0.033 0.927 0.383 *** 0.064 1.466 -0.215 *** 0.075 0.806
Hospital: ER Related 0.575 *** 0.044 1.778 0.591 *** 0.083 1.806 -0.048 0.126 0.953
Hospital: Non ER related 0.438 *** 0.028 1.549 0.177 *** 0.059 1.194 -0.058 0.082 0.943
Medical School/Parent University -0.047 0.044 0.954 0.283 *** 0.077 1.327 -0.442 *** 0.097 0.643
Other Facility 0.492 *** 0.049 1.635 0.643 *** 0.101 1.901 1.260 *** 0.087 3.524
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist -0.119 *** 0.031 0.887 0.193 *** 0.060 1.213 0.099 0.072 1.104
Surgical specialist -0.195 *** 0.033 0.823 0.376 *** 0.061 1.457 0.455 *** 0.074 1.576
Hospital specialist 0.084 ** 0.033 1.087 0.558 *** 0.063 1.748 0.417 *** 0.078 1.517
Other specialist 0.255 *** 0.037 1.291 0.475 *** 0.081 1.609 -0.268 *** 0.09 0.765
Female 0.079 *** 0.022 1.083 -0.212 *** 0.041 0.809 0.659 *** 0.054 1.933
Race (relative to Caucasian)
African American 0.189 *** 0.034 1.208 0.098 0.064 1.103 -0.255 ** 0.103 0.775
Asian -0.046 0.035 0.955 -0.072 0.058 0.931 -0.284 *** 0.098 0.753
Hispanic 0.135 ** 0.065 1.145 0.159 0.100 1.172 -0.257 0.179 0.773
Other Race 0.070 * 0.039 1.072 -0.042 0.071 0.958 -0.160 0.119 0.852
Foreign Born 0.028 0.031 1.028 0.136 ** 0.054 1.146 -0.075 0.086 0.928
Age -0.318 *** 0.042 0.728 -0.608 *** 0.076 0.544 -0.505 *** 0.079 0.603
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.600 *** 0.085 1.822 1.121 *** 0.159 3.067 1.058 *** 0.148 2.880
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.362 *** 0.056 0.696 -0.653 *** 0.107 0.521 -0.607 *** 0.089 0.545
County Characteristics
Population (10,000s) 0.051 *** 0.007 1.053 0.040 ** 0.016 1.041 0.000 0.019 1.000
Population × Rural 0.130 *** 0.021 1.139 -0.002 0.040 0.998 0.054 0.063 1.056
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.080 *** 0.008 1.084 0.043 *** 0.015 1.044 -0.037 ** 0.018 0.964
Births (1000s) -0.673 *** 0.091 0.51 -0.027 0.175 0.974 0.438 ** 0.214 1.550
Pregnancies (100s) 0.058 *** 0.008 1.06 0.017 0.015 1.018 -0.046 ** 0.018 0.956
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.023 *** 0.005 0.978 -0.006 0.01 0.994 -0.016 0.013 0.984
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.179 *** 0.016 0.836 -0.025 0.031 0.975 0.06 0.039 1.062
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.069 *** 0.011 0.933 -0.086 *** 0.022 0.918 -0.002 0.029 0.998
Midlevel Practitioners -0.004 *** 0.000 0.996 -0.005 *** 0.001 0.995 0.001 0.001 1.001
Midlevel Practitioner × Rural -0.001 0.002 0.999 0.005 0.004 1.005 -0.004 0.006 0.996
Registered Nurses (1000s) 0.320 *** 0.058 1.377 0.242 ** 0.111 1.273 -0.070 0.142 0.933
Registered Nurses × Rural -0.367 ** 0.169 0.693 -1.438 *** 0.327 0.237 -0.286 0.449 0.751
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.241 *** 0.029 0.786 0.022 0.057 1.022 0.167 ** 0.077 1.182
Medicaid Eligibles × Rural 0.208 *** 0.056 1.232 0.156 0.107 1.169 -0.079 0.150 0.924
Medicare Insured (10,000s) -0.014 0.053 0.986 0.098 0.099 1.103 0.161 ** 0.067 1.174
Medicare Eligibles × Rural -0.532 *** 0.099 0.588 0.122 0.198 1.130 -0.034 0.261 0.967
Primary Care Physicians 0.002 *** 0.000 1.002 0.001 * 0.001 1.001 -0.002 ** 0.001 0.998
Medical Specialists 0.001 *** 0.001 1.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 0.997 -0.002 * 0.001 0.998
Surgical Specialists 0.006 *** 0.001 1.006 0.008 *** 0.002 1.008 0.003 0.002 1.003
Hospital Specialists 0.002 *** 0.001 1.002 0.001 0.001 1.001 -0.002 0.002 0.998
Other Specialists -0.010 *** 0.001 0.99 -0.001 0.002 0.999 0.006 ** 0.003 1.006
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) 0.261 *** 0.018 1.299 0.106 *** 0.037 1.112 0.056 0.047 1.058
Retail Sale × Rural -0.103 0.089 0.903 0.327 * 0.170 1.387 0.057 0.226 1.059
Unemployed (100s) -0.002 *** 0.000 0.998 -0.002 ** 0.001 0.998 -0.001 0.001 0.999
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) 0.018 0.041 1.018 0.02 0.079 1.021 -0.044 0.108 0.957
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.032 *** 0.002 0.969 -0.027 *** 0.005 0.974 -0.001 0.006 0.999
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.045 ** 0.018 1.047 0.04 0.037 1.041 0.027 0.050 1.028
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.026 *** 0.010 1.026 -0.004 0.020 0.996 0.035 0.025 1.036
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.036 *** 0.007 0.964 -0.027 0.017 0.973 -0.025 0.020 0.975
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.016 * 0.009 0.984 -0.055 *** 0.02 0.946 0.000 0.022 1.000
Average SAT Math (100s) -0.271 * 0.158 0.763 -1.705 *** 0.302 0.182 -0.041 0.390 0.959
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 0.302 * 0.163 1.352 1.505 *** 0.31 4.504 0.145 0.400 1.157
Year 1.015 *** 0.057 2.76 1.079 *** 0.11 2.943 -0.373 *** 0.140 0.689
Year Squared -2.218 *** 0.127 0.109 -2.489 *** 0.252 0.083 0.301 0.319 1.351
Year Cubed 1.402 *** 0.084 4.064 1.607 *** 0.168 4.989 -0.002 0.214 0.998
Constant 3.404 *** 0.749 30.098 -14.338 *** 0.677 0 6.610 *** 1.700 742.483
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. The coefficients for the permanent unobserved heterogeneity and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity are
listed in Table A.12.
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2.6.3 Policy Experiments
Experiment A: Loan-Forgiveness Programs
In the past few decades, policymakers in the US have created multiple types of student loan forgiveness
programs in order to attract physicians to rural and underserved areas. The most notable program is the National
Health Service Corps (NHSC) loan repayment programs, which offers tax-free loan repayment assistance to
support qualified physicians in rural or underserved areas. The qualified area of practice is generally specified
by the area’s Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) scores.23 These programs offer up to $200, 000 at
the end of the physician’s tenure in approved rural areas (normally for a two-year contract).24 In addition to
federal programs, individual states can offer additional payment to physicians in underserved areas. NC offers
additional grants totaling up to $70, 000 (capped at half of the total student loan amount) to physicians willing
to commit five years serving in an HPSA through the Community Practitioner Program (CPP).25 However, the
effectiveness of these policies is debated as recent reports continue to show a significant shortage of physicians
in underserved and rural areas. As noted by the AMA and American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP),
retention of physicians in rural and underserved areas remains a problem as physician demographics change in
the US.26 27 Although the NHSC and many state programs use loan-repayment programs to draw new physicians
to serve in areas of need, the majority of enrollees leave these areas after completion of the program (ASPE
2015).
To simulate these types of loan forgiveness programs, I consider three different ways of implementing a lump
sum increase in non-labor income. The first simulation allows an increase in average salary for all rural areas of
$200,000 or $100,000 in the first year (i.e., year 2003 at the time of the study). The second simulation allows a
$200,000 increase in the average salary in all rural areas in the first year of practice for all physicians. The last
23Congress created the Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) indication and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) in the
1970s to easily and clearly identify and assist areas in need of physicians and other health professionals. There are three types of
HPSA designations: primary medical care, dental, and mental health. HPSAs can be geographic areas, population groups, or facilities.
The most commonly used HPSA is a geographic area HPSA, which is based on the physician-to-population ratio in a defined area.
24Because loan forgiveness programs differ across states, I simulate two levels of loan forgiveness, $100,000 and $200,000. The loan
forgiveness of $200, 000 is used to simulate the most generous version of the loan forgiveness program in the US, while the $100,000
captures the average amount of loan forgiveness. In NC, eligible physicians receive funding from both Federal and State agencies.
According to the NC Office of Rural Health from NCDHHS, physicians who are willing commit to the state’s underserved rural
communities are eligible for federal funding up to $50, 000 and state loan repayment up to $100, 000 (NCDHHS 2016). The second
simulation with an average loan forgiveness amount of $100,000 is also comparable in cost to the reimbursement rate simulation in the
next section.
25The CPP program is offered by the NC Medical Society and targeted toward practitioners who have a willingness to live and work in
an underserved, often rural, part of the state.
26http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/rural-practice-paper.html
27http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2009/05/pfor1-0905.html
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simulation targets only young physicians with under 10 years of experience and allows a $200,000 increase in
average salary in all rural areas. Since the majority of the programs and grants are tax-free loan payments on
both loan principal and interest, the simulation is similar to an increase in disposable income for physicians. An
increase in average salary by $200,000 for one year for all rural areas is a generous version of the policy. Given
that the average rural annual salary is around $220,000 dollars in the time period of the study, the simulation
allows for almost a doubling of income for rural physicians. However, the generous version of the policy allows
us to observe whether an increase in lump sum salary affects physician location behavior and retention in the
best case scenario. Table 2.14 shows the difference between the likelihood of movement averaged over all years
between the baseline simulation without the policy and the respective policy simulations. As shown in the table,
a lump-sum increase in salary decreases the likelihood of moving within NC but by a small amount.
However, retention of physicians in rural areas is another important aim of the policy. To evaluate the
retention of physicians in the same rural area, I calculate the probability of moving away after one year or after
two years of service in a rural area conditional on observing a move during the simulated time periods.28 An
increase in retention is captured by a significant decrease in the probability of moving away from the same area.
Table 2.15 shows that a lump-sum increase in non-labor salary slightly decreases the probability of moving away
after one or two years of service for both male and female physicians. This finding supports the literature that
physicians tend to move to rural areas with loan forgiveness programs, but they only stay until the expiration of
their contract and retention of physicians after program expiration is low.29
28I have generated other indicators to capture retention, but this is the most narrow definition of retention which would allow us to
accurately capture whether or not the policy has an effect on physician retention in the same location of employment.
29In addition to assessing physician retention rates associated with policy intervention, I examine whether the physicians who remain in
a county are similar to those who leave. Importantly, we may care about the quality of physicians who remain in the rural areas. Since
there are no quality measures in the physician licensure database, I rely on observable physician characteristics to proxy for physician
quality. Table A.16 and A.17 exhibit physician demographics in all counties and in only rural counties for each policy simulation
compared with the benchmark simulation. Across gender, race, nationality, age, experience, and specialty types, physicians are not
significantly different between the benchmark model and different types of policy simulations. These results suggest that heterogenous
responses to policy changes, conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, will not generate differences in quality in different areas.
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Table 2.14: One-Time Lump-Sum Increase in Non-Labor Income Simulation
Activity and Movement Movement and Rurality Conditional upon Moving
Percentage Change in
Probability by Scenario
Do Not
Move
Move within
NC
Move out of
NC
Become
Inactive
Move within
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move within
County to Rural
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Rural
Zipcode
Increase salary of all rural
counties by $200,000 in year
2003
1.07 -1.40 -8.53 -29.43 -6.72 36.57 2.09 3.72
Increase salary of all rural
counties by $200,000 in all
years
1.56 -3.79 -9.54 -34.33 -5.06 37.89 5.41 -9.75
Increase salary of all rural
counties by $200,000 in all
years for young doctors
1.35 -3.68 -6.16 -29.83 -8.58 33.22 5.46 6.16
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Table 2.15: Lump Sum Non-Labor Income-Retention
All Male Female
Percentage Change in Probability by
Scenario
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Increase salary of all rural counties by
$200, 000 in 2003
-0.24 -0.96 -0.14 -0.44 -0.83 0.58
Increase salary of all rural counties by
$200, 000 in all years
-3.17 -2.57 -4.68 -4.24 -0.92 0.14
Increase salary of all rural counties by
$200, 000 in all years for young doctors
-0.37 -0.13 -1.38 -0.15 0.92 -0.68
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Experiment B: Proportional Increase in Salary
Another policy that has been used by some countries to draw physicians to rural areas and retain them is
an increase in reimbursement rates for physicians. The rationale behind this targeted incentive is the belief that
physicians are rational economic agents. If some form of economic inducement enhances the reimbursement for
rural services, then physicians are more likely to locate in these areas and remain there. This approach has been
met with some success in Britain, Canada, and Australia, using a variety of bonuses to increase reimbursement
for selected rural practitioners (Rosenblatt 2006). One of the reimbursement strategies in the US has targeted care
provided for Medicaid and Medicare recipients. For example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
of 1987 provided a bonus payment of 5-percent of the amount paid by Medicare for physicians providing care
in rural primary care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs). In 1991 the bonus payment was increased to
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10 percent, and eligibility was expanded to include reimbursement for services provided by physicians of certain
specialties in urban HPSAs.
To simulate this type of change and to differentiate between an expansion in Medicare and Medicaid cover-
age, I allow a percentage increase in salary of 5, 10, and 20 percent in rural areas. Tables 2.16 and 2.17 show
the simulated probabilities of movement and retention in the same county of employment. A 5-percent increase
in average salary in all rural counties increases the likelihood of a physician staying in the same zipcode by 3.96
percent and decreases the probability of movement by 13.03 percent. Conditional on moving, a proportional
increase in salary does not increase the probability of moving to rural areas, within the county and out of the
county. However, the retention of physicians in the same county increases with an increase in reimbursement
rate and there is a decreasing marginal return to larger increases in salary (10 or 20 percent). Table 2.17 shows
that a 5-percent increase in average salary decreases the probability of moving after one year by 11.7 percent and
of moving after two years by 6.7 percent. The effect is larger among male physicians (12.2 percent) than female
physicians (4.3 percent). Although a percentage increase in salary in rural areas is not effective in inducing
physician movement, the reimbursement policy is effective at increasing physician retention in rural areas. The
behavior difference between men and women is consistent with the literature, where female physicians are more
likely to move for non-pecuniary reasons such as moving for a spouse’s job opportunities.
Table 2.16: Proportional Income Increase Simulation
Activity and Movement Movement and Rurality
Percentage Change in
Probability by Scenario
Do Not
Move
Move within
NC
Move out of
NC
Become
Inactive
Move within
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move within
County to Rural
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Rural
Zipcode
Increase salary of all rural
counties by 5% in all years
3.96 -13.03 -35.71 -46.74 13.05 10.95 -6.06 -44.47
Increase salary of all rural
counties by 10% in all years
3.98 -13.20 -35.59 -46.57 12.81 9.86 -5.27 -44.49
Increase salary of all rural
counties by 20% in all years
4.06 -13.71 -35.55 -46.74 12.31 11.77 -5.17 -43.69
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
41
Table 2.17: Proportional Salary Increase-Retention
All Male Female
Percentage Change in Probability
by Scenario
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Increase salary of all rural counties
by 5% in all years
-11.69 -6.69 -12.24 -8.04 -4.33 -3.71
Increase salary of all rural counties
by 10% in all years
-14.21 -7.05 -14.69 -8.59 -4.43 -4.22
Increase salary of all rural counties
by 20% in all years
-15.41 -6.98 -15.27 -8.33 -8.11 -4.74
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Experiment C: Change in the Composition of Medical Professionals
Policy makers have also attempted to influence physician behavior by changing the composition of their
substitutes and complements. A recent MGMA publication shows a positive effect of mid-level practitioners
(i.e., APNs and PAs) in areas with a physician shortage. To simulate an increase in mid-level practitioners, I
allow a 5-percent increase in all rural areas. To simulate a shock to physician complements in rural areas, I
allow a 5-percent increase in RNs for all rural areas. Although there are no policies enacted that target RNs
specifically, an increase in rural physician resources or funding can be translated to an increased ability to hire
more nurses.
Table 2.18 shows the effect of these two simulations. An increase in mid-level practitioners decreases the
likelihood of remaining in the same area and moving. However, the likelihood of being inactive increases 2.8
percentage points (i.e., physicians are 1.6 times more likely to become inactive compare to the physicians who
did not receive the policy), which supports the theory that an increase in physician substitutes could induce
physicians to exit the labor force. Conditional on moving, physicians are 5.17 percent less likely to move within
the county to an urban area and 31.29 percent more likely to move within the county to a rural zipcode and
18.05 percent more likely to move out of the county to an urban zipcode and 30.24 percent less likely to move
out of the county to a rural zipcode. On the other hand, a 5-percent increase in RNs increases the probability of
moving by 15 percentage point (121 percentage increase or 1.2 times more likely) and decreases the probability
of staying in the same area of employment by 13.8 percentage point (16.56 percentage decrease). Conditional
on moving, the policy also has a sizable effect on physician relocation behavior by increasing the likelihood of
moving within the same county to a rural zipcode by 25.8 percentage point (3.75 times more likely).
In terms of retention, Table 2.19 shows that an increase in midlevel practitioners significantly increases the
probability of moving after one or two years of service by 15.7 percent and 8.3 percent respectively for all
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physicians. Combined with the increase in inactivity, an increase in midlevel practitioners in rural areas allows
physicians to exit the labor force earlier and decrease their stay in rural areas. On the other hand, an increase in
RNs decreases the probability of leaving after one or two years of service by 13.8 percent and 2.7 percent. This
finding could mean that an increase in RNs, a complement to physicians in areas with an existing shortage, may
decrease the likelihood of burn out in those areas and decrease movement away from rural counties. Similar to
the previous reimbursement rate experiment, males are more receptive to the policy change than their female
counterparts.
Table 2.18: Increase in Midlevel Practitioners or RN Simulation
Activity and Movement Movement and Rurality
Percentage Change in
Probability by Scenario
Do Not
Move
Move within
NC
Move out of
NC
Become
Inactive
Move within
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move within
County to Rural
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Rural
Zipcode
Increase midlevel
practitioners in rural counties
by 5% in all years
-1.71 -9.37 -10.14 163.59 -5.17 31.29 18.05 -30.24
Increase RN in rural counties
by 5% in all years
-16.56 121.43 -20.21 -39.70 -0.19 375.72 -58.23 -75.81
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Table 2.19: Increase in Midlevel Practitioners or RN Simulation-Retention
All Male Female
Percentage Change in Probability
by Scenario
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Increase midlevel practitioner in
rural counties by 5% in all years
15.71 8.30 15.27 7.24 15.30 8.97
Increase RN in rural counties by
5% in all years
-13.76 -2.70 -15.27 -3.80 -3.32 -1.93
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Experiment D: Increase in Medicaid and Medicare Eligibles
The recent changes in Medicare and Medicaid have altered the programs’ eligibility requirements, which
could potentially affect physician behavior. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Oba-
macare”), Medicaid eligibility for U.S. citizens and legal residents increased significantly. The law allows adults
without dependent children to qualify for coverage with income up to 133 percent of the poverty line.
To see the change in physician professional and geographical outcomes, I first allow a simple 10-percent
increase in the number of Medicaid and Medicare eligibles in rural counties. This type of simulation is different
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from the second set of policy experiments that capture an increase in reimbursement rates for Medicare and
Medicare eligibles. Tables 2.20 and 2.21 report the changes in the probabilities of moving and retention. An
increase in Medicare and Medicaid eligibles slightly decreases the likelihood of moving. Conditional on moving,
an increase in Medicaid eligibles increases the probability of movement within the county to a rural area by 29.74
percent and out of the county to an urban area by 18.29 percent. Similar to an increase of midlevel practitioners,
an increase in Medicaid eligibles increases physician inactivity by almost 1.39 percentage points (180 percentage
increase or 1.8 times more likely). The finding is similar to an increase in Medicare eligibles. In both simulations,
the probability of moving away after one or two years of service increases across genders. An increase in
Medicaid or Medicare eligibles increases the likelihood of moving away after one (two) year of service by 22.2
(10) percent or 21.6 (10.9) percent, respectively. The finding is consistent with physicians moving away from
rural areas because Medicaid and Medicare patients have a lower reimbursement rate, higher reimbursement
wait time, and more complex paperwork than private insurance. The effect is similar in magnitude for both male
and female physicians.
Table 2.20: Increase Medicare or Medicaid Eligibles Simulation
Activity and Movement Movement and Rurality
Percentage Change in
Probability by Scenario
Do Not
Move
Move within
NC
Move out of
NC
Become
Inactive
Move within
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move within
County to Rural
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Urban
Zipcode
Move out of
County to Rural
Zipcode
Increase Medicaid in rural
counties by 10% in all years
-2.32 -8.12 -7.45 180.32 -5.12 29.74 18.29 -30.13
Increase Medicare in rural
counties by 10% in all years
-2.35 -7.99 -2.58 173.92 -5.32 29.90 18.39 -29.62
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Table 2.21: Increase Medicare or Medicaid Eligibles Simulation-Retention
All Male Female
Percentage Change in Probability
by Scenario
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Increase Medicaid in rural counties
by 10% in all years
22.17 9.97 21.32 9.36 22.58 10.03
Increase Medicare in rural counties
by 10% in all years
21.56 10.87 20.77 10.16 20.65 10.08
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
The aforementioned simulations consider an increase in Medicare and Medicaid coverage, while holding the
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population of other insurance recipients constant or assuming that the increase in public insurance only affected
the uninsured population. This assumption could be unrealistic because, theoretically, an increase in public
insurance would affect the privately-insured and uninsured population due to a crowding-out effect.
Dubay (1999) defines the potential crowd-out effect and outlines a topography of transitions from private
to public insurance. He categories the new public enrollees into four groups: (1) transitions from uninsured to
publicly insured; (2) involuntary transitions from Employer Sponsored Insurance to public insurance (e.g. job
loss); (3) voluntary transitions from Employer Sponsored Insurance to public insurance; and (4) publicly insured
who gain eligibility for Employer Sponsored Insurance, but remain on public insurance.
Crowd-out effects are commonly defined as the latter two categories of new enrollees and can occur when
an individual drops private insurance due to a public coverage expansion or retains subsidized coverage when
an employer sponsored offer becomes available. Early work by Cutler and Guber (1996) find that 50 percent
of the increase in Medicaid was associated with a decrease in private insurance after Medicaid coverage was
expanded to pregnant women and children between 1987-1992. Recent studies found a much lower crowd-out
estimates for the same Medicaid expansions and the later Childrens Health Insurance Program/CHIP (Gruber &
Simon, 2008; Thorpe & Florence, 1998; LoSasso & Buchmueller, 2004; Shore-Sheppard 2008; Ham & Shore-
Sheppard, 2005). In an aggregating study by Sommers et al. (2007), the authors find private to public substitution
for children covered by CHIP ranging from a low of 7.4 percent to a high of 19.1 percent using ten case studies
in different states. For the adult population, several studies have found that there is minimal substitution of
private insurance by public insurance in low income parents and/or adult in poverty (Aizer & Grogger, 2003;
Dubay & Kenney, 1997; Kronick and Gilmer, 2002), but a significant reduction in private coverage for the
near-poor and overall population (Kronick and Gilmer, 2002; Busch and Duchovny, 2005). However, many
of the studies did not consider the potential decrease in private insurance from job loss or minimal availability
of employer-sponsored coverage among low income workers. To focus on the new Medicaid enrollees from
the ACA using survey data from Ohio, Seiber and Sahr (2011) found that substitution effect, or crowding out
effect, remain low because it affects low-income adults (up to 133 percent FPL). More specifically, they found
only 2.9 percent to 4.6 percent of new Medicaid adults substituted public for private coverage in the data after
controlling for involuntary substitution. Of the voluntary substitution, two-thirds report that they could not
afford the insurance offered by their employer. They also found the voluntary substitution remained low for
families earning above 100 percent to 150 percent of poverty level because all transitions from private coverage
to Medicaid (both voluntary and involuntary) are only 10 percent higher than the previously studied group. The
same result is confirmed by a more recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine by Frean, Gruber, and
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Sommers (2016). Since the passage of ACA, the insured rate has dropped from 16 percent to 9 percent and 44
percent of coverage gains is due to enrollment of previously eligible adults and children, 19 percent of coverage
is gained due to enrollment of adults who became newly eligible in 2014, and 37 percent of the gains are due
to premium subsidies, but there was no significant reduction in private coverage as a result of the Medicaid
expansion. Therefore, my previous simulations under the assumption that public insurance expansion affects
only the uninsured population could be applied to the ACA Medicaid expansion because it did not crowd out
private insurance.
Since most expansion of public insurance is coupled with an increase in physician salary to compensate
for the increase in workload (e.g., US states that expanded Medicaid under ACA also increased reimbursement
rate for physicians), a more realistic simulation for an area with an increase in public insurance would includes
a simultaneous increase in salary for physicians. Table 2.22 shows that by including an increase in salary for
physicians in conjunction with Medicaid expansion, majority of the decrease in retention from the previous
simulation is negated, which could explain the physicians supply remaining relatively stable geographically
after ACA is implemented in the after 2012.
Table 2.22: Increase Medicaid Enrollees and Salary Simulation (ACA) -Retention
All Male Female
Percentage Change in Probability
by Scenario
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Prob of Moving
after One Year
Prob of Moving
after Two Years
Increase Medicaid in rural counties
by 10% and increase salary by 5%
in all years
4.25 1.68 6.61 2.63 3.16 -2.88
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
2.7 Conclusion
This research uses a dynamic multiple-equation approach to examine physician professional and geographic
outcomes in North Carolina. In particular, the results provide insights into the underlying mechanisms behind
physician intra-state migration and the effectiveness of policy interventions. Using data on the population of
physicians in NC from 2003 to 2012, I jointly model physicians’ dynamic behavior relating to activity, location,
facility, and hours of direct patient care. In this model, I allow physicians’ behavior histories, individual char-
acteristics, and time-varying county-level characteristics that capture amenities, number of physician substitutes
or complements, and demand for healthcare professionals to affect physicians’ current behaviors.
Simulations based on the estimated model demonstrate several major findings. Firstly, simulated loan for-
giveness programs that aim to attract and retain physicians in rural areas are not as effective as a simulated
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increase in physician reimbursement rates. Although the simulated loan forgiveness policy is the most generous
version of the loan forgiveness program, I find that the policy does not significantly decrease the likelihood of
movement nor does it decrease the probability of moving away from rural areas after one or two years of ser-
vice (i.e., retention). This finding is congruent with previous findings where a majority of the enrollees in loan
forgiveness programs leave underserved areas after completion of the program. However, a 5-percent increase
in rural county physician salary, simulated as an increase in reimbursement rate, decreases the probability of
moving away from the same rural area significantly, and male physicians are more receptive to policy changes
than their female counterparts.
Secondly, a change in the composition of healthcare providers in a rural area significantly affects physician
movement and retention in the same area of employment. A 5-percent increase in midlevel practitioners in rural
counties not only increases the probability of physicians moving away from the area after one or two years of
service but also increases the likelihood of a physician becoming inactive. However, a 5-percent increase in RNs
in rural counties significantly decreases the likelihood of physician leaving rural areas.
Lastly, considering the simulated effects of Medicaid and Medicare expansion on physicians, I find that both
policy experiments increase physician movement away from their county of service and increase the likelihood
of inactivity. The findings could be explained by physicians moving away from rural areas or transitioning into
inactivity because Medicaid and Medicare are more complicated and time-costly than private insurance.
There are several important extensions that can be explored in future research. First, the current model
is a partial equilibrium model and takes the demand for medical professionals as given. Hence, the simulation
captures the behaviors of physicians in light of the assumption that labor demand is fixed. A two-sided model that
includes the demand for healthcare professionals, as well as physician labor supply, would be more accurate in
capturing the general equilibrium effects that occur when health care policy changes. Policies such as building a
new hospital in a rural area or restructuring rural healthcare clinics could be tested under the general equilibrium
model. Secondly, the research sample only includes active licensed physicians after completion of medical
school and residency. Although initial selection into rural areas is considered in the current model, a more in-
depth analysis of professional behaviors could be performed with data that include medical school selection and
residency training, as well as initial employment, location, and facility type.
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CHAPTER 3
O PHYSICIAN, WHERE ART THOU? IDENTIFYING THE EFFECT OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY ON
AMBULATORY CARE SENSITIVE CONDITION ADMISSIONS
3.1 Introduction
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSC) are preventable or manageable with access to a primary
care physician and medication, and may lead to hospitalization when not treated. Hospitalization rates related to
these conditions is a manifestation of an unnecessarily ailing population and can be an expensive problem for the
individual patients as well as the society. Research has shown that hospitalization for ACSC is eight times more
expensive than a visit to a primary care physician (PCP) for ACSC (outpatient care) (Galarraga et al. 2015) and
that ACSC constitute as many as half of all hospitalizations (depending on the classification used) in the US. For
these reasons, improved access to preventative care for ACSC is one of the most important goals in healthcare
today. Because many costly federal and state programs are implemented with this goal, researchers have studied
the relationship between the supply of PCPs (the source of preventative care for ACSC) and hospitalization for
ACSC. However, the results in both the health policy and health management literatures are mixed.
The findings of the extant literature range from the presence of more PCPs in an area decreases hospitaliza-
tion for ACSC, has no effect, or even increases hospitalizations for ACSC. The current research suffers from two
statistical problems that could, theoretically, produce each of these outcomes and, empirically, lead to incorrect
inference about the effect of PCPs on hospitalizations for ACSC. The first and most critical issue is the problem
of reverse causality or simultaneity bias. That is, although the number of PCPs may affect hospitalization for
ACSC, physicians tend to locate in areas where there is a high incidence of these or any other illness (i.e., ACSC
admissions also affect the number of PCPs or an increase in ACSC would attract more physician due to the in-
crease in demand for physician services). Ignoring this feedback effect would result in an underestimation of the
effect of PCPs i.e., make PCPs appear less effective in preventing hospitalizations for ACSC, having no effect on
ACSC or even make them appear to increase hospitalizations for ACSC.1 The second problem, omitted variable
bias, results when a variable that affects both the number of occurrences of ACSC in a county and the decision
of a physician to locate in a county is not controlled for in the analysis. The omitted variable could make the
1That is, if we assume the simultaneity bias is positive.
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effect of PCPs on hospitalizations for ACSC appear spuriously larger or smaller.2 The problem of simultaneity
bias is not addressed in any of the existing literature while omitted variable bias is a problem in most existing
studies.
Due to these issues, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method commonly used in the literature is not capable
of delivering unbiased and consistent parameter estimates. This chapter addresses this particular endogeneity
issue by exploring an exogenous change in the physician labor force stemming from the federal and state-level
policy called Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) designation. The chapter also addresses the issue
of omitted variable bias by including a set of county-level characteristics. I use the Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design to correctly identify the causal relationship between PCP supply and ACSC admissions. RD is
a type of quasi-experimental design that evaluates the causal effects of interventions (e.g., a policy change on
the physician supply) by assigning a cutoff or threshold above or below which an intervention is assigned. By
comparing observations lying closely on either side of the threshold, RD is able to estimate the average treatment
effect of the intervention on the dependent variable of interest.
For my analyses, I use the North Carolina physician licensure database, hospital discharge data, and ag-
gregate county-level variables from 2003-2007. Individual physician and patient information are aggregated to
the county-level through zipcodes and matched to county characteristics. A broad selection of ACSC ailments
appropriate for diverse inpatient data across different patient demographics are used, as well as subcategories of
ACSC, such as chronic, acute, and preventable ailments. I also include a rich set of county characteristics that
address the potential for omitted variable bias.
Using the constructed database, the OLS method, which fails to address simultaneity or omitted variable
bias, produces a positive relationship between PCPs and ACSC using my data, where an increase in PCP supply
increases ACSC admissions. However, after accounting for both reverse causality and omitted variable using RD
and a set of county-level characteristics, I find a significant negative relationship between PCP supply and ACSC
admissions. This analysis provides strong evidence that an increased supply of PCPs decreases admissions for
ACSC, which has large ramifications for health care costs. The results support calls for programs aimed at
redistribution of PCPs by population. I use two separate model specifications to study the effect of PCPs on
hospitalization for ACSC; one in levels while controlling for population and another that normalizes all variables
by population. Both models reveal a similar negative relationship. After controlling for aggregate county-level
2For example, consider the amount of air pollution in a county: Increased air pollution would be associated with a higher incidence of
ACSC, but it would also tend to dissuade physicians from living in that county. This unobserved variable would make the coefficient
more negative than it would be if this omitted variable is controlled for. Such an effect would make PCPs seem better than they are in
preventing hospitalization from ACSC.
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variables such as income, the number of Medicare eligible persons, and hospital resources, I find that whether
the county is urban or rural has no significant impact on hospitalizations for ACSC. This finding dispels the
notion that living in a rural area alone has a negative impact on hospitalization for chronic conditions. On the
subcategories of ACSC, I find physician supply has the strongest effect on chronic ACSC while the effect is the
lowest and insignificant with preventable ACSC.
Additional analyses are performed by age group, gender, and race to evaluate whether there are heteroge-
neous effects by patient demographics. Access to physicians has a slightly higher effect on female patients than
their male counterparts, while patients in age group (40-64) and (65-85) benefit most from access to primary
care doctors. I did not find significant differences across races, which means that access to physicians has a
similar effect on all races after controlling for economic variables.
The next section breaks the existing literature into two groups and briefly describes some of the findings.
Section 3 gives a brief history of the past and present policies enacted by the government to deal with the
uneven distribution of physicians in the United States, which are used as policy instruments in our analysis.
Data constructed for this chapter and their respective summary statistics are presented in Section 4. Section 5
describes the empirical model using RD and Section 6 shows the results. Section 7 concludes the analyses with
directions for future research.
3.2 Literature Review
Although numerous studies in public health and health policy examine ACSC admissions, the relationship
between ACSC conditions and access to physicians is often overlooked or not sufficiently addressed. Among
studies that measure the effect of the availability of PCPs on ACSC, the results are mixed. In this section, I
review the literature on the definition of ACSC and the relationship between ACSC and PCP access.
Literature concerning ACSC is divided into two strands. One strand of research evaluates the selection of
ailments that have been classified as ACSC over time. Because ACSC designation was developed initially as
a measure of access to care for the non-elderly population, a critical examination of the selection of ailments
across time and population-at-risk is required to construct the ailment database used in this chapter. The other
strand of research studies the effect of access to PCPs on hospitalization for ACSC.
Rutstein (1976) first measured the quality of medical care using counts of unnecessary or preventable ail-
ments. In the paper, he provided a list of hundreds of ailments separated into groups, such as “unnecessary
disease”, “unnecessary disability”, “unnecessary untimely death”, and “others ailments”. Due to advances in
the medical technology and quality of care overtime, the last 40 years has seen an almost complete eradication
of several of the diseases on the list such as smallpox, polio, plague, and yellow fever. The set of preventable
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ailments has been updated while keeping true to the general qualifications over time. Existing papers (Billings
et al., 1993; Institute of Medicine, 1993; Bindman et al., 1995; Pappas, 1997; Ricketts, 2001; McCall et al.,
2001; Laditka et al., 2005) categorize similar sets of ailments that can be applied to different populations with
some small variations. Because the data used in this chapter include all hospital discharges in a five-year period,
the annual patient population varies by age, gender, and economic characteristics. Therefore, I include a broader
selection of ailments (17 general categories) than most of the current literature in order to study the relationship
between physician supply and ACSC hospital admissions across different types of ACSC.
Using ACSC specification similar to the framework set forth by McCall (2001), I separate ACSC into three
broad subcategories: chronic, acute, and preventable. This categorization scheme allows me to study the effect
of physicians on categories containing similar ailments, rather than for the seventeen ACSC independently. Most
of the chronic conditions are incurable if diagnosed, but admission to the hospital is preventable if the patient has
adequate access to a PCP. The six chronic conditions include: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD),
asthma, diabetes mellitus, epilepsy and recurrent seizures, congestive heart failures, and hypertension. Subcate-
gories under COPD are characterized by irreversible airflow limitation include chronic bronchitis, emphysema,
bronchiectasis, and chronic airway obstruction. Acute ACSC are normally acute manifestations of chronic ail-
ments or acute episodes of a usually treatable condition that do not require hospitalization. The eight conditions
currently categorized as acute ACSC are: pneumonia (hypersensitivity pneumonitis and organism unspecified
pneumonia), pulmonary tuberculosis, urinary tract infection (UTI), hypoglycemia, cellulitis, hypokalemia, ulcer,
and severe ear-nose-throat infection. The last category, preventable conditions, includes gangrene, influenza, and
malnutrition. These conditions usually take a long time to manifest (gangrene and malnutrition), or are usually
easier to prevent hospitalization (influenza) than any acute ACSC. Although gangrene is sometimes considered
as an acute manifestation of chronic diabetes type 1 or 2, this chapter uses a broader definition of gangrene
that includes any tissue necrosis due to non-diabetic disease (e.g., Raynaud’s, infectious organism, peripheral
vascular disease, and phagedena). Higher hospitalization rates with any of ACSC listed above would suggest
low accessibility to PCP or low quality of the PCP system.
Statistical studies that examine the relationship between physician supply and ACSC find mixed results.
Krakauer et al. (1996) find that physician supply levels and distribution have very little influence on ACSC
admission rates using linear regression models on cross-sectional data. The authors also find that the effect
is even smaller on mortality rates, except in areas with extremely low physician supply. In the paper using
similar NC discharge data, Ricketts et al. (2001) find there is no significant relation between physician primary
care resources and ACSC admission rate. The only predictors of ACSC rates are income and other economic
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conditions in the area. Ricketts claims that adverse health outcomes are explained by the socio-economic factors
in the market instead of the health care system.
Other papers find a negative relationship (Parchman et al. 1994, Laditka et al. 2005, Ansari et al. 2012) using
different datasets across time and counties. Similar results are also found among the Medicare beneficiaries in
both rural and urban areas (Culler et al. 1998, McCall et al. 2001). Some authors found a correlation between
rurality and ACSC admissions, which they attribute to the lack of primary care access (Komaromy et al., 1996;
Laditka et al., 2004).
Work by Schreiber and Zielinski (1997) reports a positive relationship between the number of physicians
and ACSC. Controlling for poverty, population density, proximity to hospital and number of PCPs, Schreiber
found that the number of primary care providers and proximity to a hospital are both positively associated with
ACSC admissions while population density is negatively correlated with admission rates. The authors further
caution against the usage of ACSC as an indicator for PC shortages in existing policies.
Overall, the findings concerning the effect of physician supply on ACSC admission rates run the gamut
from a positive relationship to a negative relationship. All of the existing research falls prey to two major
statistical shortcomings, simultaneity and omitted variable bias. Papers that uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
or generalized linear regression without considering the fact that two variables on either side of the equation
would influence each other at the same time, or the flow of causality is not one hundred percent from PCP to
ACSC admissions, potentially biasing the coefficients. Other papers only focus on the relationship between
PCP and ACSC without considering characteristics in the area that affect both the supply of physicians and the
patient demographics. To address these issues, I attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity through the
RD method and by including a broader range of county-level characteristics.
3.3 Existing Policies
In the 1950s and 1960s, migration of rural physicians into urban areas, combined with increasing specializa-
tion among physicians decreased the PCP supply in the US, especially in rural areas. The US Congress created
the Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) indication and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) in
the 1970s to easily and clearly identify areas in need of physicians and other health professionals in order to
address the physician shortage problem. To be considered a HPSA, an application with reasons for the request,
accompanied by data, must be sent to the Health Resource and Service Administration (HRSA).
There are three classifications of HPSA designation for different types of physician shortages: primary
medical care, dental, and mental health. Within each HPSA, shortages can be sorted into three categories:
geographic areas, population groups, or facilities. For this chapter, I use the designation of whether or not a
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county exhibits PCP shortage by geographic area because ACSC admission is measured at the hospital level
from inpatient data. I do not use shortages by population because this designation generally captures access
barriers that prevent certain population groups from using medical services, which is difficult to capture using
existing county-level data.3 I also do not use the facility designation of HPSA because, for facilities to receive
HPSA, they have to be a Federal or State Correctional Institution with a particular number of inmates or a
non-profit facility such as a migrant health center. The mechanisms behind population and facility HPSA are
different from the effect this chapter is trying to measure.
For a county to be assigned primary care HPSA, the physician to population ratio in the county must be
lower than 1:3500. The threshold is strict with one exception. Any county that exhibits high need can request
a lower threshold of 1:3000. High need designation is assigned if at least one of three criteria are met: the area
has more than 100 births per year per 1,000 women of child-bearing age, the area has more than 20 infant deaths
per 1,000 live births, or the area is one in which more than 20 percent of the population have incomes below the
poverty level.
The timing of HPSA designation assignment and retraction depends on the amount of backlog and process-
ing time at both the state and federal levels. An inquiry to offices in charge of North Carolina and federal HRSA
reveals that the assignment requires reconciling the submitted application with data from the census bureau and
physician licensure data. However, additional checks might be performed by phone and in person if needed.
Therefore, confirmation of HPSA assignment ranges from less one month to years. Although requests for HPSA
assignment are normally initialized by the county, there have been incidences where the state HRSA gives the
HPSA designation to counties that have not applied but show need consistently.
For areas recognized as an HPSA, the NHSC agency would provide both job opportunities and loan repay-
ment for physicians who are willing to relocate to these areas and provide service. The first clinician was placed
by NHSC in 1972 and, since then, more than 30,000 clinicians have served in the Corps. According to the report
published in 2012 by the Community Health Councils (CHC), more than 7,500 clinics and 10,000 sites currently
participate in the program, serving over 7 million patients across the United States.4
For medical students in their final year of medical school, NHSC’s Students to Service Loan Repayment Pro-
gram (S2S LRP) provides a tax-free award up to $120,000 to medical students (MD and DO) for a commitment
to provide full-time primary health care for at least 3 years or part-time for at least 6 years at an NHSC-indicated
3HRSA defines barriers to access as economic, linguistic, cultural, architectural, or refusal of some provider to accept certain types of
patients or to accept Medicare/Medicaid payments.
4http://chc-inc.org/downloads/PB/20HPSA/20Guide/2010-08-12.pdf
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HPSA of greatest need. Physicians continuing to work in those areas after completion are eligible for more
loan forgiveness. PCPs who already have a board license can get up to $50,000 to repay their loan through the
NHSC Loan Repayment Program in exchange for a two-year commitment. NHSC also provides a scholarship
to current medical students for each year of financial support (up to four years) if the student agrees to serve one
year (minimum two years in total) in an HPSA.
The loan repayment programs are only available to U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals, but there are other policies
initiated by the US to draw foreign physicians to underserved areas through the Department of Health and
Human Service (HHS), the Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Citizens and Immigration Service. A
foreign physician who currently on a J1 visa or exchange visitor classification, who is interested in serving in an
HPSA, can apply for an extension of the J1 visa (or be granted a waiver of the J1 visa two-year foreign resident
requirement). A J1 visa extension allows for a longer stay in the U.S., so a foreign physician has more time to
acquire a Green Card or US permanent residency. The foreign resident requirement waiver allows them to adjust
their status (J1 to permanent residency) without leaving the country. Both policies are extremely attractive to
foreign physicians and have increased the number of foreign physicians in the US after their implementation.
The retraction process of HPSA designation is always initialized by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in the form of a formal letter to the county’s primary care office (PCO). The county is then allowed 60
days to counter the retraction of the HPSA designation. If no additional evidence is presented, the county loses
its HPSA designation and respective benefit. In North Carolina, the retraction process is initialized by the state
on all HPSA areas every three to four years. However, retraction depends on the amount of backlog and when
the county first applied for the designation. No new assignment or retraction is performed when the database is
updated in NC, the timing of which is determined randomly by the state government. The new system should
be completed in June 2017. The new system should decrease the time between checks and retraction to no more
than three years.
Based on publicly-available information provided by the state and federal departments in charge of HPSA
designation, both assignment and retraction require coordination between the state and federal government,
which may depend on random, non-HPSA events. While initiation and retraction are prompted by a countys
proximity the PCP-to-population threshold, the timing of the actual designation (i.e., which determines program
availability) is exogenous.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
In the following section, I describe the datasets used for estimation: the North Carolina Hospital Discharge
data, the Physician Licensure Database from the North Carolina Medical Board, and the aggregate county
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database-Log Into North Carolina (LINC). Databases are merged using zipcodes, which I aggregate to the
county-level. As noted by Ricketts (2001), North Carolina is a diverse state with a relatively equal distribu-
tion of urban and rural counties across its 100 total counties. The ability to link the entire inpatient population
and the physician population by zipcode provides us an opportunity to explore the relationship between primary
physician supply and ACSC admission rates by patient demographics over time.
3.4.1 Inpatient Hospital Discharge Data (Patient-Level Data)
The annual hospital discharge data for inpatient services are collected by Truven Health Analytics (Truven)
from all NC hospitals. This chapter uses data from 2003 to 2007. Variables included in the data are patient ori-
gins, patient characteristics, total days spent in the hospital, physician diagnoses, procedure performed, cost, and
discharge status. Among the patient origins variables, I use patient self-reported residence zipcode to determine
from which county the patient originates and the distance to the hospital of admission. Patient characteristics
such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, and insurance are used to stratify the sample group for analysis. Table
B.9 displays the demographic breakdown of all patients in NC over time, with a total of 5,481,258 patient-year
observations. Discharges of patients from the hospital are broken down into multiple categories, where around
75 percent are discharged to home, self or outpatient care, 12 percent are transferred to a facility that provides
nursing, custodial or support care, and three percent expired during their stay.
In the discharge data, patients can receive up to nine diagnoses from physicians. The first diagnosis code
is an optional admission diagnosis whereby a physician diagnoses the patient based upon medical information
from their prior location or makes an on the spot diagnosis when the patient is admitted. The other eight
diagnoses are made after the patient is admitted. All diagnoses used in this chapter are from the International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, or usually called by the short-form name
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes, not the Diagnosis-related group (DRG). For the data in
this chapter, an older version of the ICD-9 code is used instead of ICD-10 to keep the data uniform. Using
the ACSC classification outlined by McCall (2001), Table B.1 displays the breakdown of ICD-9 codes for all
ACSC ailments. Patients with any diagnosis that falls under the ICD-9 codes is counted toward the final counts
of ACSC occurrences. The total number of ACSC over time is listed in Table B.3, broken down into five
categories: ACSC, chronic, acute, preventable, and multiple. ACSC indicates that the patient exhibits at least
one ailment, while the next three categories (chronic, acute, preventable) are subcategories of ACSC. The last
group, multiple, means the patient exhibits at least two of the three subcategories. The table also separates the
ailment groups by patient county of origin: rural or urban. As expected, the population adjusted ACSC ratio is
significantly higher for rural areas than for urban areas. Tables B.5 and B.7 break down the average cost and
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days stayed. On average, most ACSC exhibit a higher cost and longer hospital stay than non-ACSC.
3.4.2 Physician Licensure Database (Physician-Level Data)
The North Carolina Physician Licensure Database from the North Carolina Medical Board provides annual
physician-level data from 2003 to 2012. The data are collected and released by the North Carolina Health
Professions Data System (HPDS). The database tracks the universe of physician applications for NC medical
licenses, which must be renewed annually. It provides a comprehensive view of the physician labor force in the
state and allows a researcher to track the movement of all physicians within the state over time.
Prior to May 2009, the state allowed two methods for annual license renewal: paper and electronic. Com-
plicated to process and prone to mistakes, paper applications have been phased out in favor of an electronic
renewal process on the NC Medical Board website. Because medical licenses are time delimited, the Board
sends a renewal notice two months before each physician’s deadline (dated as his/her birthday). On average,
the electronic renewal process takes about 15 minutes because the information regarding education history, de-
mographics, and work history often remains unchanged. If a physician changed location of practice, facility
type, or specialty, they must update this information. Many physicians also provide updates when they decide to
become inactive, by indicating retirement or other reasons. Inactive physicians that annually update their status
can avoid a time-consuming reinstatement process should they decide to return to practice.5
If a physician fails to renew the license on time, a grace period of 30 days is provided and the physician
is charged an additional late fee. If renewal is not completed during the grace period, the license is placed on
inactive status and it is illegal to practice medicine or surgery, write prescriptions or administer prescription
drugs in NC under any circumstances. If the inactivity period is less than one year, it is necessary to pay an
additional fee and undergo a background check to reactivate the license.
However, if there has been an interruption in the continuous, clinical practice of medicine greater than two
years, the applicant may have to reestablish his or her competence to practice medicine safely to the Board’s
satisfaction, in accord with GS 90-14 (11a). The reinstatement procedure might entail, and is not limited to, full-
scale assessments, engagement in formal training programs, supervised practice arrangements, formal testing
(Board Examination), or other proofs of competence. The Board is much more likely to require a physician who
has not maintained annual notification of reason for inactivity to undergo these competency procedures.6 Such
5Among physicians who become inactive by notifying the board, rather than failure to renew, the four most common reasons are:
primarily engaged in medical research and/or teaching, employment in a non-medical field/industry, temporarily out of the labor force,
and retirement.
6Updated requirements for medical license renewal process comes from the North Carolina Board of Medicine:
http://www.ncmedboard.org/renewals/renewal type/category/physicians.
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decisions are made on a case by case basis.
After a physician submits his/her application, the information is processed and updated in HPDS. Basic
information in the database includes an ID number to identify the physician through time (not the board license
number), gender, race, age, medical school, internship, residency, location of practice, facility type, and practice
specialty.
In total, there are 166 specialties recorded in 2003 and a total of 55 additional specialties were added through-
out subsequent years of observable data. Areas of expertise that fall under PCP labor supply, which is the focus
of this chapter, include family medicine, general internal medicine, general pediatrics and general OB/GYN.
The broader inclusion of PCP follows the guideline set forth by the AMA. Only full time (35 hours+ weekly)
PCPs who deal directly with patients are counted toward PC physician supply. Table 2.6 reports the numbers
of PCPs in the data sample in rural and urban counties. As expected, there are significantly more physicians in
urban areas than rural areas. Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that there are rural counties in NC that are
consistently without any PCPs.
3.4.3 Log Into North Carolina (County-Level Data)
I obtain county-level data from Log Into North Carolina (LINC), which combines census data from both
state and federal agencies. The 100 counties of NC differ greatly in wealth, size, and the demographics of its
residents. I link the county-level data with the location of the physician’s primary practice. The county-level
data include basic demographic variables that summarize the size, age, and race distributions of the population
in each of the 100 counties in NC. These variables include the number of unemployed, income per capita,
total retail sales, and number of industry establishments. Importantly, the county-level variables also include
characteristics of the medical care market in the county. The variables chosen reflect the potential demand for
medical care as well as medical care supply-related characteristics (i.e., number of hospital beds, number of
long-term care beds, and total number of Medicaid eligible and Medicare enrollees). Summary statistics for
available county-level data are provided in Table B.11 are averaged over the 100 counties by year. 7
3.5 Theoretical Model
3.5.1 Individual’s Problem
Consider a simple model, where the health (Hij) of individual i in county j is determined by the number of
visits to a PCP (Vij), individual’s characteristics (Xij), and unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics
(ij). Specifically,
Hij = α0 + α1Vij + α2Xij + ij (3.1)
7All dollar-valued variables are adjusted to reflect real values in year 2003 dollars.
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Taking the number of PCPs serving her area as a given, an individual’s demand for PCP visits depend on
the number of PCPs serving county j (PCj), individual characteristics (Xij), health (Hij) and unobservables
(ϑij). Visits to PCPs captures the interactions between physicians and patients because the existing literature
uses ACSC admissions to capture access to PCPs.
If the health of the individual falls below a particular threshold, H , I assume she seeks treatment at the
hospital (i.e., she is admitted or Aijt = 1). I assume an individual places a high value on life (versus death)
and would always go the hospital if H is reached. Additionally, I assume that a hospital always treats a patient
regardless of the health condition at the time of admission.
Furthermore, following a particular distributional assumption about health (i.e.,Hij ∼ F (·)), the probability
of health falling below the threshold is denoted by piij = f(Hij). The probability of going to the hospital
is decreasing in Vij until some unknown threshold ( ∂pi∂V < 0). In contrast to no treatment, a PCP is more
likely to detect an ailment and to provide treatment that deters or prevents a more severe manifestation of the
disease. However, the marginal benefit of visiting PCPs decreases over time.8 For example, an annual medical
examination is deemed beneficial by the American Medical Association and the American public with 92 percent
of Americans believing it to be an important part of their health care (Bloomfield, 2011; Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll, 2014), but the marginal benefit of PCP visits decreases as the number of visits increases.
Mathematically, the above concept can be formalized as:
pi(Hij) = P[Hij ≤ H]
= P[α0 + α1Vij + α2Xij + ij ≤ H]
= P[ij ≤ H − α0 − α1Vij − α2Xij ] (3.2)
If the individual is above health threshold, the only cost is the cost (c) of going to a PCP, where the cost per visit
is homogeneous. However, if the individual experiences any ACSC episodeHBij ≡ Hij < H , an additional cost,
C, is incurred.
Because an individuals utility depends upon the amount of the consumption goods and the individuals health,
the individual selects the number of PCP visits to maximize expected utility subject to a budget constraint that
incorporates the expenditures on the consumption goods and PCP visits along with the potential cost of hospital
care if the individuals health declines below H . To formalize the concept, individuals select the optimal number
of doctor visits Vij to maximize their utility function Uij , subject to a budget constraint where Ii is the total
8Hypochondriacs are examples of overconsumption of PCP care.
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income earned at any period which is used to pay for PCP visits (c) as well as hospital visits (C) if health drops
below the threshold H:
max
Vij
Uij = h(Hij , Cij)
subject to Ii ≥ g(Cij , piij , c, C) (3.3)
The number of hospital admissions for ACSC, which the econometricians observes, is aggregated at the count-
level,
∑
j Aij = Aj . The number of ACSC admissions is indirectly affected by the number of PCPs in the
county where the population is treated. The function g(·) is a generic function of Cij , piij , c, C that defines the
relationship between income, consumption, the probability of health falling below the threshold, the cost per
PCP visit, and the hospital cost if health falls below the threshold.
3.5.2 PCP Problem
The physician chooses their location of practice (j) based on county-level characteristics, the number of
hospital admissions (Aj), available government policy (Gj), and an unobserved component (ψij).
max
j
UPCij = p(Xij , Aj , Gj , ψij) (3.4)
Government policy (Gj) refers to the HPSA designation given to counties that exhibited the need for PCPs.
If Gj = 1, or the HPSA designation is in effect, then the county receives a physician if there are physicians
and funding available. This indicator is important in the empirical framework because it allows the model to
correctly identify the effect of physician supply on patient outcomes as measured by ACSC admissions.
To visualize the intercorrelated relationship between the patients and physicians, Figure 3.1 shows a sim-
ple theoretical relationship between ACSC admissions, the number of PCPs and government policy aimed at
changing physician supply.
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Figure 3.1: Graphical Representation of the Model
ACSCj
Hij
Vij
PCPjHPSAj
3.6 Empirical Model
3.6.1 HPSA designation and its Significance
Before I present the empirical model that assesses the causal effect of PCP supply on ACSC admissions, I
need to first address the government assignment and retraction of the HPSA designation and its exogenous effect
on the PCP supply at the county-level.
Although the state and federal government use the PCP-to-population ratio to determine whether a county
is a HPSA; the timing of the granting and removal of HPSA designation has been under scrutiny (especially the
removal process) in recent years. Since the HPSA withdrawal process is always initiated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (or an officer of similar position and power) through written notice to the county, a
county with higher than the threshold level PCP-to-population could fly under the radar if the government did not
initiate the process. Because the state government initiation of the withdrawn process is random, these counties
continue to enjoy the extra resources for PCPs. On the other hand, for counties below the HPSA threshold that
have submitted an application, the assignment timing for them is also random due to backlog and the application
process.
Since assignment and retraction can occur at any time during the year, a county is considered to have an
HPSA designation if and only if the designation has been in effect for more than six months in any given year.
For example, if county j receives HPSA designation in October of 2003 but the status was retracted in April of
2005, HPSA designation is only in effect for 2004 in my analysis but not for 2003 or 2005. This is due to the
nature of the funding process of HPSA because a county with an active HPSA status would not immediately
receive funding and would not receive any funding for at least 2 months before the actual retraction occurs.
60
The true HPSA designation date is constructed from data listed on the HRSA database,9 while the true shortage
designation is constructed from the PCP-to-population threshold from county-level data.10
To demonstrate this exogenous assignment and retraction, Table 3.1 shows that out of all year-county ob-
servations, about one-quarter of counties that have a PC shortage according to the PCP ratio did not receive the
HPSA designation in the 2002-2007 period, i.e., the sample period.11 Additionally, about one-quarter of counties
that do not show a shortage are designated as HPSAs. Therefore, there are errors (or delays) in both government
assignment and retraction of the HPSA designation. In addition, of areas that have an HPSA designation, around
90 percent of have had the HPSA designation in previous periods.12
Table 3.1: Government HPSA vs. True PCP Shortage Counties from Data
2002-2007 HPSA Not HPSA
Data-PCP Shortage 45 14
Data-No PCP Shortage 129 412
3.6.2 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
Consider an equation characterizing the causal relationship between PCPs, PCPj,t and ACSC admissions
in county j at time t:
ACSC.Countj,t = α0 + α1PCPj,t + α2Xj,t + νj,t (3.5)
Equation 3.6 controls for other county-level characteristics Xj,t and idiosyncratic error νj,t. Estimation of
the above equation using OLS with and without county-level characteristics may lead to biased estimates of α1
because physicians may be demand-driven agents that locate in areas with high ACSC presence.
Control variables are included in the equations, Xj,t, capturing the county-level characteristics from the
9To my knowledge, data on the effectiveness of the program and the number of physicians drawn into under-served counties is not
available.
10Similar to the process used by the state and federal government, I use Census data as well as state-collected databases to construct the
shortages areas.
11A similar comparison is performed for the time period between 2002-2012 and the result are the same.
12Table B.16 shows the county characteristics for counties below the physician shortage threshold of 1:3500 with and without HPSA
designation. Between the two types of counties with and without HPSA designation errors, there is no statistically difference between
county characteristics at the one percentage level. This means that counties below the HPSA threshold have the same observable
characteristics and HPSA designation is random due to different barriers, such as bureaucracy, timing, and/or unexpected press releases.
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patients region of residence such as the number of short-term care beds (i.e., hospital beds), number of long-
term care beds (i.e., nursing home beds), number of Medicare eligibles, number of Medicaid enrollees, per-capita
income, poverty level, rurality designation, and population demographics.
As described in the sections above, the HPSA designation should significantly increase the number of PCPs
on the county-level at the 1:3500 PCP-to-population cutoff, c. A way to address the simultaneity bias between
PCP supply and ACSC admissions is through the RD design. The identifying assumptions in my analysis are
that all other outcome-determining characteristics except for the number of PCPs and probability of HPSA
designation vary smoothly near the cutoff and that the outcome of interest, ACSC admissions, changes at the
cutoff only because of the induced change in PCP supply. The following section describes and tests the validity
of the identifying assumptions for this method (Trochim 1984; Hahn et al. 2001).
The advantage of using RD is that the method allows me to uncover the causal effect in a quasi-experiment
framework by comparing observations on either side of a cutoff from an exogenous intervention. Theoretically,
the policy implemented by the government increases the number of physicians at the cutoff, which in turn
decreases the number of ACSC admissions. Since HPSA designation is given by the government at a PCP-to-
population level and assignment and retraction has errors, the jump in the probability of receiving the treatment
(Gj = 1) at the cutoff is less than one. This means that the probability of government HPSA assignment does not
jump from zero to one at the cutoff, this is a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity, which is similar to a variation of
the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The basic idea for IV is that the observed
values of PCPj,t can be replaced by predicted values of PCPj,t that are related to the dependent variable but
uncorrelated with the error term.
The forcing variable used in my RD is the number of physicians in the data, and the threshold is defined
as whether or not the county should receive government assistance base on this data, PCP j,t. It varies at the
county-level because the number of threshold physicians increases as population increases and vise versa. The
dummy Zj,t measures the whether the county is a shortage area, where Zj,t = 1(PCPj,t − PCP j,t). Since the
HPSA indicator from the government depends on both the number of physicians and population, both variables
are used in the model.13 The equations estimated in the RD frame work are:
13A different model specification with a contemporaneous policy effect (Zj,t, Gj,t, PCPj,t) is also estimated, but for simplicity only
the empirical model with the lagged policy effect is shown for brevity in this section.
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1st Stage:
Gj,t−1 = α0+α1(PCPj,t−1−PCP j,t−1)+α2Zj,t−1(PCPt,j−1−PCP j,t−1)+α3Zj,t−1+α4Xj,t−1+φj,t−1
(3.6)
2nd Stage:
PCPj,t = β0+β1Ĝj,t−1+β2(PCPj,t−1−PCP j,t−1)+β3Zj,t−1(PCPt,j−1−PCP j,t−1)+β4Xj,t+µj,t (3.7)
3rd Stage:
ACSCj,t = γ0 + γ1P̂CP j,t + γ2(PCPj,t−1−PCP j,t−1) + γ3Zj,t−1(PCPt,j−1−PCP j,t−1) + γ4Xj,t + εj,t
(3.8)
where, Gj,t−1 is the lagged government HPSA designation in county j, Zj,t = 1(PCPj,t − PCP j,t) or an
indicator variable which denotes whether or not county j is below the PCP-to-population threshold, Xj,t−1 is
the list of lagged county characteristics, and Xj,t−1 is the list of contemporaneous county characteristics.
In order to accurately capture a causal interpretation of the RD design, the non-confounded assumption is
required. This assumption means that a county cannot manipulate the data in order to receive an HPSA desig-
nation and its corresponding funding. Because the government has to evaluate their own data when assigning
HPSA status to counties, the number of physicians and the population in the area is accurate regardless of the
county of application. In addition, I perform graphical analyses to test the validity of using RD. As shown
through the scatter bin diagrams (Appendix Figure A1-5), there is a clear break at the threshold PCP , but there
is no relationship between the forcing variable and other covariates.
3.7 Results
To substantiate the claim that previous research recovers biased estimates of PCP supply on ACSC admis-
sions, I use the sample data to compare the results from univariate OLS (physicians only), multivariate OLS
(includes county-level controls), and the RD method in Table B.12. Similar to the existing literature, the results
are mixed across different methods. The coefficients for the univariate OLS are positive and significant in lev-
els. Although adding additional independent variables and controlling for omitted variable bias decreases the
positive bias of the coefficient, the coefficients are insignificant in multivariate OLS. The only results that are
significant and negative (the theoretically expected result) are from the RD method. Table B.13 shows results
from the RD regression with covariates from all stages. Table B.14 further break down the categorization of
ACSC into chronic, acute, preventable and multiple conditions using RD. Additional analyses by age group,
63
race and gender are also performed to examine the heterogeneous effect of PCP on ACSC admissions.
Looking at Table B.13, the results from the RD model display a significant negative relationship between
PCP supply and ACSC admissions. A one unit increase in PCP decreases ACSC admissions by almost 148
incidences. This means an additional PCP, or an average of 3.5 percent increase in rural PCP supply, decreases
ACSC admissions by 4.2 percent on average in rural counties. In the first stage, the coefficient of the true
shortage indicator derived from PCP supply and population is significantly positively correlated with the HPSA
designation by the government but is less than one. This further substantiates the usage of “fuzzy” discontinuity
design because if a county is below the cutoff, the county is more likely to be a HPSA. In the second stage, there
is a significant positive relationship between the HPSA designation and the number of PCPs, more specifically,
a county with a HPSA designation at the threshold would have four more PCPs than its non-HPSA counterpart.
There is also a significant positive relationship between numbers of short-term care beds and ACSC ad-
missions. Short-term care beds or hospital beds are an important control as the number of beds providing the
opportunity for patients to be treated, which leads to the positive relationship. However, the indicator variable
for whether or not the county is urban or rural is not significant in our analysis. Similar to what Rickett found in
his paper, whether or not a county is rural or urban does not significantly affect the number of ACSC. Holding
economic characteristics such as per capita income and number of people below the poverty level constant, a
rural county does not differ greatly from an urban county in terms of preventable hospitalization.
Examining subcategories of ACSC, Table B.14 shows that PCP supply has the largest effect on chronic
ACSC while the effect is the smallest and insignificant with preventable ACSC admissions. Because patients
with chronic conditions require more frequent outpatient care in order to maintain their health, easy access to
a PCP prevents more ACSC admissions for those at-risk patients than for the rest of the population. Since
preventative care is more dependent on the patients willingness to care for themselves, the effect of additional
PCPs is small and insignificant on preventable ACSC. This result means that treatment for preventable ACSC
and the corresponding patient welfare is not dependent on the access to PCPs. Comparing the models with
lagged and contemporaneous policy, it is evident that lagged policy has a stronger effect on ACSC admissions
because it allows the county more time to increase its PCP supply. Thus, a county with a longer HPSA duration
is able to attract more physicians and decrease the number of ACSC admissions by a larger magnitude across all
types of ACSC.
Since prior research has shown that ACSC affects patients differently across their lifecycle, I divided the
sample into five age groups: pre-adolescent (age 0-18), adult (age 19-39), prime age (age 40-64), post-retirement
(age 65-84), elderly (age 84+). As seen in Table B.15, the effect of access to PCPs on ACSC is more prominent
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in the prime age and post-retirement age group. This finding is very different from other papers. The result
is logical, however, because aging adults are more vulnerable to limited access than their younger counterparts
since their failing health makes them more prone to be admitted to the hospital for ACSC.
When comparing the effect of physician supply across genders (shown in Table B.15), I find females benefit
more from an increase in PCPs than their male counterparts in ACSC admissions and its subcategories. Women
may make more use of their PCPs than males. I performed some analyses by race using the same dependent vari-
ables; however, no significant differences were found. This result means that the effect of access to physicians
is equally important to all races after controlling for income and other economic variables.
For robustness, I consider a window of data symmetric about the discontinuity to test whether the result is
sensitive to the bandwidth for the first and second stages. At a small bandwidth, the estimation produces similar
results and discontinuity estimates only fluctuated slightly due to the inclusion of a limited additional number of
counties at the boundary. However, because the small numbers of counties below the cutoff in the data, a larger
bandwidth size would render the estimation insignificant.
3.8 Conclusion
Since the creation of ACSC, many costly federal and state policies have been implemented to increase PCPs
in the U.S. with the aim of improving patient welfare and decreasing preventable hospitalizations. However, the
relationship between PCP supply and preventable hospitalizations (ACSC admissions) is a debated topic in the
health policy literature due to the mixed empirical results. Because the number of PCPs may affect hospitaliza-
tion for ACSC and physicians tend to locate in areas where there is a high incidence of these or any other illness,
there is a reverse causality problem in existing studies. This chapter addresses the simultaneity problem by using
timing discrepancies related to HPSA designations through RD design. Using the population of physician and
patient data from North Carolina and controlling for endogeneity, I find a significant negative relationship be-
tween PCPs and number of ACSC admissions, such that an increased access to PCPs significantly decreases the
number of preventable hospitalizations in NC. Estimates using different population groups indicates that female
patients benefit more from access to PCP than their counterparts but the effect of PCP are the same across races.
Out of the three types of ACSC patients, chronic ACSC patients benefit more from PCP presence than acute
ACSC and preventable ACSC patients.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF PHYSICIAN LABOR SUPPLY DYNAMICS
A.1 Results from Conditional Multinomial Logit
Although the existing migration literature focuses on both push and pull factors, my model focuses on push
factors (i.e., the current location characteristics that drive physician professional and geographical decisions)
with a limited set of movement alternatives. As described in the Empirical Framework of the Model section, it
is possible to model the decision problem with 100 counties in NC and their respective county characteristics.
However, the inclusion of individual-specific variables with county-level attributes would make the parameter
space computational intractable. Another disadvantage of including push factors in the existing model is the
results cannot be interpreted meaningfully in conjunction with pull factors and physicians characteristics. Al-
though the model with all counties would produce the marginal effect of pull factors, I am more interested in the
factors that drive physician to move away from a location and what types of physicians are more likely to move.
To test how pull factor and push factors affect physician decisions, I follow the random utility model, origi-
nally developed by McFadden (1974), as a baseline:
Uij = Xijβ + Ziγj + ij (A.1)
where Uij is the utility that individual i=1,2,,N receives from county j = 1, 2, . . . , J . The Xij represents a
1 × L vector of choice-specific attributes such as population, number of Medicare eligible in county j. The Zi
represents a 1×K vector of individual specific variables such as gender, and race. The baseline model assumes
that the ij follows a Type 1 Extreme value distribution. It also follows the Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives
assumption (IIA) and assumes the alternatives have the same variance.
To allow for both individual level controls and county characteristics of the number of location alternatives,
the model requires estimation of (J-1)*K parameters, where J is the number of alternatives and K is the number of
individual level controls. This method is rarely used in a model with a large choice set and cannot accommodate
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a large number of controls. In my model, the location choice set is 100 counties with 1 outside option of
moving outside of NC. There are more than twenty county characteristic variables and a large set of individual
observed characteristics over ten year periods. There are 29,908 unique physicians in the dataset, which increases
computation cost further.
Table A.1 shows the result compared with the push factors estimated without UH and with UH. Because the
model does not include any individual-level controls, a majority of the coefficients are significant but may be
biased. Nevertheless, the sign of the significant parameters is useful. Theoretically, the push factors should have
opposite effect as pull factors, i.e., places with a higher level of undesirable characteristics would be more likely
to push physicians out of the county, while counties with a lower level of the aforementioned characteristics are
more likely to draw physicians in.
Out of fifteen mutually significant variables, the majority of the variables have the same sign and only three
variables have opposite signs. Theoretically, physicians in high-population counties are more likely to move
away than those from low-population counties, and physicians should be less likely to move to high-population
than low-population counties. However, the conditional logit model shows that physicians are also more likely
to move to counties with higher populations. This contradictory result could be due to the exclusion of individual
characteristics and simultaneity bias, i.e., areas with higher population would attract more physicians and see
more physicians leaving as well.
To address this issue and avoid inclusion of a unfeasibly large set of parameters, I included only two sets of
individual-specific variables, gender and race. Table A.1 compares the results with the push factors estimated
without UH and with UH. The number of the mutually significant variables with opposite signs increases, where
a majority of the variables in the second model have opposite signs (3 variables out of 16 have the same sign).
I attempt to add in more individual-level characteristics but it is infeasible. The existing results demonstrate
that the conditional logit with only county-level controls tends to be biased, but the inclusion of several individual
characteristics does improve the results. The mixed logit model demonstrates that pull factors tend to have the
opposite effect on physician location decisions as push factors. For computation simplicity, I include only push
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effects in my model estimation.
Table A.1: Conditional and Mixed Logit Comparison
Conditional Logit
with No Exog.
Variables
Conditional Logit
with Exog.
Variables
Multinomial Logit
without UH
Multinomial Logit
with UH
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Births (1000s) 0.66*** 0.80*** -0.54*** -0.54***
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) 0.02*** -2.45*** 0.25*** 0.26***
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01** -0.01**
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) 0.002 0.34*** -0.12*** -0.13***
Population (10,000s) 0.06*** -0.07* 0.05*** 0.05***
Midlevel Practitioners -0.00 -0.05*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Registered Nurses (1000s) 0.60*** -0.25** 0.19*** 0.21***
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds
(100s)
0.08*** 0.10*** -0.06*** -0.07***
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.03*** -0.66*** -0.14*** -0.15***
Medicare Insured (10,000s) -0.03*** 1.47*** 0.01 0.02
Unemployed (100s) -0.00*** 0.02*** -0.00*** -0.00***
Pregnancies (100s) 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.35*** 0.49*** -0.09** -0.1**
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.02*** 0.10*** -0.03*** -0.03***
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.020*** -0.13*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Local Education Expenditures (10
Million $)
0.03*** -0.42*** 0.03** 0.04**
Total Education Expenditures (10
Million $)
0.05*** -0.43*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Public School Personnel (100s) 0.06*** -0.19*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Public School Personnel with MA
(100s)
-0.05*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.01
Average SAT Math (100s) -0.11*** -0.62*** -0.13 -0.06
Average SAT Verbal (100s) -0.39*** -0.05 0.12 0.07
A.2 Location and Rurality Construction
In the licensure renewal process, each active physician provides the address of his/her primary location of
practice. Physicians can also provide location of secondary or tertiary practice, business, and home. Valid
zipcodes that are not between the smallest zipcode in North Carolina (27006) and the largest zipcode in North
Carolina (28909) are coded as outside of NC. If primary location is missing, I intelligently assign a location
based on other information in the data. If available, the business zipcode replaces missing observations of
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primary location of practice. For remaining missing primary zipcodes, where facility type is provided and
unchanged between years, primary location in the previous year replaces the missing value. Home zipcode is
used to fill in the remaining missing values. In some cases, the primary location zipcode is missing but the
facility type is the same as the type listed in the secondary location that has a zipcode. In these cases, I use the
secondary zipcode to fill in the primary location. Remaining observations that are missing are not included in
the estimation sample. Only 2,518 unique physicians remain which are missing the primary location of practice
and cannot be intelligently filled in. These missing observations are not included in the research sample.
The Sheps Center and Rural Center of NC have a clear definition of rural or urban counties. However, there
is another way to categorize urban and rural designation through the usage of zipcodes instead of aggregating the
zipcodes to the county level. There are around 850 zipcodes in NC, which physicians can select as their primary
location alternative. One advantage of using zip codes to separate rural from urban areas is the precision it gives
to the model. A county contains multiple zip codes but the number of zipcodes within a county varies greatly,
as the largest county by population (Mecklenburg County) covers around 83 zip codes, while the largest county
by landmass (Robeson County) covers only 17 counties. Even within counties of the same rurality designation,
the number of zipcodes included differ in both population and landmass. Orange County, an urban county with
average landmass size, has only 9 zip codes. In all counties, regardless of its rurality designation, there are zip
codes that are densely populated while some are sparsely populated. It is likely that physicians that serve in
rural counties tend to concentrate in more populated areas. Thus, the marginal effect of county characteristics on
physician geographical and professional decisions could be different between a physician in a densely populated
zipcode and a physician in a sparsely populated zipcode conditional on the same county rurality type. Therefore,
a physician in a high-density populated area with a rural designation might behave similarly to a physician in a
high-density populated area with an urban designation than his/her rural counterparts in low population zipcodes.
Although there are multiple definitions of rurality from multiple government agencies, the most commonly
used one is the Census designation, where the agency categorizes area to either Urbanized Areas (UAs) or
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Urban Clusters (UCs) and all other areas that are not urban is considered rural.1 This definition is applied to
cities or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).2 Because the Census does not provide the border for each ur-
ban city/MSA, the designation is broad and geographically vague. Three additional definitions of rurality are
provided by the Economic Research Service (ERS) from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA):
Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, Urban Influence Code, and Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA). The first
two indices are on the county-level, and only the last one is based on zipcode. Like the MSAs, the RUCAs are
based on Census data that assigns a code to each Census Tract. Tracts inside Metropolitan counties with the
codes 4-10 are considered rural. Although RUCA codes allow identification of rural census tracts in Metropoli-
tan counties, there are some that are extremely large. In these larger tracts, the use of RUCA codes alone fails
to account for distance to services and sparse population.3 The shortcoming of the RUCA is the difficulty in
interpreting the indices and the potential changes it could cause because the census tracts tend to be fluid.
To correct for the potential issues mentioned above, I construct a rural-urban index that best fit my data.
Using the definition set forth by NC Rural Center as a benchmark, I sort the zip codes into rural and urban.4
I calculate the zipcode population density by dividing 2000 and 2010 population from the NC database by the
zipcode square mileage from decennial Census data.5
A.3 Estimation Results by Race
An additional challenge in meeting NC communities needs for physicians is to understand how the recent
influx of Hispanic and Asian immigrants combined with a large existing African American presence impacts the
1UAs contain 50,000 or more people while UC have at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people.
2The 2010 Census listed 126 urban cities/MSA in NC, while the remaining areas are rural.
3In response to these concerns, FORHP has designated 132 large area census tracts with RUCA codes 2 or 3 as rural. These tracts are at
least 400 square miles in area with a population density of no more than 35 people. Following the 2010 Census, the FORHP definition
included approximately 57 million people, about 18 percent of the population and 84 percent of the area of the USA. However, the
inaccuracy of RUCA makes it unattractive in defining zipcode rurality in my estimation.
4The NC Rural center definition is also used by Sheps Center. By their definition, a rural area has an average population density of 250
people per square mile or less, while an urban area has an average population density exceeding 250 people per square mile. The urban
designation includes both regional city and suburban areas.
5The designation uses population density with land only square mileage. I evaluate the difference between indicators, there are only
around 10 zipcodes out of 850 zipcodes that are different. The differences are due to the large water area, which could lead to potential
underestimation if total area is used but it is too small to affect my estimation.
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demand for physicians. While research has established a positive association between the number of minority
physicians and health care access and patient satisfaction among minorities, existing policies have yet to address
ways to facilitate the unmet needs of underserved communities regarding ethnic diversity through physician
mobility. Therefore, I study the determinants of physician movement within NC by race, gender, and ethnicity
of the physicians while accounting for county-level changes in demand associated with race and ethnicity.
As shown in Table 2.13, I find that African American physicians are 1.21 times more likely to change their
location of practice and 0.78 times less likely to become inactive. Conditional on moving, minority physicians
behave similarly to Caucasian physicians. However, they are significantly more likely to change facility in a
given year and work more hours of direct patient care. One plausible explanation for the differing behavior of
minority physicians is that a large minority presence increases demand for minority physicians, which results
in greater hours worked and subsequently induces an employment transition. The initial relocation of some
minority physicians may subsequently increase demand for the remaining minority physicians.
To explore the potential divergence in physician preferences by race, I estimate separate models for each type
of physicians in two ways. For each race, the first specification includes the same variables as in the benchmark
estimation. The second specification also includes the racial demographics for the physicians current county.
Table A.2 displays result from the first method and compares the FIML results across race for moving within
NC relative to not moving. I find Caucasian physicians are more likely to move if they report more hours of
direct patient care, while Hispanic physicians are less likely to move. The coefficient for the average wage is
significant for Caucasian, African American, and other physicians, but not for Asian and Hispanic physicians.
Only African American physicians are more likely to move within NC if the current area is rural. The finding
is partially congruent with the literature that African American physicians are more likely to move if they are in
lower amenity area, but they are not less likely to be burned out through working more hours. Female African
American or Asian physicians are not more likely to move than their male counterparts. Table A.3, A.4 and A.5
list results for movement and rurality outcomes across different races.
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In the second model where the racial demographics enter into estimation, Table A.6 shows some unex-
pected results. Although a higher rate African American presence does not significantly change the likelihood
of Caucasian physician movement to an urban location, a higher ratio of African Americans relative to Cau-
casians significantly decreases the probability of moving for African American physicians. In addition, Table
A.7 shows that increase in African American population does not significantly increase per period hours of direct
patient care. The finding contradicts the hypothesis that large minority presence could induce minority physician
movement due to great hours work from higher demand for services. It is more plausible that African Amer-
ican physicians are less propense to move from an area with more African American patients or that African
American patients prefer doctors of the same type as them. Due to data limitations, most of the variables are
insignificant because there is a small number of other types of minority physicians.
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Table A.2: Race Analysis For Moving within NC Relative to Not Moving
White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 0.76*** 0.92*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 0.64***
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 -0.02 -0.01**
Current Salary Rank 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
Current Rural Location 0.00 0.35*** 0.06 -0.21 0.00
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice -0.11*** -0.01 -0.12 0.18 -0.12
Hospital: ER Related 0.55*** 0.41* 0.54*** 0.71** 0.45***
Hospital: Non ER related 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.64*** 0.35*
Medical School/Parent University -0.2 -0.18 0.03 0.48 0.04
Other Facility 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.21 0.13 0.36*
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist -0.11*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.25 -0.18
Surgical specialist -0.20*** -0.20* -0.26** -0.2 -0.26**
Hospital specialist 0.13*** -0.03 -0.08 -0.37 0.24**
Other specialist 0.37*** 0.22* 0.13 -0.05 0.28*
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.06** 0.07 0.1 0.31* 0.16**
Foreign Born -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.46** 0.1
Age -0.35*** -0.49*** -0.06 -0.21 -0.28
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.66*** 1.03*** 0.03 0.38 0.54
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.39*** -0.7*** 0.03 -0.21 -0.33
Experience -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 0.02 -0.05*
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.08* 0.06 0.33* -0.16 0.15
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.01 0.18 -0.41 -0.24 -0.14
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) -0.47*** -0.67** -0.2 -1.27** -0.83**
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.01 0.14 0.11
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.02*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.14*** -0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.17***
Population (10,000s) 0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01
Midlevel Practitioners 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.01** -0.01***
Registered Nurses (1000s) 0.17*** 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.59**
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.06*** 0.01 -0.06 -0.22*** -0.07
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.19*** -0.18** 0.09 -0.12 -0.08
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.11 -0.28
Unemployed (100s) 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
Pregnancies (100s) 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.11** 0.08***
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.1** -0.33** 0.03 0.00 -0.23
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.03***
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.06*** 0.06** 0.04 0.17** 0.07*
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.04*** 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.07*
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.05*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06**
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.03
Average SAT Math (100s) -0.24 0.39 0.23 -0.34 -0.28
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 0.11 0.11 -0.17 -0.18 0.77
Primary Care Physicians 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
Medical Specialists 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0**
Surgical Specialists 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01* 0.01 0.00
Hospital Specialists 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other Specialists -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01**
Year 1.05*** 1.35*** 0.78*** 0.68* 0.82***
Year Squared -2.26*** -2.89*** -1.73*** -1.63* -1.76***
Year Cubed 1.43*** 1.82*** 1.11*** 1.12** 1.16***
Constant 20.85*** 4.2 -0.18 4.03 69.62***
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1.
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Table A.3: Race Analysis For Moving within the County to Rural Zipcode
White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 1.55*** 1.46*** 0.89** 1.73*** 1.47***
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.06** -0.04
Current Salary Rank 0.00* 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.01 0.01**
Current Rural Location 3.75*** 3.45*** 4.03*** 3.59*** 4.18***
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 0.01 0.23 0.56 0.42 -1.06**
Hospital: ER Related 0.24 0.63* -0.42 -0.57 0.7
Hospital: Non ER related -0.01 -0.15 -0.17 -0.39 -0.11
Medical School/Parent University -0.66*** -1.02* -0.38 -1.06 -0.61
Other Facility 0.31 0.23 0.34 -2.22** -0.26
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist 0.21 0.34 0.4 1.21* 0.24
Surgical specialist 0.21 0.47 -0.41 -0.09 0.38
Hospital specialist 0.29** -0.45 -0.13 1.41** -0.52
Other specialist 0.34** -0.18 -0.69 -0.81 0.00
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.01 0.18 -0.23 0.00 -0.16
Foreign Born -0.11 -0.15 0.1 -0.02 0.23
Age -0.37** -0.21 -0.1 0.81 -0.15
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.81** 0.22 0.16 -1.7 0.01
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.54** 0.02 -0.05 1.21 0.28
Experience -0.07** -0.11 -0.21** -0.37 0.01
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.09 0.73 0.88 2.33 -0.46
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) 0.00 -1.47 -1.13 -4.35 0.45
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) 0.51 -0.85 0.46 -2.32 0.55
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.17* -0.36 -0.01 0.22 1.08**
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.11*** -0.1 -0.15* -0.45** -0.12
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.04 0.13 -0.22 -0.12 -0.39
Population (10,000s) 0.06 -0.08 -0.16 0.75 0.24
Midlevel Practitioners 0.00* 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Registered Nurses (1000s) 0.49* 0.51 1.04 1.99 0.82
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.01 0.09 0.23 -0.1 0.11
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) 0.29** 0.61* 0.7 0.58 -0.06
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.11 1 -5.76*** 1.64 1.02
Unemployed (100s) 0.00 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 -0.02
Pregnancies (100s) -0.07* 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.16
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.79*** -1.27** 0.43 0.16 -1.89***
Industrial Establishments (100s) 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.09
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) -0.12*** -0.27* 0.24 -0.21 -0.18
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.56*** 0.3 0.53 -0.03 0.65*
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.2*** 0.04 -0.32* 0.2 0.07
Public School Personnel (100s) 0.13*** -0.02 0.5*** -0.36 -0.01
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.06 0.02 -0.45** 0.53* 0.06
Average SAT Math (100s) -4.5*** -5.15*** 1.99 -6.03* -6.08***
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 2.79*** 3.91** -3.04 1.29 3.51*
Primary Care Physicians 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Medical Specialists -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02** 0.00 -0.01
Surgical Specialists -0.02*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Hospital Specialists 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01 0.00 0.02
Other Specialists 0.00 0.02** 0.02 0.00 0.01
Year 1.20*** -0.23 -0.42 2.26 -0.28
Year Squared -2.55*** 0.81 -0.09 -4.5 2.15
Year Cubed 1.58*** -0.51 0.39 2.42 -1.91
Constant 25.65*** 17.2* -113.74*** 10.57 15.68*
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. The analysis for moving within the county to a
rural zipcode relative to moving within the county to an urban zipcode.
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Table A.4: Race Analysis For Moving out of the County to Urban Zipcode
White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 1.64*** 1.41*** 1.25*** 1.88*** 1.32***
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.01*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.03 -0.03**
Current Salary Rank -0.01*** 0 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.01*** 0 0.01* 0 0.01
Current Rural Location -1.47*** -1.68*** -1.28*** -1.29** -1.44***
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 0.1 0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.01
Hospital: ER Related -0.34*** -0.35 0.12 0.15 0.4
Hospital: Non ER related -0.01 -0.59*** 0.2 -0.54 0.15
Medical School/Parent University -0.18 -0.89*** -0.22 -0.77 0.29
Other Facility 0.26* -0.43 0.78** -1.03 0.22
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist 0.08 -0.08 -0.17 1.14** 0.5*
Surgical specialist -0.04 0.07 0.14 -0.72 0.36
Hospital specialist 0.18** 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.37
Other specialist 0.30*** 0.41* 0.59* 0.2 0.49
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.13** 0.03 -0.17 0.03 0.19
Foreign Born 0.04 -0.17 0.25 0.08 0.06
Age -0.25** -1.34*** -0.12 -0.29 0.11
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.49** 2.82*** 0.24 0.51 -0.38
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.3** -1.86*** -0.16 -0.27 0.39
Experience -0.08*** -0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.05
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.21** -0.37 0.03 -1.48 0.04
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.17 0.78* 0.57 4.16 -0.1
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) 0.49** 1.29* 1.23* 1.6 1.25
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.13** -0.32** -0.37** -0.09 0.12
Hospital Discharges (1000s) 0.03** 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.01
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.46*** 0.43 0.2
Population (10,000s) -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.49** 0.06
Midlevel Practitioners 0.00** 0 -0.01* 0 -0.01***
Registered Nurses (1000s) -0.76*** -0.65 -0.71 -0.67 -0.36
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) 0.12*** 0.13 0.32*** -0.02 0.09
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.18** -0.15 -0.34 0.01 -0.51*
Medicare Insured (10,000s) -0.4 -0.69 -0.52 -0.05 1.65
Unemployed (100s) 0 0 0 0 -0.01**
Pregnancies (100s) -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.23* -0.16**
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.02 0.28 1.14*** 0.84 0.1
Industrial Establishments (100s) 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.03
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) -0.09 -0.06 -0.23*** -0.07 -0.22**
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.15*** -0.28** -0.4*** 0.37 -0.24
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.13*** 0.11 0.16** -0.12 0.2**
Public School Personnel (100s) 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.11 -0.03
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.13 -0.07
Average SAT Math (100s) -3.98*** -2.87* -4.85*** -2.27 -7.9***
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 2.56*** -0.12 1.25 -1.41 4.46**
Primary Care Physicians 0.00* 0 0 0 0
Medical Specialists 0 0 0.01* -0.01 0
Surgical Specialists 0 -0.01 -0.03*** 0 0
Hospital Specialists 0 0 0.01 0 0.01
Other Specialists 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0 0
Year 0.3 -0.52 0.03 0.79 1.32*
Year Squared -0.74 0.98 -0.51 -1.99 -2.54*
Year Cubed 0.42 -0.63 0.31 1.18 1.38
Constant 14.18*** 38.3*** 17.86*** 21.63 -37.13***
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. The analysis for moving out of the county to
an urban zipcode relative to moving within the county to an urban zipcode.
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Table A.5: Race Analysis For Moving out of the County to Rural Zipcode
White Black Asian Hispanic Other
Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 0.03 -0.21 0.39 -0.9 -0.44
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07* -0.01
Current Salary Rank -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.01*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Current Rural Location 1.03*** 0.87** 1.25*** -0.39 0.53
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 0.06 -0.23 0.97*** -0.85 -0.52
Hospital: ER Related -0.31* -0.38 0.66 -3.01* 0.5
Hospital: Non ER related 0.00 0.12 0.29 -1.39* 0.26
Medical School/Parent University 0.78*** 0.07 2.42*** -2.64* 1.3*
Other Facility 0.25 -0.33 0.64 NA 0.55
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist -0.06 0.15 0.76* 2.18** -0.05
Surgical specialist -0.14 -0.51 0.01 0.11 0.69
Hospital specialist -0.04 -0.18 -0.88* 1.23 -0.33
Other specialist -0.37* -0.43 -0.05 -0.07 -1
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.12 -0.3 0.03 -0.44 0.26
Foreign Born -0.13 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.49
Age -0.2 -1.16* -0.39 1.42 0.81
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.43 2.46* 0.91 -2.64 -1.8
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.26 -1.63* -0.65 1.61 1.37
Experience -0.02 0.03 -0.42*** -0.39 -0.12
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.00 -0.41 2.93*** 3.13 1.06
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) 0.03 0.76 -5.7*** -6.71 -2.52
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) -1.78*** -1.4 0.04 -6.36* 0.84
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.94*** -0.36 -0.4 -0.31 0.75
Hospital Discharges (1000s) 0.04 0.01 0.19* -0.43* 0.08
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.52*** -0.15 -0.53 -0.29 0.04
Population (10,000s) -0.37*** 0.06 0.07 -0.28 0.17
Midlevel Practitioners -0.03*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.00
Registered Nurses (1000s) 3.31*** 0.13 0.99 6.1** 1.34
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.47*** -0.3* 0.28 -1*** -1.12***
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) 0.11 0.44 -0.61 2.19** -0.69
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.05 1.49 -1.08 0.62 -1.46
Unemployed (100s) -0.01*** -0.02* -0.03* -0.01 -0.06***
Pregnancies (100s) 0.26*** 0.02 -0.09 0.4 -0.2
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -1.28*** -0.86 0.33 -0.45 -0.72
Industrial Establishments (100s) 0.06** 0.11** 0.15*** 0.06 -0.24**
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.21*** -0.19 -0.24 0.42 0.54*
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.48*** -0.89*** -1.35*** -1.06 -0.89**
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.35** 0.65* 0.46**
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.22*** -0.33** 0.02 -0.11 0.05
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) 0.12 0.27* -0.1 -0.19 0.2
Average SAT Math (100s) -1.70** -3.01 -2.78 -0.83 -2.69
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 1.56** 3.06 1.58 0.57 1.25
Primary Care Physicians 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medical Specialists 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Surgical Specialists -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.05
Hospital Specialists -0.01*** -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04*
Other Specialists -0.05*** -0.01 -0.04** -0.09* -0.07***
Year 0.80** -1.03 -0.08 2.49 -0.67
Year Squared -2.13*** 1.85 -0.52 -5.92 1.55
Year Cubed 1.6*** -0.97 0.6 3.81 -1.17
Constant -0.4 24.71** 13.26 -20.93 247.86***
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. The analysis for moving out of the county to
a rural zipcode relative to moving within the county to an urban zipcode. Coefficients with “NA” means there are no observation
in the research sample that fits the criteria.
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Table A.6: Race Analysis with County Demographics-Movement
Move to Urban Area Relative to Not Move Move to Rural Area Relative to Not Move
Coeff SD Odds Coeff SD Odds
Caucasian
African American Percentage 0.00 0.00 1 -0.01 0.00 0.99
Asian Percentage -0.03*** 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.01
Hispanic Percentage 0.05*** 0.01 1.05 0 0.01 1
Other Race Percentage 0 0.03 1 -0.03 0.04 0.97
African American
African American Percentage -0.02** 0.01 0.98 -0.01 0.02 0.99
Asian Percentage -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.02 1.01
Hispanic Percentage 0 0.02 1 0.03 0.03 1.03
Other Race Percentage -0.15* 0.08 0.86 -0.04 0.11 0.96
Asian
African American Percentage 0 0.01 1 -0.03*** 0.01 0.97
Asian Percentage -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.02 1.01
Hispanic Percentage 0.03 0.02 1.03 -0.03 0.03 0.97
Other Race Percentage -0.05 0.07 0.95 -0.16 0.12 0.85
Hispanic
African American Percentage 0.02 0.02 1.02 -0.01 0.03 0.99
Asian Percentage 0.04 0.03 1.05 0.05 0.06 1.05
Hispanic Percentage 0.06 0.05 1.06 0 0.07 1
Other Race Percentage 0.22 0.19 1.24 0 0.23 1
Other
African American Percentage -0.01 0.01 0.99 -0.03** 0.02 0.97
Asian Percentage -0.01 0.02 0.99 -0.02 0.02 0.98
Hispanic Percentage 0.09*** 0.03 1.09 0.06** 0.03 1.07
Other Race Percentage -0.16* 0.09 0.85 0.03 0.11 1.03
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. All race ratio reported are relative to Caucasian percentage in the
county.
Table A.7: Race Analysis with County Demographics-Hours Worked
Hours Worked
Coeff SD
Caucasian
African American Percentage 0.00 0.01
Asian Percentage 0.00 0.02
Hispanic Percentage -0.03 0.03
Other Race Percentage -0.34*** 0.08
African American
African American Percentage 0.01 0.04
Asian Percentage -0.03 0.05
Hispanic Percentage -0.1 0.09
Other Race Percentage -0.59* 0.33
Asian
African American Percentage -0.02 0.04
Asian Percentage -0.04 0.05
Hispanic Percentage -0.14 0.09
Other Race Percentage -0.49** 0.25
Hispanic
African American Percentage 0.07 0.06
Asian Percentage 0.13 0.12
Hispanic Percentage 0.11 0.15
Other Race Percentage 0.6 0.39
Other
African American Percentage 0.10** 0.04
Asian Percentage 0.06 0.06
Hispanic Percentage -0.17 0.11
Other Race Percentage 0.09 0.38
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05
and ** means p ≤ 0.1. All race ratio reported are relative to
Caucasian percentage in the county.
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A.4 Additional Estimation Results
Table A.8: Estimation Results: Movement and Rurality Outcome at End of Period
Move within the County to Rural Zip. Move out of the County to Urban Zip. Move out of the County to Rural Zip.
Coeff Signif SD Odds Coeff Signif SD Odds Coeff Signif SD Odds
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.025 *** 0.007 0.975 -0.019 *** 0.003 0.981 -0.062 *** 0.007 0.940
Average Salary × Rural 0.059 *** 0.008 1.061 0.045 *** 0.007 1.046 0.078 *** 0.008 1.082
Current Salary Rank -0.008 *** 0.002 0.992 -0.005 *** 0.002 0.995 -0.004 ** 0.002 0.996
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.006 *** 0.002 1.006 0.004 *** 0.001 1.004 -0.003 0.003 0.997
Experience -0.034 0.025 0.966 -0.086 *** 0.015 0.917 -0.072 *** 0.025 0.930
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 0.056 0.127 1.058 0.200 ** 0.082 1.221 0.127 0.122 1.136
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.033 0.179 0.967 -0.169 0.123 0.845 -0.103 0.168 0.902
Current Rural Location 0.256 ** 0.115 1.292 -1.888 *** 0.111 0.151 3.726 *** 0.115 41.516
Moved in Previous Period -0.013 0.158 0.987 1.588 *** 0.078 4.892 1.544 *** 0.113 4.683
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 0.095 0.115 1.100 0.059 0.078 1.061 0.015 0.116 1.015
Hospital: ER Related -0.181 0.158 0.835 -0.099 0.092 0.905 0.342 ** 0.136 1.408
Hospital: Non ER related -0.084 0.105 0.920 -0.129 ** 0.062 0.879 -0.036 0.103 0.965
Medical School/Parent University 0.531 *** 0.179 1.701 -0.505 *** 0.089 0.603 -0.726 *** 0.176 0.484
Other Facility 0.084 0.187 1.088 0.215 ** 0.108 1.240 0.359 ** 0.165 1.432
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist 0.011 0.122 1.011 0.073 0.070 1.075 0.291 ** 0.124 1.338
Surgical specialist -0.114 0.124 0.892 -0.005 0.076 0.995 0.250 ** 0.125 1.285
Hospital specialist -0.108 0.120 0.897 0.110 0.071 1.117 0.251 ** 0.113 1.285
Other specialist -0.390 ** 0.158 0.677 0.358 *** 0.080 1.430 0.157 0.133 1.170
Female -0.114 0.088 0.892 0.074 0.048 1.077 0.018 0.081 1.018
Race (relative to Caucasian)
African American 0.012 0.137 1.012 0.152 ** 0.074 1.164 0.087 0.121 1.091
Asian -0.197 0.143 0.821 -0.112 0.074 0.894 -0.079 0.124 0.924
Hispanic -0.116 0.220 0.891 -0.193 0.129 0.825 -0.066 0.231 0.936
Other Race -0.184 0.144 0.832 -0.108 0.090 0.897 -0.184 0.147 0.832
Foreign Born 0.036 0.119 1.037 0.072 0.069 1.074 -0.012 0.118 0.988
Age -0.178 0.174 0.837 -0.308 *** 0.094 0.735 -0.368 *** 0.140 0.692
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.411 0.347 1.508 0.603 *** 0.196 1.828 0.762 *** 0.277 2.143
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.265 0.224 0.767 -0.363 *** 0.131 0.696 -0.480 *** 0.176 0.619
County Characteristics
Births (1000s) -2.066 *** 0.612 0.127 0.668 *** 0.200 1.950 0.673 0.420 1.960
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.373 ** 0.158 0.689 -0.104 ** 0.042 0.902 -0.197 ** 0.087 0.821
Retail Sale × Rural -1.034 *** 0.299 0.356 -0.749 *** 0.285 0.473 -0.896 0.338 0.408
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.103 ** 0.045 0.902 0.019 0.012 1.019 -0.044 * 0.023 0.957
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.917 *** 0.111 0.400 0.245 *** 0.040 1.277 0.088 0.069 1.091
Population (10,000s) -0.101 * 0.055 0.904 -0.005 0.018 0.995 0.000 0.041 1.000
Population × Rural 0.330 *** 0.069 1.391 0.396 *** 0.071 1.487 0.264 *** 0.070 1.302
Midlevel Practitioners -0.033 *** 0.004 0.968 -0.003 *** 0.001 0.997 -0.001 0.002 0.999
Midlevel Practitioner × Rural -0.011 0.007 0.989 -0.019 *** 0.007 0.981 0.004 0.007 1.004
Registered Nurses (1000s) 4.705 *** 0.394 110.547 -0.450 *** 0.132 0.637 0.215 0.249 1.240
Registered Nurses × Rural -1.900 *** 0.629 0.150 -0.968 * 0.543 0.380 -2.280 *** 0.597 0.102
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.581 *** 0.064 0.559 0.082 *** 0.028 1.085 0.011 0.042 1.011
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) 0.047 0.188 1.048 -0.021 0.073 0.979 0.106 0.132 1.112
Medicaid Eligibles × Rural 0.757 *** 0.232 2.132 -0.525 *** 0.198 0.592 -0.205 0.208 0.815
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.184 * 0.099 1.202 -0.114 0.279 0.893 0.080 0.132 1.084
Medicare Eligibles × Rural -0.482 0.325 0.618 -0.135 0.257 0.874 -1.322 *** 0.336 0.267
Unemployed (100s) -0.014 *** 0.004 0.986 0.002 * 0.001 1.002 0.001 0.002 1.001
Pregnancies (100s) 0.221 *** 0.053 1.247 -0.102 *** 0.017 0.903 -0.074 ** 0.036 0.928
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.793 *** 0.230 0.453 0.168 0.113 1.183 -0.489 *** 0.148 0.613
Industrial Establishments (100s) 0.017 0.018 1.017 0.028 *** 0.005 1.028 0.010 0.010 1.010
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.257 *** 0.042 1.293 -0.105 *** 0.028 0.901 -0.082 *** 0.027 0.921
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.336 *** 0.129 0.715 -0.047 0.043 0.954 0.201 ** 0.080 1.223
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.103 * 0.056 1.109 0.085 *** 0.024 1.088 -0.010 0.044 0.990
Public School Personnel (100s) 0.048 0.062 1.049 0.013 0.018 1.014 0.030 0.040 1.031
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.219 *** 0.071 0.804 -0.031 0.021 0.969 -0.031 0.048 0.969
Average SAT Math (100s) -1.016 0.641 0.362 -3.324 *** 0.493 0.036 -2.681 *** 0.556 0.068
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 1.097 0.667 2.994 1.272 ** 0.502 3.567 1.630 *** 0.579 5.106
Primary Care Physicians 0.007 *** 0.003 1.007 -0.001 0.001 0.999 -0.001 0.002 0.999
Medical Specialists 0.030 *** 0.005 1.030 0.001 0.001 1.001 -0.007 *** 0.002 0.993
Surgical Specialists -0.016 ** 0.006 0.984 -0.005 ** 0.002 0.995 -0.004 0.004 0.996
Hospital Specialists -0.006 0.005 0.994 0.002 0.002 1.002 0.010 *** 0.003 1.010
Other Specialists -0.057 *** 0.007 0.945 0.014 *** 0.002 1.014 0.004 0.004 1.004
Year 0.752 ** 0.302 2.121 0.279 0.178 1.322 0.671 ** 0.284 1.955
Year Squared -2.235 *** 0.632 0.107 -0.821 ** 0.368 0.440 -1.681 *** 0.586 0.186
Year Cubed 1.661 *** 0.396 5.267 0.480 ** 0.232 1.616 1.076 *** 0.367 2.934
Constant 5.021 3.255 16.858 *** 1.931 12.659 *** 2.655
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. All categories are relative to moving within the county to urban zipcode. Coefficients of permanent and time-varying
heterogeneity are listed in Table A.12.
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Table A.9: Estimation Results: Facility Outcome at End of Period
Solo Practice Hospital ER Hospital Non-ER
Coeff Signif SD Odds Coeff Signif SD Odds Coeff Signif SD Odds
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 0.109 0.091 1.115 0.342 ** 0.141 1.408 -0.006 0.074 0.994
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.012 *** 0.002 0.988 -0.024 *** 0.006 0.976 -0.002 0.002 0.998
Current Salary Rank 0 0.001 1 0.003 0.003 1.003 0.001 0.001 1.001
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care -0.004 ** 0.002 0.996 -0.016 *** 0.003 0.984 -0.011 *** 0.002 0.989
Current Rural Location 0.065 0.053 1.067 -0.136 0.115 0.873 -0.068 0.058 0.935
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 6.662 *** 0.167 781.73 5.811 *** 0.292 333.829 5.355 *** 0.244 211.751
Hospital: ER Related 3.247 *** 0.236 25.716 46.438 *** 0.576 1.47E+20 37.554 *** 1.13 2.04E+16
Hospital: Non ER related 3.071 *** 0.171 21.57 39.726 *** 0.838 1.79E+17 40.444 *** 1.135 3.67E+17
Medical School/Parent University -0.958 *** 0.184 0.384 1.094 *** 0.194 2.986 1.035 *** 0.114 2.816
Other Facility 3.026 *** 0.187 20.609 40.961 *** 0.584 6.15E+17 37.331 *** 1.138 1.63E+16
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist -0.017 0.051 0.983 -0.678 *** 0.149 0.508 -0.119 ** 0.053 0.887
Surgical specialist 0.029 0.052 1.03 -1.192 *** 0.155 0.304 -0.608 *** 0.06 0.545
Hospital specialist 0.205 *** 0.075 1.227 1.85 *** 0.098 6.36 1.113 *** 0.062 3.044
Other specialist 0.628 *** 0.062 1.874 0.093 0.143 1.097 0.417 *** 0.068 1.518
Individual Characteristics 1
Female -0.032 0.041 0.969 -0.276 *** 0.075 0.759 -0.175 *** 0.04 0.84
Race (relative to Caucasian)
African American 0.436 *** 0.062 1.547 0.286 ** 0.125 1.331 0.136 ** 0.063 1.146
Asian 0.398 *** 0.06 1.488 0.244 * 0.125 1.277 0.248 *** 0.059 1.281
Hispanic 0.235 ** 0.113 1.265 0.471 ** 0.188 1.602 0.194 * 0.113 1.214
Other Race 0.282 *** 0.075 1.326 0.164 0.13 1.178 0.107 0.071 1.113
Foreign Born 0.313 *** 0.057 1.367 -0.073 0.115 0.929 0.185 *** 0.056 1.203
Age 0.219 *** 0.072 1.245 0.103 0.122 1.109 0.021 0.073 1.021
Age Squared (divided by 100) -0.271 ** 0.138 0.762 -0.132 0.243 0.876 0.051 0.147 1.052
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) 0.118 0.085 1.126 0.059 0.156 1.061 -0.074 0.096 0.929
Experience 0.012 0.012 1.012 -0.007 0.022 0.993 -0.045 *** 0.012 0.956
Experience Squared (divided by 100) -0.114 ** 0.056 0.892 -0.124 0.11 0.883 0.066 0.064 1.068
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) 0.171 ** 0.074 1.186 0.232 0.152 1.262 -0.003 0.095 0.997
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) -0.205 0.167 0.815 -0.506 0.348 0.603 -0.215 0.164 0.806
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.029 0.034 0.971 -0.184 ** 0.081 0.832 -0.125 *** 0.034 0.883
Hospital Discharges (1000s) -0.004 0.009 0.996 -0.03 0.02 0.971 -0.019 ** 0.009 0.981
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.038 0.028 0.963 -0.098 * 0.056 0.907 -0.039 0.027 0.962
Population (10,000s) 0.004 0.015 1.004 -0.023 0.033 0.977 -0.055 *** 0.014 0.947
Midlevel Practitioners 0 0.001 1 -0.001 0.002 0.999 0.001 0.001 1.001
Registered Nurses (1000s) -0.067 0.099 0.935 0.423 ** 0.198 1.526 -0.019 0.097 0.981
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.006 0.02 0.994 0.031 0.04 1.031 0.103 *** 0.02 1.108
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.044 0.056 0.957 0.173 0.117 1.188 0.004 0.055 1.004
Medicare Insured (10,000s) -0.085 0.06 0.919 -0.136 0.107 0.873 -0.244 * 0.129 0.784
Unemployed (100s) 0.001 0.001 1.001 0.004 ** 0.002 1.004 0.002 ** 0.001 1.002
Pregnancies (100s) 0.023 0.014 1.023 0.059 ** 0.03 1.061 0.038 *** 0.014 1.039
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) 0.016 0.074 1.016 -0.237 0.156 0.789 -0.127 * 0.077 0.881
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.001 0.004 0.999 0.009 0.009 1.009 0.001 0.004 1.001
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.023 * 0.013 1.023 0.017 0.024 1.017 0.013 0.016 1.013
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.047 0.033 1.048 0.03 0.071 1.031 -0.009 0.033 0.991
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.02 0.018 0.98 -0.036 0.037 0.964 -0.005 0.018 0.995
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.003 0.015 0.997 -0.02 0.032 0.981 0.016 0.015 1.016
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) 0.009 0.018 1.009 0.055 0.038 1.056 0.022 0.017 1.023
Average SAT Math (100s) 0.401 0.282 1.494 -0.419 0.639 0.658 -0.174 0.304 0.84
Average SAT Verbal (100s) -0.473 0.293 0.623 0.337 0.665 1.4 0.283 0.317 1.328
Primary Care Physicians 0.001 0.001 1.001 0.002 0.002 1.002 -0.001 0.001 0.999
Medical Specialists 0 0.001 1 0.002 0.002 1.002 -0.003 *** 0.001 0.997
Surgical Specialists -0.002 0.002 0.998 -0.014 *** 0.004 0.986 -0.003 0.002 0.997
Hospital Specialists 0.001 0.001 1.001 0.004 0.003 1.004 0.005 *** 0.001 1.005
Other Specialists 0.001 0.002 1.001 0.005 0.004 1.005 0.007 *** 0.002 1.007
Year -0.431 *** 0.119 0.65 -0.887 *** 0.231 0.412 -1.033 *** 0.115 0.356
Year Squared 0.643 ** 0.262 1.902 1.943 *** 0.511 6.982 2.292 *** 0.254 9.899
Year Cubed -0.329 * 0.171 0.72 -1.18 *** 0.339 0.307 -1.412 *** 0.167 0.244
Constant -4.482 *** 1.35 0.011 -1.688 2.319 0.185 0.368 1.333 1.444
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. Coefficients of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are listed in Table A.12. The results are all relative to
the omitted facility category of group practice.
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Table A.10: Estimation Results: Facility Outcome at End of Period Continued
Medical School Related Other Facility
Coeff Signif SD Odds Coeff Signif SD Odds
Endogenous Var
Moved in Previous Period 0.09 0.163 1.094 0.09 0.111 1.094
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) -0.006 0.004 0.994 -0.026 *** 0.004 0.974
Current Salary Rank -0.008 ** 0.004 0.992 0.001 0.002 1.001
Current Hours of Direct Patient Care 0.01 *** 0.003 1.01 -0.031 *** 0.003 0.969
Current Rural Location 0.057 0.142 1.059 -0.13 0.087 0.878
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 1.139 *** 0.2 3.125 5.253 *** 0.255 191.08
Hospital: ER Related 3.622 *** 0.208 37.412 42.982 *** 0.464 4.64E+18
Hospital: Non ER related 3.941 *** 0.088 51.489 39.644 *** 1.108 1.65E+17
Medical School/Parent University 8.154 *** 0.167 3478.652 -0.415 ** 0.169 0.66
Other Facility 2.134 *** 0.174 8.453 47.741 *** 3.509 5.42E+20
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist 0.459 *** 0.092 1.582 -0.785 *** 0.094 0.456
Surgical specialist 0.442 *** 0.11 1.556 -0.693 *** 0.101 0.5
Hospital specialist 1.045 *** 0.111 2.843 0.751 *** 0.104 2.118
Other specialist 0.228 * 0.138 1.257 0.555 *** 0.084 1.741
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.027 0.073 0.974 0.317 *** 0.065 1.374
Race (relative to Caucasian)
African American -0.226 * 0.137 0.797 0.415 *** 0.093 1.514
Asian 0.222 ** 0.108 1.248 0.199 ** 0.094 1.221
Hispanic 0.465 ** 0.188 1.591 0.479 *** 0.183 1.614
Other Race -0.036 0.145 0.965 0.193 * 0.115 1.212
Foreign Born 0.162 0.103 1.176 -0.066 0.088 0.936
Age -0.061 0.143 0.941 -0.017 0.104 0.983
Age Squared (divided by 100) 0.236 0.289 1.266 0.195 0.2 1.215
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -0.182 0.189 0.833 -0.162 0.125 0.851
Experience -0.048 ** 0.022 0.953 -0.047 ** 0.018 0.955
Experience Squared (divided by 100) -0.064 0.117 0.938 0.122 0.086 1.13
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) 0.21 0.171 1.234 -0.107 0.114 0.899
Exogenous Var
Births (1000s) -1.647 *** 0.37 0.193 -0.443 * 0.254 0.642
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.051 0.094 0.95 -0.105 ** 0.052 0.9
Hospital Discharges (1000s) 0.105 *** 0.03 1.11 -0.01 0.014 0.99
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) 0.207 ** 0.082 1.23 -0.072 0.044 0.93
Population (10,000s) 0.011 0.056 1.011 -0.019 0.023 0.981
Midlevel Practitioners -0.005 *** 0.002 0.995 0 0.001 1
Registered Nurses (1000s) 1.24 *** 0.277 3.455 0.132 0.166 1.141
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.179 *** 0.058 0.836 0.039 0.032 1.04
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.193 0.136 0.825 -0.095 0.086 0.909
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.323 ** 0.159 1.381 0.023 0.157 1.023
Unemployed (100s) 0 0.002 1 0.002 0.001 1.002
Pregnancies (100s) 0.096 *** 0.032 1.1 0.068 *** 0.021 1.07
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) 0.246 0.199 1.279 -0.292 ** 0.116 0.747
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.023 ** 0.012 0.977 -0.008 0.006 0.992
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) -0.124 *** 0.035 0.883 0.012 0.022 1.012
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.029 0.093 0.971 0.08 0.052 1.084
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.075 0.047 1.078 -0.024 0.027 0.976
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.024 0.035 0.977 -0.015 0.023 0.985
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) -0.017 0.044 0.983 0.009 0.028 1.009
Average SAT Math (100s) -1.484 ** 0.726 0.227 -0.245 0.429 0.783
Average SAT Verbal (100s) 0.971 0.709 2.64 0.443 0.45 1.557
Primary Care Physicians 0.002 0.001 1.002 -0.002 0.001 0.998
Medical Specialists 0.003 ** 0.002 1.003 -0.003 ** 0.002 0.997
Surgical Specialists -0.004 0.004 0.996 0.001 0.003 1.001
Hospital Specialists -0.003 0.003 0.997 0.004 ** 0.002 1.004
Other Specialists 0.006 0.004 1.006 0.003 0.003 1.003
Year 1.447 *** 0.251 4.249 -0.313 * 0.175 0.731
Year Squared -3.001 *** 0.597 0.05 0.669 * 0.383 1.951
Year Cubed 1.662 *** 0.417 5.267 -0.396 0.251 0.673
Constant -40.37 *** 1.389 0 -0.016 2.006 0.984
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. Coefficients of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are listed
in Table A.12. The results are all relative to the omitted facility category of group practice.
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Table A.11: Estimation Results: Hours of Direct Patient Care at Beginning of Period
Coeff Signif SD Odds
Current Average Salary (10,000 $) 0.018 *** 0.006 1.018
Average Salary × Rural 0.017 * 0.010 1.017
Current Salary Rank 0.003 0.003 1.003
Previous Hours Worked 0.334 *** 0.005 1.396
Experience -0.279 *** 0.050 0.756
Experience Squared (divided by 100) 1.344 *** 0.300 3.834
Experience Cubed (divided by 10,000) -1.582 *** 0.495 0.205
Current Rural Location 0.689 *** 0.201 1.991
Moved in Previous Period -0.615 0.428 0.541
Facility (relative to Group Practice)
Solo Practice 0.618 ** 0.285 1.855
Hospital: ER Related -0.578 0.372 0.561
Hospital: Non ER related 0.794 *** 0.290 2.211
Medical School/Parent University 0.785 * 0.402 2.192
Other Facility -4.207 *** 0.466 0.015
Specialty (relative to Generalist)
Medical Specialist 0.471 ** 0.224 1.602
Surgical specialist 0.601 * 0.309 1.824
Hospital specialist -3.548 *** 0.334 0.029
Other specialist -0.991 *** 0.285 0.371
Individual Characteristics
Female -3.506 *** 0.151 0.030
Race (relative to Caucasian) 1.000
African American 1.782 *** 0.223 5.939
Asian -0.027 0.210 0.973
Hispanic 1.107 *** 0.373 3.025
Other Race 0.308 0.240 1.360
Foreign Born 1.163 *** 0.211 3.200
Age -0.490 0.514 0.613
Age Squared (divided by 100) 1.630 1.053 5.106
Age Cubed (divided by 10,000) -1.741 ** 0.698 0.175
County Characteristics 1.000
Births (1000s) -1.330 *** 0.416 0.264
Gross Retail Sales (Billion $) -0.275 *** 0.072 0.760
Retail Sale × Rural -1.329 *** 0.499 0.265
Hospital Discharges (1000s) 0.052 ** 0.021 1.053
Acute Care/Hospital Beds (100s) -0.146 * 0.078 0.864
Population (10,000s) 0.106 *** 0.031 1.112
Population × Rural 0.355 *** 0.113 1.426
Midlevel Practitioners -0.015 *** 0.002 0.986
Midlevel Practitioner × Rural 0.009 0.009 1.009
Registered Nurses (1000s) -0.632 ** 0.289 0.531
Registered Nurses × Rural -0.395 0.855 0.674
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds (100s) -0.011 0.053 0.989
Medicaid Eligibles (10,000s) -0.419 *** 0.126 0.658
Medicaid Eligibles × Rural -0.680 ** 0.277 0.507
Medicare Insured (10,000s) 0.812 *** 0.212 2.253
Medicare Eligibles × Rural -0.747 0.536 0.474
Unemployed (100s) -0.016 *** 0.002 0.984
Pregnancies (100s) 0.116 *** 0.034 1.123
Per-capita Income (10,000 $) -0.636 *** 0.205 0.530
Industrial Establishments (100s) -0.008 0.011 0.992
Older Population (65+) (1,000s) 0.042 0.038 1.043
Local Education Expenditures (10 Million $) -0.309 *** 0.075 0.734
Total Education Expenditures (10 Million $) 0.167 *** 0.041 1.182
Public School Personnel (100s) -0.117 *** 0.032 0.890
Public School Personnel with MA (100s) 0.045 0.039 1.046
Average SAT Math (100s) 2.532 *** 0.778 12.583
Average SAT Verbal (100s) -4.712 *** 0.803 0.009
Primary Care Physicians 0.000 0.002 1.000
Medical Specialists 0.002 0.002 1.002
Surgical Specialists 0.020 *** 0.004 1.020
Hospital Specialists 0.013 *** 0.003 1.013
Other Specialists -0.012 *** 0.005 0.988
Year -8.578 *** 0.408
Year Squared 14.018 *** 0.724
Year Cubed -6.875 *** 0.391
Constant 49.396 *** 8.189
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. Coefficients of
permanent and time-varying heterogeneity are listed in Table A.12.
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Table A.12: Estimation Results: UH Coefficients
Estimated Permanent Mass Points Estimated Time Varying Mass Points
2 3 4 2
Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error Coeff Std. Error
Activity and Movement
Move within NC 0.565 0.160 0.600 0.157 0.464 0.161 -1.314 0.038
Move out of NC 0.550 0.229 0.542 0.204 1.323 0.223 45.418 0.654
Inactive 1.490 0.287 0.175 0.283 0.444 0.305 -2.476 0.367
Rurality and Movement
Move within the County to Rural
Zip.
0.456 0.399 0.398 0.382 -0.051 0.395 -0.204 0.129
Move out of the County to Urban
Zip.
0.138 0.248 0.529 0.229 0.048 0.242 -0.723 0.067
Move out of the County to Rural
Zip.
-0.246 0.366 0.374 0.328 0.099 0.352 -0.856 0.120
Facility
Solo Practice -7.942 0.346 -8.210 0.345 -7.945 0.375 -4.290 0.690
Hospital ER -8.083 0.438 8.862 0.415 9.796 0.466 26.531 1.396
Hospital Non-ER -30.969 0.345 -31.590 0.338 -30.770 0.358 -37.626 0.043
Medical School Related 6.570 0.398 8.289 0.385 7.714 0.419 5.219 1.196
Other facility -28.061 0.433 -28.610 0.435 -28.306 0.489 -3.380 0.555
Hours of Direct Patient Care -11.00 0.699 2.116 0.698 12.997 0.751 -1.919 0.199
Estimated Probability Weight 0.137 0.612 0.212 0.899
A.5 Results from Policy Experiment Comparing Between Zipcode and County Level Shocks
Table A.13: Wage Experiments
All Male Female
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Benchmark 8.21 15.55 10.85 20.73 7.27 13.68
Increase salary of all rural county by
$200,000 in all years
7.95 15.15 6.93 13.10 10.75 20.76
Increase salary of all rural zipcode by
$200,000 in all years
7.97 15.16 10.74 20.58 6.96 13.18
Increase salary of all rural county by
5% in all years
7.25 14.51 6.38 12.58 10.38 19.96
Increase salary of all rural zipcode by
5% in all years
7.29 14.39 9.79 19.48 6.34 12.44
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Table A.14: Midlevel Practitioners and RN Experiments
All Male Female
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Benchmark 8.21 15.55 10.85 20.73 7.27 13.68
Increase midlevel practitioner in rural
county by 5% in all years
9.50 16.84 8.38 14.67 12.51 22.59
Increase midlevel practitioner in rural
zipcode by 5% in all years
10.54 18.46 13.68 23.94 9.33 16.33
increase RN in rural county by 5% in
all years
7.08 15.13 6.16 13.16 10.49 20.33
increase RN in rural zipcode by 5% in
all years
7.59 14.89 10.24 20.25 6.57 12.81
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Table A.15: Midlevel Practitioners and RN Experiments
All Male Female
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Prob of Moving
after 1 year
Prob of Moving
after 2 year
Benchmark 8.21 15.55 10.85 20.73 7.27 13.68
Increase Medicaid in rural county by
10% in all years
10.03 17.10 8.82 14.96 13.30 22.81
Increase Medicaid in rural zipcode by
10% in all years
11.71 19.52 14.91 25.23 10.46 17.26
Increase Medicare in rural county by
10% in all years
9.98 17.24 8.78 15.07 13.09 22.82
Increase Medicare in rural zipcode by
10% in all years
11.79 19.70 14.84 25.05 10.59 17.57
Note: Percentage change in probability is calculated as the relative change between the simulated data without the policy and the simulated data with the policy.
Table A.16: Comparing Physician Characteristics Across Policy Simulations in All Counties
Stay in the Same Zipcode
Variable Benchmark
100K Salary
Increase
5% Salary
Increase
5% RN
Increase
5% Midlevel
Increase
Medicaid with
Salary Increase
Female(%) 24.70 24.71 24.68 25.28 24.99 24.70
Age 50.00 50.01 50.03 49.47 49.77 50.01
Experience 16.50 16.50 16.53 16.05 16.11 16.45
Caucasian (%) 74.39 74.39 74.48 74.4 74.38 74.43
African American(%) 7.58 7.56 7.56 7.58 7.62 7.59
Asian(%) 9.84 9.81 9.75 9.81 9.82 9.77
Hispanic(%) 2.33 2.35 2.34 2.34 2.33 2.35
Other Race(%) 5.85 5.88 5.86 5.87 5.84 5.87
Foreign Born(%) 8.83 8.84 8.83 8.94 8.88 8.86
Generalist (%) 36.47 36.44 36.58 35.31 35.81 35.97
Medical Specialist(%) 16.75 16.85 16.71 17.72 17.09 16.92
Surgical specialist(%) 21.66 21.69 21.61 21.64 21.86 21.94
Hospital specialist(%) 18.24 18.18 18.36 18.33 18.30 18.37
Other specialist(%) 6.89 6.84 6.73 7.01 6.94 6.80
Move within NC
Benchmark
100K Salary
Increase
5% Salary
Increase
5% RN
Increase
5% Midlevel
Increase
Medicaid with
Salary Increase
Female(%) 27.58 27.55 28.03 24.53 28.27 28.48
Age 48.62 48.59 48.31 50.75 47.99 47.91
Experience 15.23 15.21 14.97 17.09 14.68 14.63
Caucasian (%) 65.63 65.76 65.65 65.68 65.7 65.51
African American(%) 10.75 10.78 10.87 10.6 10.44 10.86
Asian(%) 12.02 12.17 12.20 12.37 12.18 12.32
Hispanic(%) 3.31 3.23 3.14 3.28 3.41 3.25
Other Race(%) 8.29 8.07 8.14 8.07 8.28 8.07
Foreign Born(%) 10.09 10.08 10.19 9.16 10.22 10.34
Generalist (%) 37.37 37.44 37.21 40.17 35.90 36.12
Medical Specialist(%) 13.76 13.86 14.20 13.38 14.57 14.61
Surgical specialist(%) 16.14 16.07 16.16 18.57 16.53 16.38
Hospital specialist(%) 23.84 23.88 23.6 20.87 24.07 23.90
Other specialist(%) 8.89 8.74 8.83 7.00 8.93 8.99
Note: Aside from age and experience, all variables are reported in percentage.
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Table A.17: Comparing Physician Characteristics Across Policy Simulations in Rural Counties
Stay in the Same Zipcode
Variable Benchmark
100K Salary
Increase
5% Salary
Increase
5% RN
Increase
5% Midlevel
Increase
Medicaid with
Salary Increase
Female(%) 22.21 22.33 22.38 23.42 22.53 21.88
Age 51.73 51.69 51.67 50.82 51.71 52.14
Experience 17.73 17.68 17.63 16.81 16.87 17.89
Caucasian (%) 73.51 73 73.52 72.95 73.32 73.28
African American(%) 7.83 8.02 7.96 8.09 7.92 8
Asian(%) 9.36 9.67 9.33 9.44 9.52 9.39
Hispanic(%) 2.40 2.62 2.52 2.57 2.48 2.59
Other Race(%) 6.91 6.69 6.67 6.95 6.76 6.74
Foreign Born(%) 9.25 9.47 9.32 9.92 9.43 9.17
Generalist (%) 44.36 44.11 44.08 43.07 44.67 43.2
Medical Specialist(%) 11.95 12.05 11.86 12.63 11.68 11.53
Surgical specialist(%) 20.12 20.23 20.51 19.4 19.23 20.71
Hospital specialist(%) 18.05 18.11 18.39 18.91 18.64 18.98
Other specialist(%) 5.52 5.49 5.15 5.98 5.78 5.57
Move within NC
Benchmark
100K Salary
Increase
5% Salary
Increase
5% RN
Increase
5% Midlevel
Increase
Medicaid with
Salary Increase
Female(%) 24.64 24.63 25.24 21.34 25.74 26.38
Age 50.55 50.51 50.01 51.77 49.66 49.32
Experience 16.64 16.6 16.09 17.77 15.64 15.42
Caucasian (%) 63.5 63.48 64.52 64.75 63.92 63.61
African American(%) 11.72 10.92 11.42 10.93 10.62 11.66
Asian(%) 11.38 11.63 11.11 11.65 11.76 11.57
Hispanic(%) 3.61 4.12 3.48 3.51 3.76 3.48
Other Race(%) 9.79 9.86 9.47 9.16 9.94 9.68
Foreign Born(%) 10.59 10.60 10.84 9.73 11.36 11.24
Generalist (%) 44.62 44.4 45.79 43.27 43.54 43.81
Medical Specialist(%) 9.73 10.19 10.11 12.11 10.68 10.30
Surgical specialist(%) 14.99 14.97 14.74 19.07 14.27 14.13
Hospital specialist(%) 23.64 23.52 22.41 19.61 24.2 24.37
Other specialist(%) 7.02 6.93 6.95 5.93 7.32 7.39
Note: Aside from age and experience, all variables are reported in percentage.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFYING THE EFFECT OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY ON
AMBULATORY CARE SENSITIVE CONDITION ADMISSIONS
B.1 Tables and Figures
Table B.1: ICD-9 Codes for Ailments
Ailment ICD-9 Code Subcategory
COPD 490,491,492,492,494 Chronic
asthma 493 Chronic
diabetes 250 Chronic
epilepsy 345 Chronic
congestive heart failures 428 Chronic
hypertension 401.9 Chronic
pneumonia 495,486 Acute
tuberculosis 011 Acute
UTI 599 Acute
hypoglycemia 251.2 Acute
cellulitis 682.9 Acute
hypokalemia 276.8 Acute
ulcer 531,532 Acute
severe ENT Infection 381,461,462 Acute
Gangrene 785.4 Preventable
Influenza 487 Preventable
Malnutrition 262,263 Preventable
Table B.2: Compare Urban and Rural Ratio of ACSC Occurrences
Chronic Acute Preventable ACSC
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
2003 0.4485 0.5173 0.1491 0.1709 0.0164 0.0183 0.5014 0.5766
SE 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008
2004 0.4555 0.5346 0.1563 0.1811 0.0200 0.0221 0.5110 0.5958
SE 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008
2005 0.4635 0.5422 0.1626 0.1836 0.0190 0.0207 0.5179 0.6005
SE 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008
2006 0.4630 0.5350 0.2032 0.2310 0.0183 0.0203 0.5352 0.6132
SE 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008
2007 0.4648 0.5395 0.2100 0.2352 0.0184 0.0223 0.5396 0.6173
SE 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008
All values are significantly different from each other by T-test with p-value < 0.01.
85
Table B.3: Breakdown of Percentage of ACSC Related Ailments-By Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Chronic
COPD 11.44 11.74 12.15 12.15 12.01
Asthma 4.82 5.01 5.17 5.17 5.21
diabetes 16.95 17.35 17.56 17.56 17.72
epilepsy 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.28 1.14
congestive heart failure 10.65 10.99 11.14 11.14 10.7
hypertension 28.14 29.08 29.66 29.66 28.08
Acute
Pneumonia 5.25 5.39 5.5 5.5 5.55
TB 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
UTI 6.93 7.44 7.74 7.74 8.28
hypoglycemia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.12
cellulitis 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
hypokalemia 3.85 4.23 4.45 4.45 4.57
ulcer 0.79 0.8 0.76 0.76 0.7
severe ENT infection 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.3
Preventable
gangrene 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.24
influenza 0.05 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.11
malnutrition 1.42 1.48 1.51 1.51 1.64
Percentage recorded is the ratio between number of ACSC diagnosis
and the total number of admitted occurrences in the data.
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Table B.6: Cost Comparison of ACSC related Ailment Groups-By Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Chronic
COPD 17699.28 19220.6 20809.9 22277.11 23664.31
12908.41 14299.77 15352.12 16614.69 17779.7
Asthma 12517.99 14108.15 15145.56 16514.95 18045.53
13504.05 14917.85 16062.65 17329.68 18510.69
diabetes 15645.98 17086.62 18306.75 19640.66 20933.54
13009.57 14413.38 15526.94 16785.26 17959.27
epilepsy 18618.88 19035.5 20783.76 23073.99 19649.29
13441.76 14866.27 16001.73 17270.08 18473.07
congestive heart failure 20392.26 22321.84 24169.95 25843.68 27120.58
12629.61 13957.81 14992.61 16239.46 17452.32
hypertension 15137.63 16641.14 17891.58 19329.09 20524.17
12798.17 14154.09 15223.91 16457.49 17690.99
Acute
Pneumonia 20149.83 22230.98 23349.99 25211.73 27230.24
13085.65 14458.63 15588.16 16831.49 17972.8
TB 21436.82 27721.97 23118.23 23793.63 27707.28
13453.62 14873 16012.98 17284.74 18483.61
UTI 19359.64 21241.69 22394.14 24265.36 25443.79
13017.18 14365.68 15479.91 16681 17858.48
hypoglycemia 10440.65 12599.8 14888.65 15151.56 16304.38
13459.6 14879.58 16016.36 17289.34 18489.05
cellulitis 19461.42 23224.65 21803.64 26163.12 26881.4
13454.27 14873.44 16012.3 17282.01 18481.42
hypokalemia 14440.35 15491.79 16293.76 17198.65 18438.16
13417.14 14850.13 16002.22 17198.65 18488.74
ulcer 21092.07 21565.54 22712.28 23771.67 26163.5
13395.89 14823.36 15964.07 17239.21 18432.06
severe ENT infection 11304.07 11739.53 13283.68 13168.21 14148.34
13464.27 14887.64 16024.25 17299.98 18499.63
Preventable
gangrene 28889.64 32824.3 32979.94 36274.37 38886.79
13414.87 14827.06 15969.04 17236.96 18436.58
influenza 11586.65 10599.37 12656.83 12700.83 13721.51
13457.41 14892.4 16021.8 17293.71 18491.61
malnurtrition 34623.63 36180.78 39931.73 42519.73 44267.34
13152.59 14557.62 15648.33 16903.06 18057.25
1) All values are significantly different from each other by T-test with p-value < 0.01,
except: 2005 hypoglycemia, and 2006-2007 hypokalemia.
2) The unit is in American dollars, unadjusted for inflation.
Table B.7: Days Spent in Hospital Between ACSC Groups
ACSC Non-ACSC Chronic Non-Chronic Acute Non-Acute Preventable Non-
Preventable
Multiple
Group
Single
Occurance
2003 5.599167 3.770023 5.374571 4.165467 6.993167 4.319793 12.07049 4.610974 7.320229 4.404401
2004 5.572837 3.794888 5.351183 4.202596 6.969316 4.322532 10.86724 4.629164 7.236624 4.4093
2005 5.539003 3.807022 5.314939 4.215805 6.867257 4.325259 11.61377 4.620437 7.12657 4.406441
2006 5.47654 3.802978 5.237554 4.224148 6.768758 4.293979 11.61976 4.586538 6.994237 4.385909
2007 5.44715 3.833426 5.192786 4.270915 6.724831 4.298615 11.70948 4.583595 6.931318 4.393161
All values are significantly different from each other by T-test with p-value < 0.01.
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Table B.8: Days Spent in Hospital Between ACSC Groups-By Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Chronic
COPD 6.22 6.19 6.18 6.07 5.99
4.55 4.57 4.56 4.54 4.55
Asthma 4.41 4.49 4.47 4.74 4.74
4.76 4.77 4.77 4.38 4.46
diabetes 5.35 5.28 5.21 5.10 5.04
4.61 4.65 4.66 4.64 4.66
epilepsy 5.81 5.56 5.55 5.78 5.25
4.74 4.76 4.75 4.72 4.72
congestive heart failure 6.77 6.72 6.69 6.54 6.50
4.50 4.52 4.52 4.50 4.51
hypertension 4.81 4.76 4.69 4.62 4.52
4.71 4.76 4.79 4.76 4.80
Acute
Pneumonia 7.42 7.49 7.38 7.28 7.29
4.59 4.60 4.60 4.57 4.57
TB 10.96 11.96 9.66 9.01 10.07
4.74 4.76 4.76 4.72 4.72
UTI 7.89 7.89 7.77 7.70 7.55
4.50 4.51 4.50 4.46 4.47
hypoglycemia 4.26 4.80 4.79 4.59 4.73
4.74 4.76 4.76 4.72 4.72
cellulitis 7.89 8.86 8.39 8.29 8.28
4.74 4.76 4.76 4.72 4.72
hypokalemia 5.59 5.49 5.38 5.21 5.18
4.70 4.73 4.73 4.70 4.70
ulcer 6.69 6.40 6.29 6.14 6.31
4.72 4.75 4.75 4.71 4.71
severe ENT infection 4.74 4.48 4.61 4.33 4.31
5.01 4.76 4.76 4.72 4.73
Preventable
gangrene 10.91 11.21 10.99 10.72 10.81
4.72 4.74 4.74 4.70 4.71
influenza 4.37 4.43 4.82 4.41 4.52
4.74 4.76 4.76 4.72 4.72
malnurtrition 12.63 12.44 12.71 12.56 12.37
4.63 4.64 4.64 4.60 4.60
1) All values are significantly different from each other by T-test with p-value < 0.01, except: 2004-2007 hypoglycemia, 2005 ENT,
and 2003, 200-2007 influenza
Table B.9: ACSC Admission Counts by Race and Gender
Male Female
Caucasian 938,392 1,289,655
Africian American 269,819 411,077
Asian & Native American 27,431 46,634
Others 68,064 123,600
Missing 917,786 1,388,517
Total 2,221,492 3,259,483
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Table B.10: Summary Statistics: Distribution of PCPs overtime
All Counties
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2003 72.65 127.77 1 724
2004 74.01 130.49 1 755
2005 76.60 136.91 1 798
2006 79.84 145.72 0 866
2007 80.93 150.29 0 917
Total 75.88 135.64 0 917
Urban Counties Rural Counties
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
2003 155.20 188.98 28.20 23.35
2004 158.26 193.07 28.65 23.76
2005 164.60 202.82 29.22 25.00
2006 173.63 216.02 29.34 25.56
2007 176.40 223.61 29.52 26.62
Total 165.62 203.12 28.98 24.73
Table B.11: County-Level Characteristics Over Time
2002 2003 2004
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Acute Care/Hospital Beds 209.3 331.6726 205.58 322.8209 205.9 323.3702
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds 430.82 485.4096 435.12 489.852 437.76 494.4008
Medicare Insured 9645.34 10456.3 9543.82 10312.49 9218.33 9810.277
Medicaid Eligibles 13900.28 14867.86 14472.83 15810.28 15123.6 16887.73
Per Capita Income 24908.76 3972.207 25391.19 3866.148 26908.7 4050.725
Population 83217.26 113962.2 84151.05 116357 85379.02 119095.3
2005 2006 2007
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Acute Care/Hospital Beds 203.38 323.6265 203.29 323.5224 203.22 325.9257
Long-term Care/Nursing Home Beds 439.87 496.0169 442.48 501.7826 442.1 500.1409
Medicare Insured 9736.58 10437.41 10102.38 10898.74 10353.02 11275.16
Medicaid Eligibles 15637.51 17859.86 16444.57 19068.42 16820.28 19671.09
Per Capita Income 28262.77 4186.869 29359.51 4544.235 30825.97 4762.536
Population 80466.68 108082.4 88836.95 127656.8 90827.23 132444.2
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Table B.12: Comparing Univariate, Multivariate, and RD Regression Results
Dep Variable: Number of ACSC Admissions
Coefficient Std. Error P-value
Univariate OLS 39.51 *** 0.96
Multivariate OLS -0.52 1.81
RD -148.32 *** 67.25
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1. Multivariate regression included all independent
variables used in stage 2 of IV regress.
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Table B.13: RDD Result
Independent Variable Estimate Signf Robust Std. Error
Number of Prime Care Physician -148.323 *** 67.253
Third Stage (Dep: ACSC Admission)
Number of Short Term Care Beds 3.870 *** 0.674
Number of Long Term Care Beds -2.252 *** 0.537
Number of Medicare Eligibles 0.352 *** 0.028
Number of Medicaid 0.199 *** 0.022
Per Capita Income -0.016 0.011
Number of people under poverty line -0.030 0.032
Metropolitan 43.006 106.556
Population 0.048 *** 0.022
Second Stage (Dep: Prime Care Physicians)
Pred. HPSA 4.409 *** 2.225
Number of Short Term Care Beds 0.010 *** 0.004
Number of Long Term Care Beds -0.002 0.004
Number of Medicare Eligibles 0.001 0.000
Number of Medicaid 0.002 * 0.000
Per Capita Income 0.0001 0.000
Number of people under poverty line -0.001 *** 0.000
Metropolitan -1.117 0.931
Population 0.0003 *** 0.000
First Stage (Dep: HPSA Designation)
Shortage Indicator 0.603 *** 0.091
Number of Short Term Care Beds -0.001 *** 0.000
Number of Long Term Care Beds 0.001 *** 0.000
Number of Medicare Eligibles 0.0000 *** 0.000
Number of Medicaid 0.0000 0.000
Per Capita Income 0.0000 *** 0.000
Number of people under poverty line 0.0000 0.000
Metropolitan -1.6457 0.7890
Population 0.0000 0.000
N 500
Adjusted R2 0.982
Note: *** means p-value is less than 0.01, ** means p ≤ 0.05 and ** means p ≤ 0.1.
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Table B.16: County Characteristics of Shortage Counties with and without HPSA Designation
Shortage Area with HPSA Designation Shortage Area without HPSA
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Short Term Care
Beds
8.59 18.47 6.79 19.38
Number of Long Term Care
Beds
126.12 85.56 64.93 77.23
Number of Medicare Eligibles 2,515.92 1,603.98 2,036.36 1,192.24
Number of Medicaid Enrollees 4,686.47 2,985.12 2,808.43 2,594.76
Per Capita Income ($) 24,950.18 3,371.80 25,813.71 2,990.50
Number of People under
Poverty Level
3,457.49 2,102.96 2,988.36 1,791.45
Metropolitan (%) 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.39
Note: Aside from Number of Medicaid Enrollees, which is significant only at the 5% level under the t-test, the remaining variables are
not statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% levels.
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Figure B.1: Scatter Bin Regression - Against ACSC (1st Polynomial and 4th Polynomial)
96
Figure B.2: Scatter Bin Regression - Against GovPolicy (1st Polynomial and 4th Polynomial)
97
Figure B.3: Scatter Bin Regression - Difference between PC and PC threshold against number of PC in both
contemporaneous and lagged time
98
Figure B.4: Scatter Diagrams with regression For other covariates
1) Short Term Care Beds
2) Long Term Care Beds
3) Medicare Eligibles
99
4) Medicaid Eligibles
5) Per Capita Income
6) Poverty Level
100
7) Population
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